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Overview of the thesis
This thesis presents four essays which illustrate the process of making microeconomic
inferences on economically relevant parameters characterizing individual welfare and
decision making using individual and household data. This process is usually thought
of as a three step approach, which starts by drawing on economic theory to focus on
the parameters of interest. Given economically relevant parameters have been defined,
the second step of the process consists of obtaining an "ideal" data set which is rich
enough to identify and estimate these parameters. It is often the case in economics and
other observational sciences that this "ideal" data set is not available, which can often
jeopardize identification of some or all parameters. In this case, researchers typically
try to circumvent the problem by either imposing assumptions on individual behavior,
or by getting better data. Of course, in the former case, the credibility of the inferences
depend on the realism and falsifiability of the assumptions made, while the feasibility
of the latter approach depends on whether or not one can actually collect richer data.
Once identification has been achieved, the final step consists of using existing or new
estimators in order to extract the relevant information from the data. Because several
estimators, under different set of assumptions, can successfully extract this informa-
tion, empirical researchers have a degree of freedom to choose the model which is
estimated. Fortunately, economic theory often restricts the set of possible econometric
models, and model testing procedures and goodness of fit evaluations can sometimes
be used to test the validity of maintained assumptions, providing a way to increase the
reliability of the inferences made.
The essays in this thesis are presented as independent chapters, and analyze the
characteristics and decision rules of immigrants who leave their host country, evaluate
1
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the determinants of trust and trustworthiness for different sub-groups of the popula-
tion, and estimate household equivalence scales. In each chapter, identification of the
economic parameters of interest is achieved either by imposing realistic and falsifiable
assumptions on individual behavior, or by collecting better data. Taken together, these
essays develop a wide range of econometric models in order to estimate the parame-
ters of interest, from discrete choice static and panel data models, to structural dynamic
programming models, nonparametric models, and semiparametric models. Although
issues of identification and estimation are discussed in all essays, their relative weight
differs across chapters.
The first two chapters deal with outmigration, defined as the departure of immi-
grants from their adoptive homeland. During the last decade, economists have increas-
ingly become aware that outmigration is not only a world wide phenomena, but the
magnitude of the outflows in some cases be sizeable. Within Europe, the case of Ger-
many stands out prominently, with an estimated half a million immigrants leaving the
country every year (OECD, 2001). Understanding the motivations for these departures
is an important input for policy makers who must forecast outflows of immigrants in
order to adjust their immigration policies to fit the future needs of their labor markets,
and to assess the economic performance of immigrants who remain in the country.
Several theories have been proposed to explain these movements, some of which pre-
dict that the relatively successful immigrants leave their adoptive country, while other
theories predict that most of the departures are by unsuccessful immigrants. Some-
what surprisingly, there has been little structural inference on the preferences, tastes,
and other primitives characterizing immigrants which would allow to validate these
theories, help us understand the type of immigrants which self-select themselves out of
the country, and would enable interesting policy experiments. Given that the param-
eters of interest are clearly defined, the lack of inferences can be traced back to data
limitations. The body of data typically available to conduct these inferences usually
consists of a sample of immigrants, reinterviewed in subsequent years.  This type of
survey data rarely contains indicators of immigrants departures. Instead, what is em-
pirically observed is attrition from the panel, caused either by immigrant departures
or by non-response of the non departing immigrants. Thus, the data fails to directly
identify the parameters of interest, and gathering the missing information would in
many instances be prohibitively costly.
Chapter 2 illustrates the case where a realistic and testable assumption can be im-
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posed on individual decision making in order to nonparametrically identify several
important economic parameters characterizing the performance of outmigrants, no-
tably the conditional outmigration probability, the conditional work probability, and
the conditional expected labor market earnings of outmigrants. The assumption re-
quired is the existence of immigrants whose observable characteristics are such that
their outmigration probability is close to zero. Equally important, because panel at-
trition is, contrary to outmigration, always observable in survey data, these results
open up the possibility to make inferences which were not previously possible due to
data limitations. To extract the parameters of interest from panel attrition, the chap-
ter presents a limited dependent variable model for panel data with random effects,
where labor market earnings are estimated jointly with both work and outmigration
equations. An important aspect of the empirical model is that it allows to test the key
identification assumption in a simple way. Indeed, the results indicate that a substan-
tial number of immigrants have an outmigration probability close to zero. The main
results from the empirical analysis show that outmigrants are negatively selected in
terms of labor market earnings and work propensities. Throughout the sample pe-
riod, we find that the gap in economic performance of immigrants who remained in
Germany and those who outmigrated was sizeable, with outmigrants having work
probabilities and expected labor market earnings respectively 18% and 30% lower than
immigrants who remain in Germany. Finally, the estimated outmigration rate in the
sample population is found to be roughly 3% per year.
Chapter 3 presents and estimates a structural dynamic model where immigrants
simultaneously choose their work and migration durations over their life-cycle. Con-
trary to existing life-cycle models, immigrants are allowed to face uncertainty about
their future labor market outcomes all through their migration experience. Because
outmigration is rarely observed at the individual level, structural estimates of life-
cycle models of outmigration have yet to be formally tested. This chapter draws on the
identification results of the previous chapter and extends the approach to a dynamic
programming setting. This allows to make direct structural inferences on outmigration
life-cycle behavior without having to observe outmigration and to test the validity of
several existing life-cycle theories. Our findings confirm the hypothesis recently put
forward in the literature that outmigration is not entirely driven by earnings differen-
tials. Specifically, we find that immigrants who feel integrated in the German society,
those who are satisfied with their income, and those who return money to their na-
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tive country are less likely to outmigrate. The results of this chapter also highlight
the importance of incorporating the work decision along with the migration duration
decision of immigrants, a feature previously ignored in the outmigration literature. It
is found that both immigrants with relatively low and high labor market experience
have a greater overall utility to outmigrate, which suggests a U shape relation between
labor market experience and the overall utility to outmigrate. The decrease in overall
outmigration utility starting from low levels of experience is consistent with increas-
ing psychological costs associated with outmigration, keeping earnings constant. The
convex increase in overall outmigration utility predicted to occur beyond 25 years of
labor market experience is consistent with progressively lower psychological costs of
outmigration and diminishing returns to labor market experience in the host country.
These results are interesting given that most of the outmigration literature has ana-
lyzed outmigration within an earnings differential paradigm which, by construction,
orient policy recommendations towards measures aimed at influencing the earnings
differential between the host and the new destination. The results of this chapter do not
rule out the important role played by labor market earnings in determining migration
durations. However, they do indicate that the shape of the migration duration distri-
bution is also determined by past work decisions, indicating that much can be gained
from an analysis in which labor supply decisions are endogenously determined. The
chapter additionally presents a series of policy simulations aimed at evaluating how
the migration duration distribution of immigrants is affected by government policy
aimed at speeding up economic integration of newly arrived immigrants.  It is found
that measures aimed at improving access to the host labor market improving acquisi-
tion of language skills, and lump-sum taxation will have little impact of the migration
duration distribution of a representative immigrant, but have substantial influence of
migration duration decisions of low income immigrants.
In chapter 4, the economic parameters of interest are the determinants of individual
trust and trustworthiness propensities. Compared to the previous two chapters, iden-
tification of these parameters is achieved, not by imposing a priori assumptions on the
individual decision maker, but by using better data in the form of a random sample
of the Dutch population who play an experimental game measuring individual trust
and trustworthiness propensities, both of which have been shown to be strongly corre-
lated with economic growth. The identification approach is novel in many respects and
makes two important contributions. First, it is one of the first "laboratory" economic                        I
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experiments which uses a sample of subjects which are representative of a nation's
population. Substantial heterogeneity in trust and trustworthiness behavior is found
in the Dutch population. Of particular interest are the roles played by the education
level and the age of subjects. The chapter shows that both of these background char-
acteristics play an important role in determining trust and trustworthiness, although
they affect trust and trustworthiness in very different ways. While the inverted U
shape relation between trust and age usually found in the literature is also present
in our data, with trust increasing until the age of 30 and decreasing beyond that, the
relation between trustworthiness and age is found to be U shaped, with trustworthi-
ness decreasing until the age of 30, and rising again beyond that point. The education
patterns are also very different. We find an inverted-U shape relation between edu-
cation and trust, and a U shape relationship between education and trustworthiness.
Such opposite influences of background characteristics are puzzling insofar as it is typ-
ically assumed that trust and trustworthiness go hand in hand, which would suggest
that both are determined in similar ways. As a second main contribution, the chapter
presents a new and simple way to compare the informational content of both revealed
(experimental) and stated (survey) trust measures. The literature has until now as-
sessed the validity of survey trust questions by testing whether or not they predicted
well experimental trust. One of the main messages of the chapter is that this method of
validation has been given too much attention, primarily because the predictive power
of survey measures is intimately linked to the sample used, the amount of background
information available on the subjects, and the experimental design. It is shown that by
carefully selecting samples and designs, experimenters increase their odds of finding
either a low or high predictive power of the survey trust measure. Thus, despite that
contrary to the existing literature the survey trust measure used in this chapter predicts
well trust in the experiment, this is not taken as evidence validating the use of survey
trust questions. With regards to the informational content both measures carry on the
determinants of trust, the differences are compelling. It is shown that education has an
inverted-U shape relation with experimental trust while it does not correlate at all with
answers to the stated trust question. In contrast, religion correlates well with answers
to the stated trust question, but not at all with experimental trust.
In stark contrast, chapter 5 presents a example where stated responses provide a
simple solution to identification problems which cannot be overcome using data on re-
I vealed actions. Household equivalence scales can broadly be defined as the additional
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income which should be given to a household with a specific composition of adults and
children to reach the same level of welfare than a reference household. These quantities
are important for public policy concerning welfare benefits and child allowances, and
have also been used to analyze income inequality within and between countries and
for the analysis of poverty. The traditional approach to estimation of equivalence scales
uses consumer demand systems, relying on variation in expenditure on commodities
across families with different composition. Pollak and Wales (1979) and Blundell and
Lewbel (1991) demonstrated that consumer demand data alone is not rich enough to
nonparametrically identify the level of the equivalence scales. In this chapter, the fail-
ure to identify levels using revealed consumption choices is overcome using stated
responses to questions on satisfaction with income, which directly reveal a cardinal
measure of consumer utility. Stated answers to such questions provide empirical re-
searchers with a discrete and ordered response variable, usually analyzed using or-
dered probit and linear regression models. The emphasis of the chapter is to recover
estimates of the level of equivalence scales for German households using a broad range
of estimation procedures, from the usual ordered probit and linear regression models,
to more recent nonparametric and semiparametric models which weaken parametric
assumptions of linear and ordered probit regression models. Given the broad range
of possible estimators, the chapter uses consistent ways of testing each underlying
model assumption against general forms of mis-specification. The main findings of
the chapter are that ordered probit models are rejected, while several semiparametric
estimators are not. Despite this, estimates of the equivalence scales are found to be ro-
bust across models. Finally, it is found that equivalence scales monotonically increase
with the number of children for low and middle income households, but are found to
be relatively flat for high income households.
Collectively, these essays present ways to overcome identification problems in mi-
gration, experimental economics, and measurement of household equivalence scales.
In each chapter, illustration of the approaches required that they be applied either to
very specific countries, institutional settings, and choice environments. However, the
usefulness of these essays goes beyond these applications, and provide means for a
significant number of extensions. The identification strategy proposed in chapter 1
opens up the possibility to do research on the economics of outmigration in practically
any country with an ongoing panel surveying immigrants. Because outmigration is
a worldwide phenomena, this avenue of future research is particularly relevant in or-
7
der to improve our understanding of the flows of human capital taking place across
the globe. Moreover, because this strategy is relatively general, it can easily be ap-
plied to analyze any form of migration movements, from the departures of natives,
to movements of individuals within a country The results presented in the first two
chapters of this thesis show that such extensions have a promising future. The thesis
also showed that one can now successfully make population inferences on behavior in
experimental games. While the thesis has shown that inferences based on survey re-
sponses can in some cases differ remarkably from those based on revealed preference
data collected from experiments, it has also been shown that survey data remains a
useful source to identify economic parameters related to measures of household sat-
isfaction. More generally, it is hoped that this thesis has also demonstrated that the
combination of survey and experimental methods has the potential to provide useful
insights in many different games, settings, and populations, which will undoubtedly
deepen our understanding of individual and household decision making in the years
to come.
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Chapter 2
Identification and Estimation of
Economic models of Outmigration
using Panel Attrition
2.1 Introduction
The widespread and often sizeable flows of immigrants leaving their adoptive home-
lands, which we will refer to as outmigration, have recently received a lot of attention.
The case of Germany is a particularly revealing example, with an estimated yearly
outflow of half a million immigrants over the last decade (OECD, 2001). Several the-
ories have been put forward to motivate outmigration movements. Theories based
on earnings differentials between the current and new destination (Harris and Todaro,
1970), higher marginal utility of consumption in the home country (Djajic and Mil-
bourne, 1988), high returns to human capital investments in the host country (Dust-
mann, 1993), information dissemination (Stark, 1995), credit market rationing in the
native country (Mesnard, 2001), and several sociological factors such as family uni-
fication, health satisfaction, feelings of being integrated in society (Stark, 1998) , and
the quality and productivity of an immigrant's social network (e.g. Carrington, Detra-
giache and Vishwanath, 1996).
These theories do not trivially predict a specific composition of departing immi-
grants. It could be the case for example that economically successful immigrants with
a relatively higher marginal utility of consumption in their native country might opt
to leave despite relatively lower earnings in that country, while persistently unsuccess-
9
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ful immigrants might find a worthwhile to keep on searching for better labor market
prospects and move to a new destination. The lack of a clear-cut theoretical prediction
concerning the economic performance of outmigrants complicates the design of im-
migration policies which are often tailored around the notion that labor market equi-
libriums may be affected by outmigration flows of non-randomly selected workers.
Careful forecasting of the quality of the migration flows is thus necessary if immigra-
tion policies are to meet the future needs of the labor market. Additionally, recent
theoretical and empirical evidence has suggested that measures of economic progress
of immigrants in their host country can be adversely affected by selective outmigration
(Schultz, 1998, and Edin, LaLonde, and Aslund, 2000). Policies aimed at improving the
labor market integration of its immigrant population may thus also be misguided if it
relies on these potentially biased measures of immigrant assimilation.
In this chapter, we are interested in testing competing explanations of outmigration
decisions while at the same time assessing the robustness of measures of economic as-
similation to outmigration flows. We do so by estimating a limited-dependent variable
panel data model where labor market earnings, work decisions, and outmigration de-
cisions are jointly determined and depend on earnings differentials, family unification,
credit market rationing, health satisfaction, and feelings of being integrated in the host
society. Unobservable characteristics such as an immigrant's ability or the quality and
productivity of his social network are incorporated in the model as individual specific
unobserved heterogeneity components. The general error structure of the model al-
lows to test whether outmigrants are self-selected in terms of labor market earnings
and in terms of work status. The model also allows to assess the impact of outmigra-
tion selection on estimates of measures of economic assimilation rates. Compared to
existing empirical models of outmigration (see below), our model has the advantage
of both incorporating the decision to work in a natural way and characterizing the
relationship between work status and outmigration.
Estimation of our model requires panel data on immigrants followed over a rela-
tively long period of time. As Dustmann (2002) recently pointed out, interesting empir-
ical analysis of outmigration decisions is limited by the fact that data sets rarely contain
information on outmigration decisionsi. Rather, they typically contain information on
whether immigrants fail to be successfully reinterviewed in subsequent waves, which
may or may not be due to selective outmigration. Existing empirical evidence on the
economic performance of outmigrants is pretty much tied to the strategy used to iden-
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tify the economic parameters characterizing the performance of outmigrants without
observing outmigration decisions. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) identify the direction
of outmigration earnings selectivity by comparing the skill composition of specific co-
horts over time. Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2000) estimate the parameters of the earnings
function of immigrants who remain in the country, controlling for non-random outmi-
gration selectivity by matching cross-section data sets and longitudinal social security
earnings records. These approaches are not without their own limitations-they do not
identify the level of earnings of outmigrants, census and earnings records often have
little information on both the human capital level and sociological characteristics of
migrants which are required to test outmigration theories 2, they do not easily allow
migration duration decisions to depend on unobserved characteristics such as inher-
ent ability or the quality of an immigrant's social network which, at least on theoretical
grounds, are important determinants of migration durations.
In this chapter, we present conditions under which the outmigration probability,
the work probability, and the expected labor market earnings of outmigrants are, con-
ditionally on observable characteristics, nonparametrically identified from survey data
with sample attrition. The cornerstone of our identification approach consists of using
panel attrition as a proxy variable for outmigration, and subsequently separating at-
trition which is not due to outmigration movements from real outmigration decisions.
Our approach overcomes several of the shortcomings of earlier approaches used to
identify the economic performance of outmigrants. First, our approach is to our knowl-
edge the first one which has the potential to provide nonparametric identification of the
economic performance and movements of outmigrants. Second, because the approach
proposed uses survey panel data instead of census data, unobserved heterogeneity
can easily be introduced in the model. Third, the approach is general enough to be
applied to any country with an ongoing panel of immigrants (examples of countries
with such panels are Canada, Mexico, Germany, and the United-States.) and can be
easily extended to estimate many different types of economic models of outmigration.
An example of this flexibility is our ability to analyze the interaction between earnings,
work, and outmigration decisions in a unified framework which was not previously
possible without observing actual migration decisions. Finally, the estimator proposed
is simple to apply, and is similar in spirit to estimators proposed to deal with misclassi-
fication of a discrete dependent variable (e.g. Hausmann, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton,
1998).
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We estimate our model using the public use file of the GSOEP. We use data on
native Germans as a reference group to compute earnings assimilation rates for our
immigrant sample. We show how the availability of a sample drawn from the native
population has the additional advantage of providing a natural way to test some of the
identifying assumptions of the model. We estimate the annual outmigration rate in our
sample to be roughly 3% per year over our time horizon. Our simulation results indi-
cate that average log earnings of outmigrants remained roughly 18% lower than those
of immigrant stayers, a clear indication that outmigrants are drawn from the bottom of
the income distribution. Moreover, outmigrants are shown to have work probability
25% to 45% lower than that of immigrant stayers over the period considered. Finally,
we do not find that assimilation rates are particularly sensitive to outmigration, which
contrasts with existing results found in the literature.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents our approach
to identify the economic parameters of interest. Section 2.3 presents the econometric
model used to model outmigration in conjunction with the work decision and labor
market earnings. Section 2.4 presents the data used in the chapter. Section 2.5 discusses
the empirical results of the model and tests for the presence of outmigration bias.  It
further presents some simulation results used to evaluate the fit of the model and to
quantify the economic performance of outmigrants. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2   Identification of outmigration parameters
Each immigrant of a population living in the host country is characterized in a given
time period by the vector  (w, p, ru, x, z, s) where w denotes his potential labor mar-
ket earnings conditional on characteristics x, p is a binary variable taking a value of 1
when the immigrant works and whose outcome is conditioned on a vector of observ-
able characteristics z, ru is a binary indicator taking a value of 1 when the immigrant
outmigrates in the next time period and we condition this outcome on a vector of char-
acteristics  s. We define X  as the vector of all distinct elements of  (x, z, s).   We are
interested in making inferences on Pr (p = 1 lru  =  1, X), conditional work probability
of an outmigrant, and on E {wlp = 1, ru =  1, X}, the conditional expected earnings of
outmigrants. The inferential problem consist of identifying these quantities when, in-
stead of observing outmigration, we observe a proxy variable ro, panel attrition, which
takes a value of 1 when the immigrant leaves the panel in the following period. Out-
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migration and attrition are related because an immigrant who leaves the country must
also leave the panel with probability 1.3
We illustrate the identification problems for the case where we want to make infer-
enceson E{wlp  = 1, ru  = 1.X}. However, all results extend directly to identification of
Pr (p =  liru  =  1, X).4 The conditional expected labor market earnings of immigrants
who leave the panel in the next time period can be expressed, using iterated expecta-
tions, as
E{wlp = l.ro = 1,X}  =  E{wlp =l, r° =l, ru =l,X} ·Pr(ru =llro = 1,X)
+E{wlp = 1,78 = 1,ru = O. X} · Pr(ru = 0170 = 1. X)
=    E {wlp = 1, ru = 1, X} ·Pr (ru = 1 lro = 1, X)
+E {wlp = 1, ru = 0, X} · Pr (ru = Olro = 1, X) (2.1)
where the second equality follows from the fact that once we know if an immigrant left
or not the country, observing whether he left of not the panel does not contain any addi-
tional information on the earnings of this immigrant conditional on X.5 An immediate
consequence of equation (2.1) is that using panel attrition as a proxy variable for outmi-
gration in itself will give biased and inconsistent estimates of the conditional earnings
of outmigrants.  This is so because the conditional expected earnings of immigrants
who leave the panel will in general be a weighted average of the conditional expected
earnings of outmigrants mixed with the conditional earnings of immigrants who re-
main in the host country. The mixing probabilities control the size of the bias. The key
parameter is Pr (ru = Olr° = 1, X), which represents the probability that an immigrant
stays in the the host country given that he is observed to leave the panel. The higher
this probability, the higher will be the bias. If every immigrant who leaves the panel
also leaves the country, r° would perfectly measure outmigration, Pr (ru  = Olr° = 1, X)
would be equal to zero, and the bias would be zero.
Next, we follow the same steps to derive the conditional expected earnings of im-
migrants who remain in the panel
E{wlp = 1, ro = O,X} = E{wlp = 1, ru = 1, X}·Pr(ru =llro = O, X) (2.2)
+E{wlp = 1, ru = 0,X} ·Pr (ru = Olro = O, X)
Because an immigrant cannot be observed to have left the country given he is observed
to be in the panel, Pr (ru  =  1 Ir°  = 0, X)  = 0, Pr (ru  = 0 Ir°  = 0, X)  =  l and (2.2) simpli-
fies to
E{wlp = 1,r  = O,X} = E{wip = 1, ru = 0,X} (2.3)
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which indicates that the conditional earnings of immigrants who remain in the panel
coincides with the expected earnings of immigrants who remain in the host country,
and it follows that E {wlp = 1, ru  = 0, X} is nonparametrically identified from data on
immigrants in the sample. Substituting (2.3) in (2.1) we obtain
E{wlp = 1,f = 1,X} = E{wip = 1, ru - 1, X}·Pr(ru =llro = 1, X)
+E{wlp = 1, ro = 0, X} ·Pr (ru = Olro = 1. X)
which can be solved in terms of E {wlp = 1, ru  = 1, X}, the parameter we hope to iden-
tify,
E{wlp=l, ru=l,X} = E{wlp=l, ro -1, X} ·Wi(X)-1
-E{wlp = 1,t - 0, X}· Wo (X) Wi (X)-1     (2.4)
Equation (2.4) shows that the conditional expected earnings of outmigrants can be ex-
pressed as a weighted average of two conditional expectations which are identified
from the data. If the weights can be identified, then the conditional earnings of outmi-
grants will be identified. Applying Baye's rule, the weights are given by
Wo (X) = Pr (ru= Olt =1, X)
=   Pr (ro = 1lru = 0, X) Pr (ru = OIX)
Pr (r° = 1 IX)
Wl (X) = Pr (ru = 1 lro = 1, X)
-    Pr (P  =  1 1 r u  -  1  X)
Pr (ru  =  1 IX)
v                    '         , Pr ( r° = 1 IX)
=1
Pr (ru  =  1 IX)
Pr (ro = 1IX)
Pr (r°  =  1 IX) is identified  from the attrition  data. What remains  to be identified  is
Pr (ru IX) and Pr (ro = 11ru = 0, X). It is clear assumptions must be placed on the data
generating process to identify the relationship between the observable attrition indica-
tor r° and the unobservable outmigration indicator ru. To simplify the notation, we will
denote a10 (X)  E Pr (r° =  1 lru  = O. X) Using the law of total probability, the attrition
probability can be expressed in general terms as
Pr (ro = 1IX) = alo (X) + 11 - alo (X)] · Pr (ru = lIX) (2.5)
and the probability of remaining in the sample as
Pr (r° = OIX) =1- {alo (X) t[l- trio (X)] Pr (ru = 1IX)} (2.6)
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Several assumptions can be imposed on the data generating process in order to identify
both alo (X) and Pr (ru = 1IX).
Assumption Al a10 (X) = alo 2 0
Proposition 2.1. If Al holds and there exists a X such that Pr (ru = 1 IX)  = 0.
E {wip = 1, ru = 1, X} is nonparametrically ident(Red.
Proof. Given the foregoing discussion, it suffices to establish that the conditions of
the Proposition identify the weights Wo (X) and Wi (X).  From (2.5), it follows that
Pr (r° = 1IX)  = 0:10 which identifies 0:10 from limit observations satisfying Pr (ru  = 1 IX)  =
0.  Given a lo is identified, Pr (ru  =  1IX) is identified from (2.6), which implies that the
weights Wo (X) and Wo (X) are both nonparametrically identified.                            0
Proposition 1 shows that if attrition which is not due to outmigration is random in
the population (Al), all important economic parameters characterizing outmigration
behavior can be recovered from the data if there exists a sample of permanent migrants;
i.e. immigrants whose outmigration probability is close to zero. In practice, this does
not seem to be a strong requirement, especially for western countries where permanent
migration is known to occur at a very large scale (OECD, 2001). Note that in practice,
Al needs not to hold if attrition which is not related to outmigration does not vary in
the population (i.e. if the variance V (trio (X)) . 0). This can be verified for example by
computing marginal effects from binary choice regressions on attrition outcomes for a
sample of individuals who by construction do not outmigrate, and test if these effects
are small. Natives living in the host country is one example of a sample not prone to
outmigration.
If attrition which is not due to outmigration is believed to be related to observable
factors which induce sufficient variation in the attrition process across individuals,
nonparametric identification of the economic parameters of outmigrants requires some
exclusion restriction.
Assumption A2 alo (X) = 0:10 (Xi) 2 0 where X = (XH, X6)'
Proposition 2.2. IfAZ holds and there exists a X; given Xi such that Pr (ru = 11Xl, XS)  =
0,
E {wlp = 1, ru = 1, X} is nonparametrically ident(/ied
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proof·  Fora given X =  (X;, X4):a10 (X)  = alo (Xl) from A2. Using Pr (ru = 11Xi, X;)  =
0, the subsample of immigrants (X;,Xi')' identifies 0: 10 (Xl ) from (2.5). Given c:10 (Xl)
is identified, Pr (ru = 1IX) is identified from (2.6), which implies that the weights Wo (X)
and Wo (X) are both nonparametrically identified.                                                          0
Partly because attrition and outmigration are very different processes, finding real-
istic exclusion restrictions which satisfy the requirements of Proposition 2 is not very
restrictive. Usually outmigration is modelled as a life-cycle event, influenced by poor
labor market performance, integration feelings, credit rationing in the home country
and age at immigration. Whether attrition which is not due to outmigration is related
to all these factors seems a priori unlikely, given that part of the survey non-response is
generally based on respondents refusal to continue working with the survey agencies.
2.3 Parametric model and estimation method
In this section, we develop and estimate a parametric model which allows us to extract
outmigration behavior from panel attrition. The choice of a parametric model is moti-
vated by our desire to model selection into work and outmigration as a decision based
on individual specific unobserved heterogeneity.  We are not aware of any existing
semiparametric technique which would allow us to estimate the system of equations
presented below.
We have a measure of N immigrants in period 1, where immigrant i remains in
the panel for Ti periods. For each immigrant i, we observe in period t, whether he
pvorks pit, his monthly labor market earnings e(wit), and his attrition status r;, in the
next period. The log of the potential labor market earnings is assumed to be generated
by a log linear earnings equation
Wit= 4,0 + Vil + ElI (2.D
where B are unknown parameters, Yii is an unobserved time invariant individual spe-
cific component of income while ElI represents a stochastic shock. These labor market
earnings are only observable when an immigrant works. The work decision pit is as-
sumed to be generated by a latent process
pi = Z<,8 +11,1 + 4 (2.8)
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where 0 are unknown parameters, 11,2 is an unobserved component of work and 4
represents some stochastic shock to the work propensity. Participation is determined
by the observation rule pit  =  1 [pi > 0].  When pit  = 1, earnings wit are observed.
Both   and Zl can be thought of capturing immigrants unobserved ability to generate
higher earnings and to find jobs. They can also be thought of as including unobserved
family background characteristics and preferences for work and leisure. Finally, an
immigrant's unobservable outmigration propensity r is assumed to be determined by
another latent process
ri = s;,7 + 4,3 + 2 (2.9)
where 7 are unknown parameters, 4,3 captures the individual specific attachment to
his native country and 4  is a stochastic shock. The triplet {,li, 111·'13} is assumed to
be observed by the immigrant who takes it into account when making his decisions
but it is not observed by the econometrician. Let rM = 1 [ri > 0] be the decision rule
governing the true outmigration decision in period t + 1. Outmigration r;; is unobserv-
able. In our empirical application, we assume that Al holds6 and express the attrition
probability as
Pr (4 = lisit)  = a1O + [1 - Kio] I Pr (r# = lIsit) (2.10)
Equation (2.10) is the sample counter part of equation (2.5).7
The earnings, work and outmigration outcomes are not likely to be independent of
each other. This will not be independent if, for example, immigrants who find work
very easily and/or who earn a high income are more reluctant to outmigrate. The
unobserved heterogeneity components 7,1,11,2 and 4,3 can be treated either as fixed con-
stants or as random variables. The main advantage of the fixed effect approach is that
it does not require that included explanatory variables be strictly exogenous to the un-
observed heterogeneity components ('1 , '1 , '1 )· However, estimation of fixed effects
in nonlinear models remains today a sizeable complication, with very little guidance
in the choice of models (see the recent review of Arellano and Honord, 2001). A second
drawback of fixed effect estimation is that by treating the unobserved heterogeneity
components as fixed, cross equation correlations which drive selection into work and
outmigration based on unobservable individual characteristics are not identified. As
the present chapter is mainly concerned with selection issues, fixed effect estimation
would limit our insights in the type of selections present in the data. We therefore in-
troduce these dependencies by assuming that the stochastic time-invariant effects are
independent and identically normally distributed over time with mean 0 and covari-
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ance matrix
4     p:.25,5,     PY,35" 5,
0 =     ·       4     P2420,20,3
2
-.           993  -
where 4 denotes the variances of the unobserved heterogeneity components, and p5·
denotes their correlations.8 These correlations are indicative of whether or not immi-
grants self-select themselves into work and into outmigration based on their unobserv-
able individual characteristics. A significant and positive p .2 indicates that individuals
who are more likely to work are also more likely to have higher earnings, give observed
characteristics. p  1 has a similar interpretation and is indicative of outmigration bias.,-
This coefficient will be negative (positive) if immigrants who have a higher probabil-
ity of outmigrating have below (above) average monthly earnings. Finally, PL can be
interpreted as measuring outmigration bias in the work decision and whose sign has a
similar interpretation.
Finally, we assume  that the vector  [el, 4,4]'  is  i.i.d normally distributed  with
mean 0 and covariance matrix
-                          -
2    E-     2aw Pl,2"W pl,3gw
E=     ·       1       pb
1
where qi is the variance of log earnings, while the variances of the unobserved stochas-
tic shocks entering the work and outmigration equations are set to 1 for identification
purposes. Contemporaneous correlations between the three stochastic components are
captured by the correlation coefficients P ,2 Pf,3 and p6J·
To simplify the presentation of the likelihood function, we divide the observable
characteristics of immigranti into a  set Yi   =   {Pit, 4, wit · Pit } il  of dependent vari-
ables,  a set Xi  =   {xit, zit, sit } ii of exogenous variables,  and a vector vi   =   (qil, '1 , 'li)
containing unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. Moreover, we denoteby g(·,  ·. · lili)
the trivariate normal density, conditional on the random effects. Numerical approxi-
mation of the likelihood function proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the likelihood
function is computed conditional on the unobserved individual characteristics. This
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first step density is given by
fc Cy,Ixi,qi; B. 8,7, r, x1O)
Tirff=  Il /   /   4 (1- rlt) (1- trio)    g(p;„riA, wit;El,li) dr;,
t=i ./Qi, ./Ci, l J -00
CO                                    fo
+41   f   g(PA, rii, wit:ElI/i) dr;t .+-0:10  11     g (PA, r,$, wit; Elqi)  dr;,     dp;; drvit0                                                                J -00
The case where outmigration is perfectly observed follows by setting a10 equal to 0.
The sets it and it define the domain of integration over the wage and work spaces and
vary over time as individuals make different choices in each period according to the
following table
Integration domains in period t
Qi:     Cit
Work                      -               [0.co)
Not Work    (-co, 00)     (-co,0]
Income is integrated out in waves where individuals do not work. The integration
domain for the work propensity follows from the work decision rule. In the second
step, the unconditional likelihood function is obtained by integrating out the random
individual effects over R3
f (yilxi; 4, 0,7,li, Cl,o:10)  =   f   f (yiIX,·,1/i; 4,0,7, E, alo) h (qi; fl) dui
JR3
where H denotes the trivariate normal cumulative distribution function with mean
vector 0 and covariance matrix O.
To solve the numerical integration problem, we approximate the integral by a sim-
ulated mean: a sequence of r = 1,2,..., R i.i.d.
draws 11)) =  (11,1('), 42('),119('))
is taken
from the multivariate normal distribution H at a given value of 0.9 For each draw, the
conditional likelihood function fc is evaluated. The partial MSL estimator consists of
replacing f by the simulated mean
  Ell, log    R El, fc  (Y,IXi,111'); 4,8,7,E,ir,o)11
The resulting estimator is inconsistent for fixed R but will be consistent if R tends to
infinity with the number of observations N. If  /N/R - 0 and with independent
drawings across individuals, the method is asymptotically equivalent to maximum
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likelihood (Train, 2003). Finally, we model labor market earnings and work decisions
of Germans using similar specifications of equations (2.7) and (2.8) and estimate the
parameters using the simulation techniques described above.
2.4 Data
The data used in this chapter is taken from the public use file of the GSOEP and covers
the 1985-1999 period. Until 1990, the GSOEP consisted of two samples, A and B. Sam-
ple A consists of households with German heads living in former West-Germany  Sam-
ple B consists of an sample of immigrants living in West-Germany coming from coun-
tries which had signed a bilateral migration agreement with Germany in the 1950s and
1960s namely Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.10 Data on speaking fluency,
integration feelings of immigrants, intended length of stay and remittances directed to
their family living outside Germany were given in consecutive waves from 1984 until
1987. Starting in 1987, this information was gathered every other yean In order to keep
constant the time period between observations, we have chosen to keep the 8 waves
of the panel where detailed information on immigrants was available, each spanned
by one year, starting in 1985 and ending in 1999. Following the literature measuring
the economic assimilation rate (e.g. Borjas, 1999a), we restrict our attention to males
between 18 and 64 years of age during the 1985-1999 period. Excluded from the sam-
ple are individuals who died during the observation period and individuals who gave
incomplete information on any single variable entering the empirical model in any of
the 8 waves. This leaves us with a sample of 1987 native Germans and 732 immigrants
starting in 1985.
The identification approach presented in section 2.2 relies on the information con-
tained in panel attrition. It becomes instructive to contrast the attrition pattern of our
immigrant sample with that of Germans whose attrition cannot obviously be attributed
to outmigration. Table 2.1 contains information on the number of individuals observed
along with the percentage of the original 1985 sample who remains in a given wave. 11
41.9% of Germans and 26.7% of immigrants have been interviewed successfully in all
the waves. The attrition rate in a given wave is defined as the percentage of individuals
not observed in the given wave but observed in the preceding wave. Over our sam-
ple period, an average of 11.6% of the remaining Germans and 17.2% of immigrants
drop out of the panel every two years. In the case of Germans, outmigration is de facto
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not an issue. Assuming that the difference in attrition rates is due to outmigration, a
back of the envelope calculation implies that we would expect the outmigration rate in
our sample of immigrants to be 6% every two years, or 3% per year, a number which
would be in line with those reported in the literature (see Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996).
Of course, this calculation relies on the assumption that attrition in the immigrant pop-
ulation which is not due to outmigration is of comparable magnitude to that of natives.
We will come back to this in section 2.5 which reports indirect evidence suggesting that
this should indeed hold in Germany.
The top panel of Figure 2.1 shows the average monthly gross income for work-
ing immigrants and Germans over the period covered. In 1985, the mean income of
Germans was 3,357 DM per month compared to 2,690 DM per month for immigrants,
giving an income ratio of 1.25 favoring Germans. The mean wage differential remaind
relatively steady until 1991, after which, the mean income differential widened even
more between the two groups to reach a ratio of 1.34 in 1999, with Germans receiv-
ing an average monthly wage of 5,848 DM while immigrants were receiving 4,348 DM
per month. The diverging economic progress of Germans and immigrants after 1991
is also reflected in the work frequencies. The bottom panel of figure 2.1 shows the
sample frequencies of individuals working in the month preceding the interview. We
can see that until 1991, labor force participation was very similar for both Germans
and immigrants. After 1991, we observe a steady decline in the work frequencies for
both groups. During that period, the percentage of immigrants working remained
steadily below that of Germans. The severe drop in work frequencies for both groups
coincides with the general deterioration of the labor market in the regions of former
West-Germany. Table 2.3 gives the unemployment rate per year by state.  With the
exception of Berlin, all provinces experienced their lowest unemployment rate of the
1985-1999 period in 1991. After 1991, the unemployment rate has progressively risen
apart from a slight fall in 1999 for most provinces.
If outmigration does occur at a systematic time in the life-cycle, it is likely to af-
fect the age and years since immigration composition of our sample of immigrants.
Table 2.2 gives variable descriptions and summary statistics for Germans and immi-
grants for the 1985 and 1999 waves. We see that both Germans and immigrants are, on
average, a little less than 40 years of age in 1985 while the average age of the cohort
increases to 45 years of age in 1999 for both groups. As the average age of the sample
increased only 8 years over this 14 year period, it is clear that both the relatively older
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Germans and immigrants left the panel. For a given mean age, Germans have acquired
relatively more years of education, but relatively lower labor market experience than
immigrants. The average number of months of labor market experience of immigrants
increased by a little less than 32 months compared to 70 months for Germans, which is
consistent with the fact that the proportion of working immigrants relative to Germans
fell dramatically in the 1990's.
Most immigrants migrated to Germany early in their productive lives, a fact re-
flected by an average age at immigration of nearly 24 years, a figure consistent through-
out the observation period which indicates that most migrants were old enough to au-
tonomously decide to move to Germany. Both the evolution of years since immigration
and immigration year are consistent with the hypothesis that outmigration occurs 20
years after migration (OECD, 2001). The average year of immigration of our cohort is
1969 in the 1985 wave, but raises to 1979 in the 1999 wave, indicating that the earlier
cohorts are most susceptible to have dropped out of the panel. As the earlier cohorts
contain the migrants with the higher number of years since migration in 1985, it is not
surprising to see that average years since immigration increases relatively less than the
14 year time span, passing from 15.75 in 1985 to 19.63 in 1999, indicating again that
earlier cohorts are those who left the panel. Reported feelings on integration in the
German society and reported speaking fluency improved over time while health satis-
faction seems to deteriorate, the latter likely capturing an aging effect. Finally, 73% of
immigrants reported having a spouse living outside Gerrnany in 1985 while as little as
1% still do so in 1999. This result can be interpreted in two ways. First, spouses may
have eventually migrated to Germany during the time period. Second, it might be that
immigrants whose spouse was living abroad were more likely to outmigrate.
2.5   Results and simulations
The regressors included in the earnings and work equations are education, labor mar-
ket experience, labor market experience squared, self reported German speaking flu-
ency, and the number of years since immigration to Germany. These are the standard
variables that have appeared in this literature (Borjas, 1999a). The provincial unem-
ployment rate in each wave is added in both equations to capture local labor market
conditions. Finally, we include time fixed effects in each wave to capture remaining
macroeconomic cyclical fluctuations. We use reported health satisfaction as the ex-
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clusion restriction in the work equation. Reported health satisfaction is a valid exclu-
Sion restriction if health problems occur mostly at a time in which an individual is
more likely to have found a stable job whose continuation depends on the worker's
choices. The outmigration equation includes as regressors whether or not the wife of
immigrants lives in Germany, the immigrants self reported feelings of belonging to the
Germans society and the unemployment rate. Immigrant's who arrive at a young age
presumably have the highest incentive to invest in acquiring country specific human
capital. This effect is captured by including age at arrival in Germany.
Immigrants investing in their native country presumably have different incentives
to stay in the host country. The motives of these investments will affect their dura-
tion of stay. Immigrants may extend their stay in the host country in order to further
increase their investments in their native country.  On the other hand, if immigrants
invest in starting up a business they wish to manage-as proposed by Dustmann and
Kirchkamp (2002), high levels of investments will be associated with shorter migra-
tion durations. To disentangle both hypothesis, we include in the outmigration equa-
tion the cumulative amount of money returned to the native country since 1984 as a
proxy for investments. Reported health satisfaction and self-reported expected length
of stay in Germany are also included, the later captures anticipatory behavior of mi-
grants, which have been shown to affect the acquisition of country specific skills (e.g.
Dustmann, 2002b). Time dummies are added to capture remaining macroeconomic
fluctuations.
In order to separate the impact of selection on earnings into a work and outmigra-
tion effect, we first estimated an earnings equation with random effects. Our second
specification is a bivariate model of labor market earnings and work. We finally es-
timated the complete model or earnings, work and outmigration.  In the latter case,
we experimented with an alternative specification of the outmigration equation which
contained education, labor market experience and its square, speaking fluency, and
years since immigration as regressors. A log-likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis
that these human capital variables have no joint effect on outmigration could not be
12rejected at conventional levels.
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2.5.1 Equation results
Covariance structure
We begin our analysis of the results with a discussion of the estimates characteriz-
ing the covariance structure of the unobserved components which are informative of
the selection mechanisms. Table 2.4 presents estimates of the covariance structure.
Focusing on the most general model which controls for both work and outmigration
selection, we find a small but significant positive correlation between the unobserved
individual heterogeneity of work and earnings (pY.2), indicating that individuals with
higher probabilities of working are also more likely to have higher earnings. The cor-
relation between individual time invariant heterogeneity of outmigration and earn-
ings  (p ,1  is -56% while that between outmigration and work  <p24 3)  is 49.8%, both
\ W/ .1
significant at the 1% level. Both correlations suggest that individuals with a higher
propensity to outmigrate are those with both a lower probability of finding work, and
a lower labor market earnings, which points to negative outmigration selection. When
comparing results with the bivariate model which does not correct for outmigration,
we find that the estimated value of P ,2 remains stable. Results for Germans are similar
to that of the immigrant sample, with a small but positive and significant work selec-
tion effect (ph) Finally, transitory shocks between earnings and work, and shocks
between work and outmigration, are all significantly negatively correlated, the former
at -34.2% and the latter at 30.4% while we do not find significant correlation between
the transitory shocks of the earnings and outmigration processes.
Outmigration
Table 2.5 presents the parameter estimates of the outmigration equation. We find that
immigrants whose wife lives with them in Germany have a significantly lower prob-
ability of outmigrating, reflecting a preference for family unity. Immigrants satisfied
with their health are significantly less likely to outmigrate, a finding consistent with
the sociological findings reported in Stark (1998). Intended length of stay captures the
expectations of immigrants and offers direct information on their remigration inten-
tions. Not surprisingly, we find that migrants who expect to remain longer in Germany
are also less likely to outmigrate. Deteriorations of the local labor market conditions,
reflected in higher unemployment rates, have a positive and significant effect on the
likelihood of outmigrating. The effect of cumulative savings returned to the home
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country is not significant, implying that immigrants who have saved and returned
more money to their native country are not more likely to outmigrate. Dustmann and
Kirchkamp (2002) find that Turkish return migrants have accumulated enough wealth
in Germany to start up businesses in their home country upon their return. Because
Turks are the biggest ethnic group in our sample, we would expect that increasing re-
mittances increase the probability of outmigration if the money returned is intended to
be eventually invested in a business. Our results suggest that migrants returned money
to help relatives rather than for investment purposes. Finally, immigrant's feelings of
integration in the German society are not correlated with outmigration.
In our data, the average attrition rate par wave (every two years) is 11.6% in the
sample of Germans and 17.2% in the immigrant sample.  If the proportion of immi-
grants dropping out of the panel and remaining in Germany is of the same magnitude
to that of Germans, than the difference of 3% in annual attrition rates between na-
tives and immigrants would be an estimate of the outmigration rate. We do not have
direct information indicating that immigrants in Germany have the level of attrition
which is not due to outmigration than natives. However, apart from outmigration and
deaths, panel attrition occurs either because individuals decide to stop participating in
the survey project, or individuals move within Germany and cannot be tracked by the
survey institution. If Germans and immigrants have similar response rates or similar
mobility, we would expect both groups to be equally well traceable. Clark and Drever
(2001) have shown that immigrants in the GSOEP sample are not more likely to move
within Germany than natives. Furthermore, Pischke and Velling (199D have shown
that immigrants in the western parts of Germany live in regions with a high concen-
tration of ethnic minorities. Both results imply that, if anything, immigrants are easier
to track than natives. Hence the proportion of immigrants dropping out and staying
in Germany should be of similar magnitude to that of Germans. This suggests that a10
should be no greater than 11.6%, which is what we find in the data.
We showed in section 2.2 that the conditional work probability and earnings of
outmigrants are nonparametrically identified under the assumption that there exists a
sample of immigrants with a probability of outmigrating close to 0. Estimates of our
parametric model were used to compute the predicted probability that an immigrant
leaves the host country in the following year. The 25th percentile of the outmigration
probability distribution was 0.69% in 1985 and 0.81% in 1997, indicating that there is a
considerable amount of immigrants with an outmigration probability close to 0.
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Earnings equation
Table 2.6 presents parameter estimates of the earnings and work equations for the im-
migrant and German samples for all three models considered. We will first focus on
the more general model which controls for both work and outmigration selectivity
and subsequently compare the results with the more parsimonious models.  Part of
the earning disparity between Germans and immigrants can be explained by differ-
ent returns to human capital investments. Returns to education of immigrants are
roughly one third those of Germans, where an extra year of schooling raises earnings
of Germans by 9.2% and those of immigrants by 2.9%. Part of the earnings differential
between Germans and immigrants can also be related to returns to labor market expe-
rience. An extra year of labor market experience raises earnings of Germans by 0.6%
compared to 0.32% for immigrants. The quadratic term of labor market experience in-
dicates that the differential in earnings attributed to different returns to labor market
experience diminishes as the level of experience increases. As expected, immigrants
with better speaking fluency have higher earnings.13 Finally, higher unemployment
rates are associated with lower earnings in the immigrant population (at the 10% sig-
nificance level) but do not affect labor market earnings of the native population. Given
we include controls for time periods, identification of this effect relies on regional vari-
ations across provinces in Germany. The effect of unemployment on earnings thus
reflects that at any point in time, earnings differ across provinces depending on the
tightness of the local labor market.
When controlling for outmigration selectivity, we control for the fact that the sam-
ple of immigrants observed over time has above average conditional earnings relative
to the population expectation. We then expect that the returns to some human capi-
tal factors will be lower in the overall immigrant population than in the population of
permanent migrants. Changes in the returns to education when controlling or not for
outmigration goes along those lines.  We find that the returns to education of immi-
grants passes from 2.9% when outmigration is accounted for to 3.5% when we do not
control for outmigration. This change is consistent with the hypothesis that permanent
migrants have above average labor market earnings. The coefficient of years since mi-
gration progressively decreases as less selection is accounted for, passing from 0.079
to 0.073 when controlling for work selectivity to 0.069 without any selection controls,
although these changes are not significant. Finally, the coefficient of the linear term of
labor market experience increases while the coefficient of the quadratic term decreases
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when outmigration is not accounted fon Again, both these changes are not significant
at conventional levels.
The robustness of parameter estimates to controls for work and outmigration se-
lectivity has implications for estimates of the economic assimilation rate. The latter is
generally defined as the differential in earnings between immigrants and natives with
Similar characteristics which results in one extra year in the host country
aE (wilixit,| aE (willxit) |A  immig at  Germans
For Germans, the passage of time is modelled as an increase of one year of labor mar-
ket experience while for immigrants, the passage of time is modelled by increasing
both the number of years of labor market experience and the number of years since
immigration by one year. We computed the assimilation rate at the sample average
of the labor market experience of immigrants in 1985. The estimate of the assimila-
tion rate is found to be -5.00% per year when outmigration is not accounted for, and
raises to -4.78% when outmigration is accounted for, a statistically insignificant in-
crease. These results show that the conditional convergence of labor market earnings
of immigrants to that of natives is not taking place in Germany. It is important to stress
that the robustness of assimilation rates to outmigration selectivity is not inconsistent
with our finding that outmigrants are negatively selected. The effect of outmigration
on the estimated values of the assimilation rate will depend on both the earnings and
work probability gap between outmigrants and immigrant stayers and on the size of
the outmigration population. In the next section, we will present simulations which
indicate that the earnings and work probability gaps between outmigrants and immi-
grants who stay are of sizeable magnitude, but the size of the outmigration population
is small. Hence, assimilation rates should be relatively robust to outmigration selec-
tion.
Work equation
The results for the work equation are in line with those of the earnings equation, both
in terms of the sign of the effects and on the robustness of the parameters to outmi-
gration selection. For both immigrants and Germans, all parameters are statistically
Significant. Education and labor market experience have positive effects on the prob-
ability of working. Higher unemployment rates have a negative effect on the work
probability while immigrants and natives with better reported health satisfaction have
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a higher probability of working. Speaking fluency has a positive effect on work par-
ticipation while the number of years since immigration has a negative and significant
impact on work participation. Similar to earnings, we find that parameter estimates
of the immigrant work propensity are quite robust to return migration selectivity. The
only noticeable difference concerns the negative effect of the state level unemployment
rate, whose coefficient passes from -0.054 to -0.076 when controlling for outmigration.
2.5.2 Simulations
Simulations are used for two purposes. First, they allow to check whether our model
provides a good fit to the data. Secondly, they allow us to quantify the implications
of outmigration selectivity on log monthly earnings and work propensities of immi-
grants.
Our simulations were done in the following way. For each individual appearing in
the sample in 1985, we take 1000 draws from the joint distribution of the time invari-
ant components (Vii, rlj'' Vi3).  Then, in each time period, we draw for each immigrant
appearing in that period 1000 draws from the joint distribution of transitory stochas-
tic components  (21„4,4)· The draws from the time invariant stochastic components
are then matched to the draws of the transitory stochastic components and used to
predict whether the immigrant will work and whether he will outmigrate in the next
period. We compute the predicted log earnings for each immigrant predicted to work
in a given wave. Simulations are then averaged over all draws and individuals. Simu-
lations for the German sample follow a similar path. Simulation results are presented
in Table 2.7. The fit for the German sample is very good, with both real and simulated
paths closely following each other over the entire sample period. Simulated log earn-
ings paths of immigrants are good up till 1991, after which, the model tends to over
predict the monthly log earnings. Part of these discrepancies can be attributed to the
progressively small immigrant sample sizes in the latter years, a fact reflected in the
increasing dispersion of the simulated log earnings estimates over time (not shown
here).
The empirical results of the previous section indicated that outmigrants were se-
lected from the bottom of the earnings and work propensity distributions of the immi-
grant population. To gain some insights into the economic performance gap between
immigrants who remained in Germany and those who left, we took the simulations
which were used to compute results for immigrants in Table 2.7 and separated them
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into a group of predicted outmigrants and a group of predicted stayers. The top panel
of Figure 2.6 reports simulations of log earnings while the bottom panel reports the
simulated work propensities.    In  1985,   the log earnings of outmigrants where  17.2%
lower than those of the immigrant stayers. This gap widened to 20.1% in 1991 be-
fore dropping back to a gap of 17.7% in 1997. The gap in work propensities between
immigrant stayers and outmigrants also confirms the strong negative outmigration se-
lectivity. Outmigrants are predicted to have a work propensity 25% lower than that
of immigrant stayers in 1985. In 1995, at the end of the economic downturn, this gap
climbed to nearly 44%. Overall, these simulations clearly indicate that the economic
performance of outmigrants in the wave preceding their departure was dramatically
worse than that of stayers, both in terms of earnings and work probabilities.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a general framework to analyze the determinants of out-
migration, to test the robustness of measures of economic assimilation, and to mea-
sure the parameters characterizing the economic performance of outmigrants using
panel data subject to sample attrition. We estimated a three equation panel data model
where outmigration decisions, work decisions, and expected labor market were jointly
determined and allowed to depend on a rich set of observable characteristics, and on
individual specific unobserved heterogeneity.
The model was estimated using the German and Immigrant samples of the Public
use file of the GSOER The econometric results are broadly consistent with a pattern of
negative outmigration selection. The model predicts an annual outmigration probabil-
ity of 3% in our sample population. Simulations revealed that compared to immigrants
who remain in Germany, outmigrants have between 17% and 20% lower expected la-
bor market earnings, and between 25% and 44% lower probabilities of working over
the 1985-1999 period. Interestingly, we do not find evidence that outmigration flows
biases estimated assimilation rates.
Computation of the results above did not require that outmigration decisions were
observable. The strategy used to identify the relevant parameters characterizing the
economic performance of outmigrants relied on using sample attrition as a proxy vari-
able for outmigration, and subsequently separating true outmigration movements from
non-response which is unrelated to departures. Conditions for nonparametric identi-
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fication of the work and outmigration probabilities, and the expected earnings of out-
migrants have been presented. These conditions require that an economic model be
specified in which some immigrants have an outmigration probability approaching
zero. Importantly, assuming the econometric model is well specified, the validity of
these conditions can be tested after estimation.
The economic model estimated in this chapter is obviously just one example. Nu-
merous directions of extension exist. The framework can be extended to any country
where outmigration flows pose substantive concerns to policy makers, given survey
data on these immigrants is available. The approach can also be extended in order to
estimate economic structural static and dynamic models, allowing to recover prefer-
ence parameters and to perform interesting policy simulations. Finally, the framework
can be used more generally to study migration movements other than those of immi-
grants. Burda, Hardle, Muller, and Werwatz (1998) for example study migration of
native Germans from the East to West-Germany following reunification using data on
intentions to migrate rather than actual migration movements, the later which were
difficult to observe in their panel data set. The framework proposed here suggests that









N     % 1985 Attrition rate % N     % 1985 Attrition rate %
1985 1987 100          - 732 100          -
1987 1648 82.9 17.1 583 79.6 20.4
1989 1408 70.8 14.6 473 64.6 18.9
1991 1253 63.1 11.0 416 56.8 12.1
1993 1122 56.4 10.5 355 48.4 14.7
1995 1002 50.4 10.7 291 39.7 18.0
1997 919 46.3 8.28 242 33.1 16.8
1999 834 41.9 9.25 195 26.7 19.4
Mean 1985-1999 11.6 17.2








· West-Germans Immigrants Variable Description
1985 1999 1985 1999
0 Age 38.33 45.85 39.78 44.53
21
N Experience 257.11 329.76 301.77 333.34 Number of months
4 Education 11.51 12.10 9.34 10.04    Number of years
 
Health satisfaction              7.26      6.81 7.21 6.77     0= unsatisfied,...,10 totally satisfied
Wife in Germany 0.73 0.01 lif yes, 0 otherwise
Integration feeling 3.94 2.93     Do you feel German ?, 1=Totally,..,5=Not at allGerman speaking fluency 2.65 2.30 1-excellent, 5=bad
Intended length of stay 2.18 0.59     1 = Within 1 year,2 - After a few years,3 = Never
Age at immigration 24.03 24.90
Years since immigration 15.75 19.63
Immigration year 1969 1979
Number Obs. 1987 1264 732 393









State 1985  1987  1989 1991 1993  1995  1997  1999
Berlin 10.3 10.5 9.8 10.6 12.3 13.6 17.3 17.7
Schleswig-Holstein 10.8 10.3 9.6 7.3 8.3 9.1 11.2 10.6
Hamburg 12.0 13.6 11.7 8.7 8.6 10.7 13.0 11.7
Lower-Saxony 11.7 11.4 10.0 8.1 9.7 10.9 12.9 11.8
Bremen 14.5 15.6 14.6 10.7 12.4 14.0 16.8 16.8
North Rhine-Westphalia    10.7    11.0 10.0 7.9 9.6 10.6 12.2 11.2
Hess 7.0 6.7 6.1 5.1 7.0 8.4 10.1 9.4
Rhinel-Palatinate-Saarl. 9.4 9.1 7.8 6.1 8.3 9.2 11.0 9.7
Baden-Wuerttemberg 5.2 5.1 4.5 37 6.3 7.4 8.7 7.3
Bavaria 7.7 6.6 5.7 4.1 6.4 7.0 6.7 7.1





Outmigration No No Yes
Work No Yes Yes
8
'8                                 Pf,2 -0.416 -0.342 -0.153
5 (0.103) (0.119) (0.069)
i                                                                           9.107)
Pl.3                               -0.106
(0.151)
 ,3                -0.304








P9,3                        -0.498
(0.173)
0-2. 0.068 0.061 0.042 0.118
V.
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)6 2.739 2.829 2.405
(0.313) (0.354) (0.164)
 72,                                          2.937
7.
(0.373)2 0.033 0.037 0.037 0.074
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Log-likelihood -7137.81 -333.54 -701.76 -1372.04
Table 2.4: Covariance structure of the time variant and time invariant components. Asymptotic standard errors in paren-
theses.
g





Wife in Germany -0.692
(0.174)






Age at immigration /102 1.618
(0.755)




Table 2.5: Estimation results for outmigration. Asymptotic standard errors in paren-





8 Immigrants West-Germans4 Equation Earnings Work Earnings Work
g Work No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
 8
Return migration No No Yes No Yes
 i Constant 7.121 7.0198 7.063 -0.596 -0.532 5.971 6.030 -2.652
(0.066) (0.055) (0.051) (0.489) (0.499) (0.051) (0.038) (0.238)
Education / 10 0.257 0.346 0.288 1.007 1.060 1.002 0.915 1.489
Oib                  (0.045) (0.029) (0.029) (0.326) (0.32D (0.031) (0.016) (0.130)
                Experience /
103
(0.201) (0.174) (0.175) (1.484) (1.612) (0.147) (0.15D (0.966)
3.112 3.150 3.239 21.934 22.002 5.999 6.087 31.613
Experience squared / 104 -0.439 -0.431 -0.451 -3.439 -3.536 -0.786 -0.799 -5.509
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.21D (0.239) (0.024) (0.02D (0.158)
Years since immigration /10 0.069 0.073 0.079 -0.438 -0.416
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.091) (0.096)
German speaking fluency -0.017 -0.015 -0.020 -0.256 -0.232
(0.006) (0.OOD (0.007) (0.063) (0.065)
Unemployment rate -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.054 -0.076 -0.0041 -0.0004 -0.068
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.026) (0.0029) (0.002) (0.015)
Health satisfaction 0.129 0.132 0.069
(0.016) (0.01D (0.011)
Table 2.6: Estimation results for income and work equations. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Wave dummies










Log earnings % Working Log earnings %Working
R S R S R S R   S
1985 7.85 7.85 0.84 0.84 7.98 7.98 0.81 0.81
1987 7.93 7.94 0.85 0.86 8.10 8.09 0.83 0.83
1989 8.06 8.09 0.85 0.84 8.22 8.22 0.85 0.85
1991 8.16 8.20 0.82 0.82 8.31 8.31 0.86 0.86
1993 8.23 8.29 0.78 0.77 8.46 8.44 0.85 0.84
1995 8.29 8.38 0.73 0.71 8.50 8.49 0.85 0.84
1997 8.30 8.37 0.70 0.70 8.58 8.57 0.81 0.80
Table 2.7: Real (R) and simulated (S) log earnings of workers and work propensities for Germans and immigrants.
ki
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Figure 2.1: Log monthly earnings and work propensities - Germans and immigrants
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Figure 2.2: Top panel: simulated log earnings for immigrants over the 1985-
1997 period. All, Stayers and Outmigrants refer to simulations averaged
respectively over all immigrants, predicted stayers only and predicted out-
migrants only. Simulations in each period are obtained by taking for each
i 1000 draws from the distribution of 4.4, 4  and  q. 41, 4 and averaging
over all draws the predicted earnings of those predicted to work. Bottom
panel: Simulated proportion of immigrants working in the 1985-1997 pe-
riod. Simulations are performed as in the top panel.
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Notes
10nly recently has such data become available. See Coleman and Wadensjoe (1999) for details on
Danish data sources.
2Lubotsky (2000) for example uses labor market experience at entry in the U.S. as the only human
capital measure entering the earnings regressions, while years since immigration is measured as an
interval. No sociological factors are accounted for in the data
3This excludes the possibility that immigrants temporarily leave the panel.  In the data used in
the empirical section of the chapter, this assumption is shown to be satisfied but should in general
be checked.
4This can be seen by replacing E {wlp = 1, r° = 1, X} with E{pIf = 1, X} (= Pr (p = lit = 1, X) in
the derivations below.
5The equality E {wlp = 1, r° = 1, r" = j. X} = E {wlp = 1, ru = 1, X} for j = 0,1 follows from
E{wip=l, r° =1, r"=j, X} = jl wf(wlro= l.ru=j,X)dw
-      f w f:'6:  2 11'r:  2  1:xxk,w
=    jf w pr(re = ilw, ru = 1 X) Pr (r" = j'x) f (wir" = jIX)dwPr (r° = 1 lru = j, X) Pr(ru = jIX)
=    E {wlp= 1, ru = j, X}
6We ran probit regressions of the attrition decision on a set of covariates including age, education and
the number of months of labor market experience. We found very small marginal effects, suggesting
that the probability of attrition which is not due to outrnigration does not vary substantially across
individuals. Results are available upon request.
7The is mathematically equivalent to the class of discrete choice models where the endogenous dis-
crete outcome is either misclassified or misreported. Recent applications include work status (Hausman,
Abrevaya and Scott-Morton, 1998) and reported speaking fluency (Dustman and van Soest 2001).
BWe have experimented with a flexible nonparametric mixture model which assumes that (,1,1,'Ii; 413)
is drawn from a discrete distribution H (41,  11, Ill)  =  74 for k  = l, ....8 where I3=1 7Tk  =  1.  Results
were similar to those presented here and are available upon request.
9In this chapter, we use sequences of 100 Halton draws (Train, 2003).
10Immigrants of Portuguese nationality are not included in the panel.
11Figures are adjusted for individuals truncated out of the sample as they reached 66 years of age.
12Results are available upon request.
13Dustmann and van Soest (2001) show that the self-reported speaking fluency indicator of the GSOEP
is measured with noise, a feature which biased downwards the effect of speaking fluency on earnings.
Due to the complexity of their correction, we have not attempted to include it in the present study.
Chapter 3
A Life-Cycle Model of Outmigration
and Economic Assimilation of
Immigrants in Germany
3.1 Introduction
The increasing importance of immigrants leaving their host country, which we refer
to as outmigration, is a world wide phenomena (see Dustmann, 2003 and the ref-
erences therein).  The case of Germany is interesting as migration out of Germany
has been particularly important in the last decades. Bohning (1987, p.147) estimates
that "more than two thirds of the foreign workers admitted to the Federal Republic
(of Germany),...have returned", while Glytsos (1988) estimates that of the one million
Greeks migrating to West-Germany between 1960 and 1984, 85% gradually returned
home. These massive movements of human capital pose substantial problems for pol-
icy makers who must forecast inflows and outflows of immigrants in order to adjust
their immigration policies to fit the future needs of their labor markets. Moreover, it
has recently been argued both theoretically and empirically that estimation of existing
measures of the economic assimilation of immigrants based on possibly non-random
samples of immigrants observed not to leave the country (e.g. Schultz, 1998; Edin,
LaLonde, and Aslund, 2000). For both these reasons, a growing body of literature has
investigated the motives behind outmigration.
Theories of outmigration typically build upon neo-classical static choice models of
migration (Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970) by assuming that an immigrant's
decision to outmigrate is based on the comparison of his current earnings and those of
a potential new destination, often assumed to be the immigrant's home country. Cen-
41
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tering the outmigration decision on earnings differentials is motivated by the fact that
outmigrants tend to have the lowest labor market performance amongst immigrants in
the host country (see Hu, 2000; Lubotsky, 2000 for evidence in the United States, and
Chapter 2 for evidence in Germany). Within the earnings differential paradigm, out-
migration occurs over time as immigrants improve their earning position in the home
country while being abroad by investing in home-country specific skills (Dustmann,
1994). Outmigration is then triggered when the relative increase in the returns to hu-
man capital in the home country is sufficient for the expected earnings in the home
country to exceed those in the host country.
However, there is empirical evidence indicating that outmigration does occurs de-
spite persistently higher earnings in the host country (e.g. Carrington, Detragiache and
Vishwanath (1996)). In order to reconcile these empirical facts, theories of outmigra-
tion have shifted from expected earnings comparisons to expected utility comparisons
between two destinations (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988). This subtle change allows out-
migration to occur despite having relatively higher earnings in the host country, as
long as the marginal utility of consumption is sufficiently higher in the new destination
than in the original host country. Several extensions of the expected utility framework
have provided new and interesting insights into outmigration behavior. In a recent
contribution, Dustmann (2003) shows that a neo-classical approach based on earnings
differentials has sufficient flexibility to explain outmigration. Using a life-cycle frame-
work and assuming that the marginal utility of consumption is higher in the home
than in the host country, he finds that migration durations may in fact decrease when
earnings in the host country are high enough, keeping constant earnings in the home
country.
A different trend of the literature has placed the emphasis on explaining outmigra-
tion decisions with non-pecuniary motives. The main reason for this shift has been the
growing evidence, mainly drawn from the sociological literature, which indicates that
expected earnings comparisons alone may not be sufficient to adequately characterize
outmigration behavior. Among the most frequently cited non-pecuniary benefits for
remaining in the host country are whether or not the spouse or children of immigrants
live in the host country, health and income satisfaction, perceptions of being socially
integrated and dependance of relatives back in the native country (Stark (1998)).
The vast array of possible determinants of outmigration has yet to be integrated in
a unified framework which allows to contrast the relevance of each potential expla-
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nation.  The goal of this chapter is to present such a framework.  The role played by
uncertainty will be a critical component of such a framework. In most theories of out-
migration referred to above, uncertainty about economic outcomes is either not present
at all or introduced in such a way that migration durations resulting from an optimiza-
tion process are deterministic: immigrants simultaneously choose once and for all, at
the beginning of their lifetime, their duration of stay in the host country and the levels
of consumption in the pre and post migration period. The prediction that immigrants
do not revise their intended migration duration during their stay in the host country is
questionable in light of the considerable uncertainty immigrants face both before and
during the migration period. One important source of uncertainty concerns the diffi-
culty in evaluating labor market prospects in the host country. Pessino (1991) develops
a model where an immigrant's uncertainty about his labor market prospects dissipates
only after having actually migrated, a feature shown to be sufficient to cause outmigra-
tion. The idea that uncertainty is removed upon arrival is intuitively appealing. Yet, it
is difficult to conceive that all uncertainty disappears upon an immigrant's arrival in
the host country, if only because immigrants generally take up low paid unstable jobs.
If uncertainty is perpetually present all through an immigrant's residence in the host
country, we would expect immigrants to continuously revise their migration duration
in the host country as their information set is updated through time, a feature not yet
addressed in the literature reviewed above.
Structural dynamic discrete choice models represent a theoretically appealing way
to describe a forward-looking decision maker facing uncertainty about the future. In
this chapter, we specify and estimate the first structural dynamic discrete choice model
of earnings, work and outmigration. In our model, forward looking immigrants make
sequential decisions on work and outmigration behavior in order to maximize ex-
pected discounted lifetime utility. Contrary to most existing life-cycle theories of out-
migration, we allow for uncertainty about future work and earnings in both the host
and home country all through an immigrant's lifetime. The model introduces this
uncertainty while still keeping several important features of the life-cycle literature.
Specifically, we allow outmigration to depend on different marginal utilities of con-
sumption and labor market earnings in the host and home country, credit market ra-
tioning, and several other non-pecuniary benefits including feelings of social integra-
tion, income satisfaction, age at immigration and whether the spouse lives in the host
country or not. Given these elements are imbedded in our model, we can directly test
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the validity of some of the motives put forward to explain outmigration.
An additional contribution of our approach is that we endogenize the work deci-
Sion of immigrants. This has interesting implications for outmigration behavior, as bar-
riers to entry in the host labor market have the potential to lower considerably welfare,
thus making outmigration an attractive option. Cohen and Ecktein (2002) estimate a
structural model of job training and labor market access and find that improving ac-
cess to the Israelian labor market gives Russian immigrants higher welfare gains than
increasing their potential labor market earnings. The extent to which lower job market
access is associated with outmigration has recently been addressed in Bellemare (2003)
who finds that immigrants in Germany leaving the country have a 30% lower proba-
bility of working than immigrants who remained in the host country. Moreover, as will
be shown in the next section, explicitly modelling the work decision endogenizes mea-
sures of immigrant economic assimilation to account for the possible non-randomness
of the sample of immigrants who remain in the host country, a fact generally over-
looked in the literature.
This chapter also makes an important methodological contribution to the empirical
literature on outmigration. One of the main obstacles which has prevented the estima-
tion of economic models of outmigration is the difficulty in obtaining accurate micro-
level data on outmigration behavior (see Dustmann (2000) for a recent discussion of
this problem).  Here, we develop an econometric framework which (nonparametri-
cally) identifies the conditional outmigration probability in our sample without having
to actually observe actual outmigration decisions. This approach draws on previous
work (Bellemare, 2003) and first uses sample attrition as a baseline proxy variable for
outmigration. The probability that sample attrition is confounded for outmigration is
then explicitly incorporated in the model and estimated. We show that this is sufficient
to recover consistent estimates of our structural parameters.
The model is estimated using 16 years of data drawn from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) Public use file. The estimated model is shown to fit the data
well. Immigrants are found to have a time horizon slightly greater than 20 years. The
outmigration rate is predicted to be approximately 3% per year, in line with previous
estimates based on reduced form approaches. Several explanations of existing life-
cycle models appear to be consistent with our data. Specifically, we find that credit-
market rationing, satisfaction with income, feelings of social integration and earnings
differentials have a significant impact on outmigration decisions. Simulation results
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show that for some immigrants, predicted migration durations are very sensitive to
both changes in returns and in the stock of human capital. Predicted migration dura-
tions are found to be very sensitive to whether a myopic rather than a forward-looking
model is used. Finally, we find that the estimated assimilation rates are robust to en-
dogeneity of the work and outmigration decisions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the life-gde
model. Section 3.3 discusses the approach used to estimate the structural model. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the data used in the chapter and sketches the state of immigration
in Germany and the historical policies that have been implemented to favor and curb
immigration flows. Section 3.5 discusses the results and presents simulations to asses
both the performance and the life-cycle implications of the model. Section 3.6 con-
cludes.
3.2 Economic model
We have a measure of N immigrants in period t =1, where immigrant i remains in the
panel for Ti periods The control variables (dj, di, d ) summarize the decisions taken
in each period. An immigrant can choose to work in Germany (dl = 1), not work but
stay in Germany (d3 = 1) or outmigrate (d  = 1). When an immigrant works and stays
in Germany, he enjoys non-pecuniary direct (dis)utility 8,j and utility derived from his
consumption cit. The marginal utility of consumption in Germany is denoted by eG.
When he does not work, the immigrant receives non-pecuniary direct utility 41, which
reflects utility derived from leisure. Finally, we assume that an immigrant who leaves
the country finds work and receives direct (dis)utility P and utility from consumption,it
where the marginal utility of consumption in his home country is denoted by GN.1  Each
decision is mutually exclusive (i.e. d 1 + di + dl = 1). We assume that outmigration is
irreversible which implies that the control variable d  acts as a stopping rule.2 Every
decision is made at the beginning of the period and is based on the information set
Oil in period t. An immigrant maximizes the following discounted expected lifetime
utility by choosing the sequence {d;,1, d 2, d } 1 over a finite horizon T
E  "I  4'-1 (d,1,  5 , + e«c,]  + d,22'4 + "il 161 + eN'"j) | n"                 (3.1)Lt=i
E denotes the expectation taken over the joint distribution of the stochastic future state
variables (see below) and B  E  [0,1] is the subjective discount rate. Equation (3.1) is
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maximized subject to the immigrant's budget constraint, which is assumed to be satis-
fied in each period, and is given by
cit  =  w„ dit + wu dit (3.2)
where wjj is the log earnings of immigrants in Germany, while wi7 denotes their log
earnings in the home country.3 Equation (3.2) implies that immigrants do not save
which is admittedly a restrictive assumption. However, 83% of the immigrants in our
sample used in the empirical part of the chapter report having not made any savings
in the year preceding the interview, a direct implication of their inherently low labor
market earnings. Hence, the assumption that immigrants exhaust all their labor mar-
ket earnings in each period is likely to be realistic for the average immigrant.4  The
functions 6,j, 6,3 and e are allowed to depend on individual characteristics
36   =   010 + all Sendcash,·t + K12Incomesait + a13Intfeelit (3.3)
+R14Educit + K15Experit-1 + t't16Expert-1 + a17Ysmit-1 + €1
 =4
JA   =   a30 + 031Sendcashit + a32Incomesait + 233Intfeelit (3.4)
+234Ageatimi + a35Wifeingeit + 4
Sendcashit is a binary indicator taking a value of 1 if the immigrant returns money to
the host country. In this chapter, we treat this variable as exogenous to our choice pro-
cess. This can be justified in the context of immigrants who have altruistic preferences
and who suffer very high levels of disutility when relatives in the native country have
little access to credit. In such a case, money is returned as soon as a need for it emerges,
a need taken here as exogenous to our model. Ageatimi denotes the age at arrival in
Germanh Intfeelit captures sense of being a German, and Wifeingeit is a binary indi-
cator taking a value of 1 when the wife of the immigrant lives in Germany. Incomesail
denotes reported satisfaction with income earned in Germany. This is included in both
the work and the outmigration non-pecuniary benefits to capture the additional utility
accruing to financial security which is not due to pure earnings consumption. Educit
corresponds to the total number of years of education, Experit denotes the total num-
ber of years of labor market experience while Ysmit represents the number of years
since immigration. The triplet  (El, 4,4) consists of time specific shocks to utility.
The specification of the earnings equation in Germany follows those used in the
literature on economic assimilation of immigrants (Borjas, 1999) and reflects the de-
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pendance of current earnings on the immigrant's past decisions
Wf = 90 + gi Educit + 92Gspeakit + 93Unempit (3.5)
+q'4Experit-1 + q)5Exper -1 + 4'6Ysmit-1 + 'lf
Earnings depend on education, years of labor market experience, years since immigra-
tion, German speaking fluency of immigrants Gspeakil, and on the unemployment rate
in the province of residence Unempit. The returns to human capital and the province
specific localization are captured by the 9 parameters while 4 captures shocks to earn-
ings.
It is important to highlight that the level of education, the years labor market ex-
perience and the number of years since migration affect the utility of working in the
host country via two channels-first through a direct effect on Al keeping earningsfixed,
and secondly via an indirect effect on the utility of consumption GGW .due to changes
in earnings wg. The signs of the direct and indirect effects which follow from chang-
ing either of these variables need not be the same. For a given level of income, higher
educated individuals will have relatively greater disutility from working in the host
country if they take on jobs associated with greater responsibilities. The direct and in-
direct effects of Experit and Ysmit on the utility of working and staying in the country
can also be very different and can explain retirement from the labor force in the later
part of the life-cycle.  This will be the case if, as it typically is the case, labor market
earnings profile level off at high levels of labor market experience. This levelling off
implies that working an extra year in the host labor market will have a very small effect
on utility via changes in consumption. Immigrant will then have an incentive to retire
from the labor force if they suffer greater disutility from working an additional year in
the host country, keeping earnings constant.
The earnings in the home country are determined by
w   = 70 + liEducit -1 + 12Experit-1 + 13Experit-1 + '1 (3.6)
where the 7 parameters capture the returns to human capital and rliY is an unobserved
stochastic shock.
In any given period, 0,1 contains all state variables entering the earnings and the
utility  of each choice,  as  well  as all shocks  (E .El. 4.'15. 11,9)·    This  set is updated
over time as decisions are made. The two endogenous state variables, Experit-l and
1     and Ysmit-1 -
Ysmi,-1, have the following laws of motion: Experi,-1 = Experit-2+ d, -1
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Ysmit-2 + Max[dj,-1, dit-1 1, with Experio = Ysmio = d o  = d 0 = d o = o. These laws
of motion show that by endogenizing both the decision to work in the home country
(d -1 = 1) and the migration duration (d -1 or dl-1 = 1), the cumulative number of
years of labor market experience and the number of years since immigration are also
endogenized. All other variables are assumed to be exogenous which implicitly as-
sumes that immigrants are in some sense myopic and cannot foresee any updating of
their characteristics over time.5
As discussed in the introduction, endogenizing both the number of years of labor
market experience and the number of years since immigration has practical implica-
tions in terms of measures of economic assimilation. The most popular measure of
assimilation (see Borjas, 1999) is usually defined as the differences in earnings between
immigrants and natives with similar observable attributes x which results from one
extra year of labor market experience
AE  tull,mix'x ) - aE (w atives'x)
(3.7)Bt              Bt
Endogenizing both decisions also implies that the assimilation rate (3.D is endoge-
nously determined by past choices. This can be seen by taking the the derivatives of
the earnings equation as we increase the number of years of labor market experiences
by one
aE   wm:mig IX 
= 94 +2· 4'5Experit-1 + 96 (3.8)
3t
Both derivatives are direct functions of the returns and the level of experience.  For
immigrants, increasing the number of years of labor market experience also has the
effect of increasing the number of years since immigration whose effect on earnings
is reflected through 96· Lalonde and Topel (1992) propose a very different notion of
assimilation, which is taken to occur if, between two observationally equivalent immi-
grants, the one with the greater time in the host country has higher earnings. In terms
of our earnings equation, the Lalonde and Topel measure of integration is simply the
coefficient of the number of years since migration 96· If accounting for the endogeneity
of the work and outmigration decisions affect estimates of the returns to labor market
experience and to years in the host country, we expect both measures of assimilation
to differ from standard linear least squares estimates. The size of the differences will
depend on the type and the magnitude of selection into work and outmigration. In the
case where immigrant workers who stay in the host country have expected earnings
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which are greater than those of a randomly selected immigrant, we would expect their
returns to labor market experience and to the number of years since immigration to be
biased upwards.
3.3 Estimation procedure
This section describes the econometric approach used to estimate the structural model
presented above. Our econometric approach assumes that instead of observing outmi-
gration decisions, empirical researchers only observe whether an immigrant drops out
of the panel.
Given some distributional assumptions on the stochastic parts of the model, it is in
principle straightforward to test different life-cycle hypothesis by estimating several
specifications, each obtained by maximizing the complete likelihood function which
combines the choice and earnings data in a single step. Given the numerical burden
of estimating a dynamic programming model, this direct approach is computationally
demanding.  In this chapter, we use the three step estimation strategy proposed by
van der Klaauw (1996). In the first step, a reduced form dynamic programming model
is estimated using the choice data. The parameter estimates of the first step are then
used to estimate the parameters of the wage equations, controlling for sample selection
due to the decision to work and to remain in the home country. In the third step, a
Minimum Distance Estimator (MDE) is used to recover the structural parameters of
the economic model. We discuss in more detail each step, starting with the reduced
form dynamic programming model.
To proceed, we divide f]it  =  [Yit, (61,4,4,49,viY)]  into a set Yit containing all
state variables assumed to be observed by the econometrician. When incorporating
the earnings equations (3.5) and (3.6) in the budget constraint (3.2), and the budget
constraint in the objective function (3.1), we can express the contemporary utility of
choosing each alternative as a reduced form
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ui (Yit) + 4   =   x10 + trliSendcashit + a12Incomesait + a13Intfeelit
ta14Educit + x15Experit-1 + x16Exper -1 + x17Ysmit-1
+BG{qo + 91 Educit + 92Gspeakit + 93Unempit + 9*Experit-1
+ '5 Expe,f,-1 + q'6Ysmif-1 + Vif   + E,1,
=   Alo + All Sendcashit + A12Incomesait + A13Intfeelit
+Al#Educit + A15Gspeakil + AlbUnempit
+A17Experit-1 + A,8Experi-1 + Al9Ysmit-1 + E,j
U2(11.,)+ 4      =     4
U3 (Yit) + Fl   =   a30 + tr31 Sendcashit + 132Incomesait + x33Intfeelit + a34Ageatimi
ta351*ifeingeit + ON  70 + 71 Educit + ... + VV  +El
=   A30 + 131 Sendcash it + A32 Incomesa it + A33 In tfeelit + 134Ageatimi
+A35wifeingeit + A36Educit + A37Experit-1 + A38Exper,2,-1 + e 
where the vector A =  [Alo, All, ···A381' will be used to denote the reduced form param-
eters. We follow van der Klaauw (1996) by assuming that the composite error terms
4   =   ec'1,9 + Elt
4=4
4   =   GH'1,7 + 4
are have conditional mean zero and are independently distributed over time and indi-
viduals and follow an extreme-value type I distribution.
The model presented above does not admit an analytical solution. Using the termi-
nal conditions and the distributional assumptions on the stochastic components of the
model, it is possible to solve numerically for the set of optimal decisions using back-
ward induction for a given set of reduced form parameters A and B. Using Bellman's
principle of optimality (Bellman, 1957), the solution of (3.1) can be decomposed as the
solution of T separate problems where, for each t = 1,2,..., T, one solves
f':5,1, (d  114' (Yi,) + 4,11 + di, 142 (Yi,) + 41 + di [Vi'(Y,) + dj)}        (3.9)
<  ,/.- ,/,  "
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where Vl (Yit) are value functions associated with choice j = 1,2,3. The value function
associated with the first two decisions (j = 1,2) given the information at time t is given
by
1/1 (Yit) = Uj (Yit) + 4EMax   1/,11 (f)#+1), 1/Al (01,+1 ), 1/Al (oil+1) 1 Yit, d t = 1 
(3.10)
where EMax represents the expected value of the maximal future value function,
where expectation is taken  over the triplet
 Ei ,t+1' C 1+1'  1+1 contained in the infor-
mation set Oit+1. Finally, the outmigration decision acts as a terminal control variable
whose associated value function has the following simple form
1/,3 (Yit) = U3 (Yit) + BE  111.1 (nit+1) 1Yit. d? - 11it   j
with E {1/,1,1 (011+1) 1Yit, d3 = 1} defined asit
T
E  4/-(1+1) (A30 + A31Sendcashit + 132Incomesait + A33Intfeelit + A Ageatimi
j=t+1
+A35Wifeingeit + 136Educit + 137Experi1 + A38Experf)
In the finite horizon case, the solution of the value functions (3.10) are computed by
backward recursion starting in the terminal period T. At every time period t, the goalis
to compute Vl (Yit) for every value of Yit that could enter the choice probabilities at time
t or are needed during the recursion in equation (3.10) to compute the choice-specific
value functions in the periods 1-1,t-2, m, 1.6 The primary task is evaluating the
EMax functions in equation 3.10. Given our distributional assumptions, the expected
value functions tum out to have a convenient analytical solution (Rust, 1988)
EMax   1/,11(ni,+1), V,+1 (Ili,+1), VAi (Ili,+1) lyn, gt = 1 
= 5 + log (Pexp (1/,t, (n"+1 ))  
where 5 is Euler's constant. Given we have solved the value function problem for each
individual and each time period in our sample for a given set of parameter values, it
is straightforward to compute the likelihood function. Each immigrant i is observed
for Ti time periods. In each time period, we observe for each i in period t the event
di (t)  =   [dj"dtt, dt]. The observable choice sequence of i over all sample periods is
denoted by di = [di (t),..., 4 (Ti)1 The sample likelihood function of the reduced form
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model is given by
N             N
] Pr [diIA, Bl = I--Ipr Wi (TA | | (Ti -1),...,  (2),di (1)1 · · ·P r [di (2)14. (1)] Pr [di· (1)1
i=1
(3.11)
From equation (3.11) we see that the choice probability at time Ti depends on all past
choices of the individual, a fact which is reflected through the information set Yit ·  In
this sense, the structure of the model allows for a general form of state dependance
across all alternatives. Given that the Bellrnan equations have been solved for a given
set of parameter values, and given the decision rule (3.9), the choice probabilities en-
tering (3.11) can be expressed as functions of the value functions
Pr (di = l'Yit  =P r  1/l (Pit) +4>v l (yi ) + 4,; for all 1 9'6 j. 
Combined with our distributional assumptions, these probabilities have a familiar
closed form expression
pr  vl (Yit) +4>V l (Yn) + €i,; for all 1  76 j 
exp  LU (Yit) -1- 4EMax ·  V,1+l (f.]it+1 ), .1/i.l (flit+1 ), '1/2 1 (r]i,+1 ) 1Yit, d{,  =  1 l j
=
Eli exp (Uk (Y'.t) + #EMax { V,1 1 (Oit+1),V,+1 (f]it+1),Vit,1 (flit+1) 1Yit, 4 = 1}).
So far, we have assumed that d was perfectly observed. However, in most data
sets, outmigration is either not observed or badly measured. What is usually perfectly
observed is whether an immigrant drops out of the panel, which is denoted here by the
indicator d30 which takes a value of 1 when the immigrant drops out of the panel and 0
tt
otherwise. One approach is simply to use d,f as a proxy for d . However, as Hausman,
Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) have shown, measurement error of a discrete left
hand side variable can lead to severely biased parameters and variance estimates in
non-linear models. Because the dynamic programming model used in this chapter is
highly non-linear, the obvious measurement error in d ° is a non-trivial issue. We deal
with the partial observability of outmigration in our data by extending the method pro-
posed in chapter 2. The method rests on the idea that an immigrant who outmigrates
necessarily leaves the panel, which suggests that panel attrition carries some informa-
Hon on outmigration behavior. To extract the information on outmigration contained
in panel attrition, we start by expressing the attrition probability. conditional on Yit, as
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Pr (d  = 114,)   =  pr  d  = 11,11 96 1  Pr (dit 0 l'Yit) (3.12)
+ Pr  di1 = lid,3, = 1) Pr (d t = l'Yit 
=   .3,12 {pr (d , = l'Yi,) + pr (d , = 11'Y,tj }
+ Pr (d t= ll i·t 
where a3.12   -   Pr (d?°  = 1 ld 9,1) represents the probability of observing  an immi-It
grant leaving the panel given that he remained in Germany, either working or not.7
The last equality in (3.12) follows from the fact that Pr (dit = 1 Id  = 1) = 1 whereby
an immigrant who outmigrates willleave the panel with probability 1. The parameter
a3.12 can be directly incorporated in the likelihood function above and estimated.8 In
the end, we solve the following problem
max log
<11Pr IdiIA, B,a3,121 A,»3.12 \i=
The procedure used above to identify the conditional outmigration probability is
motivated on the basis that the information on outmigration behavior contained in
panel attrition can be sizeable. The informational content of panel attrition is summa-
rized in the following Proposition
Proposition 3.1.  If a3,12 is independent ofobservable characteristics and there exists a T,·t such
that
Pr (dl = 11Yit = Tit)  = 0, both Pr (d  = 11Yit) and E {wfldl = 1, Yit} are nonparametri-
cally identifted for all Yit·
proof See Chapter 2                                                                                                            0
The Proposition shows that if there exist immigrants with observable characteristics
Ti' such that their outmigration probability is zero, panel attrition is sufficiently infor-
mative to nonparametrically identify all the economically relevant outmigration pa-
rameters.910 The assumption that there exists a subpopulation of immigrants with ob-
servable characteristics such that the probability of outmigration is zero can be checked
after having estimated the model by computing the predicted outmigration probabili-
ties for each immigrant. Intuitively, this condition is likely to be satisfied in countries
where a substantial part of the immigrant population is observed to remain in the
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country We will see in section 3.4 that more than 25% of immigrants remained in the
sample between 1985 and 1999. Results of Proposition 1 also suggest that it is possible
to extract the relevant outmigration parameters using some nonparametric estimator.
This approach is not practical in the present context as our main goal is to estimate our
structural economic model which is generically nonparametrically under-identified.11
However, this nonparametric identification result provides a sound motivation to the
approach presented here and suggests that parametric estimates of the outmigration
probability should not depend heavily on our parametric assumptions.
The reduced form estimates of the dynamic programming model are used to esti-
mate the earnings equation (3.5) correcting for selectivity due to work and attrition.
Dubin and McFadden (1984) show that when the errors are extreme-valued and under
the assumption that the conditional expectation E (414*64) is linear in £1, 61 and
4. Elle conditional expected earnings of immigrants who work in Germany is given by
E  wifld,J = 1. Yit    =   90 + 91 Educit + 92Experit-1 + 93Exper -1 + 94Ysmit-1
+eGspeakit +  Unempit
Pr (4 = l'Yit) log (Pr (4 = 11Yit))+T2
+log (pr (dii, - tly„))11 - Pr (dlt = l'Yit)
 T)    Pr (di;
= l'Yit) log (Pr (d to =
l'Yit))  + log (Pr (dI, = 11Yit) )]1 - Pr (d  = l'Yit)
The parameters of this equation can be consistently estimated using OLS provided
we can obtain consistent estimates of the choice probabilities which enter the selection
terms (see van der Klaauw, 1996). Here, we replace Pr (d,i, = 11Yit) , Pr (d  = 11Yit) and
Pr (4 = llY#) by estimates from the reduced form dynamic programming model.
-        7/
Finally,  in the third stage, given consistent
estimates  of    #, 23,12, A', 0', 92, 93]      E
F, consistent estimates of the structural parameters 9 are obtained using a minimum
distance estimator (Chamberlain, 1984). We define the MDE as
mm (P- g (0))'C-1 (P- g (4'))
where the function g imposes the restrictions specified by the structural model on the
reduced form parameter estimates.12 C denotes the covariance matrix of F which can
be computed using the estimated covariance matrices and the outer-product of the
Scores from the first two rounds (see van der Klaauw, 1996). The resulting estimate of
9, 9   tpo and
 (0 - 90) 1 N  O,  H'C-1H -1 
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where H = ag (4') /alp' and tpo is the true value of TD.
We now briefly discuss identification of the structural parameters. The discount
factor B is identified from the assumption that time preferences are additive. The pa-
rameters of the earnings equation in the host country are identified from earnings data.
Given these and the fact that because the utility of leisure is normalized to zero, re-
duced form A parameters are identified from the choice data, thus BG is identified from
the exclusion of Gspeakit and Unempit from the direct utility of working. Moreover, the
identification of the reduced form A parameters also implies that {0:31,O:32, a33, a34, 235  
are identified. Identification of the parameters of the earnings function in the home
country (3.6) would require data on immigrant earnings upon their return. Because our
data does not contain this information (see section 3.4), we cannot separately identify
eN  and all 7 parameters. Instead, our data identifies  {0:30 + eN70, eN71, eN72, eN73}
which nevertheless reveals some information on the coefficients of the earnings equa-
tion of wy. More precisely all four ON'y parameters are non-zero if and only if GN and
the parameter 7 are separately non-zero. Under the plausible assumption that BN > 0,
the signs of the 7 parameters as well as ratios of 7j are identified.
Given the parameters which are identified, some of the existing outmigration the-
ories can be tested in a straightforward way. The neo-classical assumption that out-
migration decisions are entirely based on earnings differentials can be evaluated by
testing whether the parameters determining the non-pecuniary benefits in equations
(3.3) and (3.4) are jointly equal to zero. The hypothesis that immigrants are myopic
decision makers can be evaluated by testing whether the discount factor B is equal to
zero. The importance of credit market rationing can be evaluated by testing whether
the coefficients of Sendcashit entering the non-pecuniary benefits of work and outmi-
gration, and whether returning money has a net positive effect on outmigration can
be seen by simulating choice sequences (section 3.5).  It is interesting to test the hy-
pothesis put forward in Dustmann (2003) which says that migration durations may in
fact decrease if the earnings in the host country increase, keeping earnings in the home
country fixed. This test is a simple comparative exercise and does not require separate
identification of the earnings function parameters in (3.6) and the marginal utility of
consumption in the home country (they are taken as given in the comparative static
exercise).
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3.4   Background and Data
The historical inflow of immigrants in Germany has never been stable. The period
of post-war adjustment saw a tremendous decolonization of former Soviet economies.
For example, 12 million Germans left eastern Europe by 1950, with 8 million coming
to West-Germany (Zimmermann, 1995; pp.46). Between 1955 and 1973, the strong eco-
nomic development across northern Europe paved the way to an increase demand for
labor and led to a large inflow of migrants mainly from the southern European coun-
tries and Turkey The percentage of foreign born workers employed in West-Germany
increased from 0.6% in 1957 to 11.2% in 1973.
Bilateral recruitment agreements between Germany and Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey,
Portugal and Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s reduced the migrants' cost of migration
considerably: workers entered Germany with a one year working contract they could
not be dismissed during the first year, travel costs were reimbursed, and employers
had to provide accommodation. After the oil shock in 1973, recruitment stopped, but
families and dependents of the immigrants living in Germany continued to flow in. In
1984, in light of difficult labor market conditions, the government issued a repatria-
tion scheme which gave financial incentives to outrnigrate. Financial incentives were
amongst the main instruments. All workers who had recently become unemployed
could apply for return package which included a lump sum subsidy and an allowance
for each child. Access to these programs was restricted to certain nationalities and
mostly immigrants of Turkish and Portuguese nationality participated; see Dustmann
(1996) for more details. In 1999, the Nationality Act was amended with the objective to
facilitate the naturalization of foreigners entering the country and to adapt immigra-
Hon flows to the requirements of the German economy (OECD, 2001). One immediate
action of the government was to vote the Nationality Code in July 1999. This code
attempts to make it easier for foreigners to obtain the German nationality.
The data used in this chapter is extracted from the immigrant sample of the pub-
lic use file of the GSOEP and covers the 1985-1999 period. The sample consists of an
oversample of immigrants living in West-Germany coming from countries which had
signed a bilateral migration agreement with Germany in the 19505 and 1960s namely
Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia13. Data on speaking fluency, feelings of
being socially integrated, intended length of stay and remittances where given in con-
secutive waves from 1984 until 1987. Starting in 1987, this information was gathered
every other year. In order to keep a constant time interval between observations, we
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have chosen to keep the 8 waves of the panel where detailed information on immi-
grants was available, each spanned by one year, starting in 1985 and ending in 1999.
We restrict our attention to males between 18-64 years of age during the 1985 and 1999
period. Excluded from the sample are individuals who died during the observation
period and individuals who gave incomplete information on any single variable en-
tering the empirical model in any of the 8 waves. This leaves us with a sample of 732
immigrants starting in 1985.
Figure 3.1 presents the proportions of immigrants in the sample which were work-
ing, not working or left the panel in each wave from 1987 to 1999.14 Changes over
time can be broken down to three sub-periods. The 1987 to 1991 period saw the per-
centage of working immigrants increase from 68% in 1987 to 73% in 1991. At the same
time, the proportion of non-working immigrants increased from 12% in 1987 to 16% in
1991. The movements in employment and unemployment were matched by a general
decline in the attrition rates, from 20% in 1987 to just over 10% in 1991. The period
from 1991 to 1995 is characterized by the general economic downturn which followed
reunification. The percentage of the immigrant population working declined steadily
to 58% in 1995 while the proportion of non-workers and the proportion of who left
the panel increased respectively by 8 and 6 percentage points. It is impossible to tell
from this raw data whether the rise in attrition, which occurred during this period of
economic austerity, was caused by increasing outmigration flows or due higher non-
response rates due to migration within the country. In the final sub-period (1995-1999),
the proportion of working immigrants slightly increased to 63% in 1997 before declin-
ing to 58% in 1999, while the proportion of non-working immigrants increased to 26%
in 1997 before falling to 22% in 1999. As a result, the attrition rate decreased in 1997
before increasing in 1999.
Table 3.1 gives variable descriptions and summary statistics for the 1985 and 1999
waves. We see that the average age of immigrants was 39.8 years in 1985 and 44.5 years
in 1999, a five year increase over a 14 year interval which indicates that the relatively
older immigrants left the panel. The average number of years of labor market experi-
ence increased by 3.3 years over the 14 year period, which is consistent with the fact
that the proportion of working immigrants fell in the 1990's.
Most immigrants migrated to Germany early in their productive lives, a fact re-
flected by an average age at immigration of nearly 24 years, a figure consistent through
out the observation period, indicating that most immigrants were in the age to au-
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tonomously decide to move to Germany The average year of immigration in our data
was 1969 in the 1985 wave, but increased to 1979 in the 1999 wave, indicating that the
earlier cohorts are most susceptible to have dropped out of the panel. As the earlier
cohorts contain the migrants with the higher number of years since migration in 1985,
it is not surprising to see that average years since immigration increases relatively less
than the 14 year time span, passing from 15.75 in 1985 to 19.63 in 1999. Reported feel-
ings on integration in the German society and reported speaking fluency improved
over time while health satisfaction deteriorated, the latter likely capturing an aging
effect. Finally, 73% of immigrants reported having a spouse living outside Germany
in 1985 while as little as 1% still do so in 1999. This severe drop can be interpreted in
two  different ways. First, spouses may have eventually migrated to Germany during
the time period. Second, it might be that immigrants whose spouse was living abroad
were more likely to outmigrate.
3.5 Estimation results for the structural model
The model was estimated by setting the time horizon, T, at 65 years of age. In this sec-
tion, we will compare two specifications, a myopic (static) model which sets  equal to
0 and a forward-looking (dynamic) model where B is estimated. In the later case. 0 con-
verged to an estimated value of 0.655, which is statistically significant at the 5% level,
indicating that immigrants are reasonably forward looking decision makers. Accord-
ingly, we will focus our analysis of the results using the forward looking specification
and make references to the myopic model when necessary.
Structural estimates and asymptotic standard errors of the myopic and forward-
looking models are presented in Table 3.2.15 All parameter estimates are fairly similar
across both models. Starting with the estimates of the earnings equation in Germany,
we find the usual positive effects of the number of years of education and labor market
experience, and the concave relationship between earnings and labor market experi-
ence in both the myopic and forward-looking models. Furthermore, increases in the
number of years since migration and improvements in the speaking fluency of im-
migrants have a positive and significant effect on labor market earnings. Living in
provinces of Germany with relatively higher unemployment rates has a small but sig-
nificant negative influence on earnings of immigrants, reflecting the presence of labor
market externalities. Immigrant earnings are found to increase by 1.1% with every
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extra year spent in the host country, which suggest that economic assimilation in the
sense of LaLonde and Topel (1992) is taking place.
As we mentioned in the introduction, it has recently been argued that this and other
measures of assimilation may be biased due to the non-randomness of the population
of working immigrants who remain in the host country. This hypothesis has up till
now received little empirical scrutiny. However, when assimilation is defined along
the lines of LaLonde and Topel or according to (3.7), the impact of selection can be
tested easily by comparing the slope parameters associated with the number of years
of labor market experience and the number of years since immigration of our structural
model and the OLS estimator. The last two columns of Table 3.2 present OLS estimates
of the earnings equation.  We find that both the first and second order terms of the
number of years of labor market experience, and the returns to an extra year of stay
in the host country are not statistically different between both models, which clearly
suggest that measures of economic assimilation, either defined in terms of equation
(3.7) or in terms of LaLonde and Topel (1992), are robust to endogeneity of the work
and outmigration decisions.16 Similar results were found in the reduced form model
of Chapter 2 which uses the same data. The main difference between the reduced form
approach of that chapter and the structural approach presented in this chapter is that
in the former case, selection bias was modelled as driven by correlated time persistent
unobserved heterogeneity across the earnings, work and outmigration behavion  In
the structural model here, selection is entirely based on observable accumulation of
human capital factors.
We now turn to the estimates of the utility function parameters in Table 3.2. Neo-
classical models of outmigration assume that outmigration is exclusively driven by
earnings differentials between the host and home country. Hence, the relevant null
hypothesis to test is whether all non-pecuniary rewards entering 5,J and 5 t are jointly
equal to zero. Our empirical results show that this null hypothesis is strongly rejected.
Increased satisfaction with income, higher feelings of being integrated in Germany and
sending money back to the native country all significantly increase the utility of work-
ing in Germany relative to not working but remaining in Germany. Sending money
back to the native country also has a significant and positive effect on the utility of
outmigration, relative to not working. Because a12 > a32, credit market rationing has
a negative net effect on outmigration in the myopic model.17 Satisfaction with income
is found not to affect e, the utility of outmigration relative to not working in the host
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country. Given that higher satisfaction with income was shown to lead to increases in
the utility of working in the host country, it is clear that this willlead to a lower out-
migration probability. Finally, psychic costs of working were captured by including
education, labor market experience and years since migration in the direct utility of
working. We find that keeping earnings constant the disutility from work in the host
country increases with the number of years of education, which can be explained by
the fact that individuals with higher levels of education tend to take jobs with more re-
sponsibilities, raising their psychic costs of working. Similarly, we find that the psychic
costs quickly increase with the number of years of labor market experience. Because
the marginal earnings gain from an extra year of labor market experience is small at
high values of labor market experience while at the same time psychic costs are at their
highest, we expect that immigrants with relatively higher migration and work experi-
ence retire progressively from the labor force. Furthermore, we find that the disutility
from working in the host country increases with the migration duration. Because the
increase in earnings which accrues to one extra year in the host country are small, this
suggests that the outmigration probability may in fact increase as the number of years
since immigration increase, despite that assimilation, in the sense of Lalonde and Topel
(1992), is taking place18. The marginal utility of consumption is positive and signifi-
cant, which indicates that earnings differentials affect the work and the outmigration
decisions. Some other results of interest are that higher age at immigration is associ-
ated with a higher utility of outmigrating, which could reflect that older migrants have
less time to integrate and establish solid roots and networks in Germany.
Turning now to parameter estimates of the earnings equation in the home country,
it is important to recall that without observations on the earnings of outmigrants in
the home country, the returns to human capital in the home country are not separately
identified from GN, nor are they separately identified from direct effects on utility
33 such as those found to affect the utility of working in Germany. However, underit
the realistic assumption that GN is positive19 and the (a priori strong) assumption that
the level of education and the number of years of labor market experience in the host
country do not affect the direct utility of outmigration other than through earnings, the
signs of 71,72 and 73 are identified.  If both assumptions hold jointly, we expect that
education enters positively (71 > 0), while experience enters with the usual concave
relationship (72  >  0,73  <  0)· If keeping earnings constant individuals with higher
levels of education or a higher number of years of labor market experience also suffer
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greater disutility from outmigrating, then estimated signs of the parameters may be
overturned. We find that education has a familiar positive and statistically significant
effect on outmigration, indicating that more educated immigrants have higher utility
from outmigrating relative to not working but remaining in the host country. How-
ever, contrary to what one would expect from a typical earnings profile, the relation-
ship between the number of years of labor market experience and outmigration utility
is convex rather than concave. Starting from no labor market experience, the utility
of outmigration is predicted to rapidly decrease as labor market experience increases,
reaching a minimum at 25.43 years of labor market experience. For an immigrant with
labor market experience higher than 25.43 years, the utility of outmigration progres-
sively increases as years of labor market experience are accumulated. One possible
way to explain this convex relation is that GN, instead of being positive, is negative. If
this were the case, we would find that education has a negative rather than a positive
effect of earnings, which is rather unlikely. Thus, it is more probable that the convex
pattern reflects unidentified psychic costs/gains associated with outmigration similar
to those found in the direct utility of working in the host country.
Our inferences on outmigration behavior rely on an identification strategy which
allowed us to extract information on outmigration behavior from sample attrition by
introducing in the likelihood function the parameter a312 which accounts for the pos-
sibility that attrition does not always lead to outmigration. The estimated value of a3.12
is 0.102, which represents the probability of attrition which is not due to outmigration.
The difference between the overall attrition rate, of the level of 17% per two years, and
#3,12, suggests an average outmigration rate of 6% per two years, or 3% per year, re-
markably close of the corresponding value reported in Chapter 2. The robustness of
this value to whether we estimate a reduced form or a structural model, or whether
we estimate a structural myopic model or a forward-looking model, is an indirect in-
dication that nonparametric identification of this quantity holds. This belief is further
reinforced by the simulation evidence presented below which indicates that the ma-
jority of immigrants in our sample are predicted to have an outmigration probability
close to 0, satisfying one of the essential requirements for nonparametric identification
of a3.12· To interpret the value of a312, it is useful to compare the average attrition rate
in our sample of immigrants with that of a representative sample of native Germans.
Table 3.3 is taken from Chapter 2 and presents the attrition rates per wave for both
immigrants and native German samples. Averaging over the sample period, we find
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that the attrition rate in the sample of Germans is 11.6% (per two years) and 17.2%
in the immigrant sample.  If the proportion of immigrants leaving the panel but re-
maining in Germany is of the same magnitude to that of Germans, than the difference
between attrition rates would represent the average outmigration rate. We do not have
direct information indicating that immigrants have the same normal attrition rate than
natives. However, apart from outmigration and deaths, panel attrition occurs either
because individuals decide to stop participating in the survey project, or individuals
move within Germany and cannot be tracked by the survey institution. Clark and Dr-
ever (2001) show that immigrants in the GSOEP sample are not more likely to move
within Germany than natives while Pischke and Velling (1997)  show that immigrants
in the western parts of Germany live in regions with a high concentration of ethnic
minorities. Both results imply that, if anything, immigrants are easier to track than
natives; hence the proportion of immigrants dropping out and staying in Germany
should be of similar magnitude to that of Germans and suggests that a3,12 should be
no greater than 11.6%, which is what we find in the data.
Before illustrating the implications of these estimates in terms of individual differ-
ences in life-cycle patterns of outmigration, we first present evidence that the model
explains our data reasonably well. We do so by simulating for each individual 1000
choice sequences from the first period to each individual's final observation period.
Yearly predicted proportions for each of our three decisions were then obtained by av-
eraging simulated choices in each period over all draws and all individuals. The top
panel of Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding simulated (S) and real (R) frequencies of
the choice to work in Germany along with the choice to stay in Germany without work-
ing. We see that our model fits the data well over our time horizon. Specifically, the
model is able to capture both the decline in the work participation and the associated
rise in the proportions of non-workers which occurred after 1991. The bottom panel
of Figure 3.2 shows the simulated and real attrition rates together with the predicted
outmigrated rate for each wave. Our model slightly under predicts attrition in 1987
and 1989 but fits the data well after that. The under prediction at the start of the sam-
ple period is consistent with the fact that attrition rates for native Germans were also
higher in the first waves of the panel (see Chapter 2), a fact which can be traced back to
the early survey methodology (Pannenberg, 1998). Finally, the predicted outmigration
rate rises from 2.5% in 1987 to 3.5% in 1995, at the peak of the economic downturn.
Subsequently, the outmigration rate is predicted to fall slightly from 1995 onwards,
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a drop which is consistent with the stabilization of the increase in the proportion of
immigrants' unemployed.
3.5.1    Implications for life-cycle behavior
The estimates in Table 3.2 show that both the myopic and forward looking models yield
very similar parameter estimates. However, because changes in model parameters will
additionally perturb the Emax functions entering the value functions of the forward
looking model, and because immigrants are found to be forward looking, predicted
life-cycle patterns may differ substantially across both models. In this section, we per-
form some comparative static exercises to quantify these differences. As the outmigra-
tion probability of an average sample immigrant is very low, performing comparative
static exercises on a representative immigrant does not induce sufficient variation in
his migration behavior to appreciate the implications of the model. Instead, we take as
a benchmark an immigrant at the margin of moving and staying in Germany. He his
defined as a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany four years ago, has 10
years of education, 8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country,
speaks below average German (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported
satisfaction with income of 3 (on the scale from 0 to 10), lives in a province with an un-
employment rate of 8% and has average labor market monthly earnings of 1000 DM in
1985. We chose a benchmark of 8 years of experience in order to be 6 years below the
potential number of years of experience.20 In this way we model an immigrant who
experienced periods of unemployment upon his arrival in the host country. We sim-
ulated predicted migration durations from 1985 onwards by simulating 10000 choice
sequences for our marginal immigrant from 1985 to the time he exits the country, using
the parameters reported in Table 3.2. We then alter successively either one variable or
parameter and compare the new distribution of predicted migration durations to the
benchmark case.
Table 3.4 reports, for both the dynamic and myopic model, predicted total migra-
tion durations (all durations include 4 years since immigration assumed at the start in
1985) averaged over all simulations. The forward-looking model benchmark predicts
an average migration duration of 14.95 years. We simulate a tax relief by permanently
increasing the net average monthly labor market earnings of immigrants by the lump-
sum value of 100 DM per month. Our simulations show that this tax relief increases
the migration duration by 65.75% to 24.78 years, a considerable increase relative to the
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amount given. Integration policies aimed at boosting human capital levels can take
different forms. Governments can offer language courses to speed up proficiency of
immigrants, or they may offer training which could raise the returns to labor market
experience of immigrants. Both policies are predicted to have sizeable consequences
for migration durations. Increasing speaking fluency from "Below average" to "Very
good" increases migration duration by 71.51% to 25.64 years, which reflects that immi-
grants with better speaking fluency have higher expected earnings. Offering training
courses which would raise the returns to labor market experience by 25% results in
average migration durations of 29.83 years, almost twice that of the benchmark case.
Alternatively, governments can reduce the barriers to entry in the host labor market
by offering internships or other programs aimed at increasing an immigrant's labor
market experience. Such a measure is simulated by increasing the number of years of
labor market experience of our marginal immigrant in 1985 by 4 years.  We find that
the migration duration increases relatively less than all previous changes, increasing
average duration by 34.18% to just above 20 years. Increasing the satisfaction with
labor income from 3 to 6 on the scale has a surprisingly important impact on the mi-
gration durations, which average 30.22 years, 102.14% higher than the baseline case.
Finally, returning money to the native country increases migration durations by 59.8%
to an average of 23.89 years, which is consistent with the predictions of recent models
of credit market rationing Mesnard (2001).
The results of table 3.4 focus on the mean of the predicted migration duration dis-
tributions. Because our simulations put an upper bound of 40 years on the possible
migration duration, the comparisons described above may be affected by this censor-
ing. Quantiles of the migration duration distribution on the other hand are robust to
this type of censoring.  For this reason, and also because our empirical model allows
sufficient non-linearities with respect to accumulated labor market experience, it is of
interest to investigate how other points of the migration duration distribution are af-
fected by changes in the economic environment. Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of
the simulated migration durations for some of the relevant cases discussed in Table 3.4.
Interestingly, the distribution of the migration durations in the benchmark case is split
between very low and very high durations. The migration duration probabilities de-
cline rapidly between 4 and 20 years of stay in the host country. The probability that the
migration duration lasts anywhere between 22 and 32 years is very small. However,
we find a small increase in the probabilities of having migrations beyond 32 years, and
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a 12% probability that our marginal immigrant enters retirement age (after 40 years in
the host country) while in Germany. The U-shape pattern of the migration duration
distribution is consistent with parameter estimates of the structural model discussed
earlier. There, we found a U-shape relation between labor market experience and the
utility of outmigration, which implies that both immigrants with the lowest and high-
est levels of labor market experience have a higher probability of outmigrating.  It is
interesting to see that the main impact of our comparative static exercises is to shift
probability mass from the lower hand of the distribution to the upper hand, wiping
out middle durations. The probability that our marginal immigrant reaches retirement
age in Germany increases from 12% in the benchmark case to a little more than 40%
in the case of a permanent tax relief of 100 DM. The effect of other changes are sim-
ilar, all leading to substantial increases in the probability of reaching retirement age
in Germany. One exception concerns increasing the number of years of labor market
experience in 1985. We find that this lowers low migration durations but increases
migration durations between 16 and 38 years, a change consistent with our parameter
estimates which suggested that immigrants with more years of labor market experi-
ence suffer greater disutility from working in the host country, and lower disutility
from outmigration.
The second column of Table 3.4 reports statistics for the same set of simulations,
this time using the myopic model. The magnitude and directions of the comparative
static effects differ enormously between both models. First we find that the predicted
average migration duration in the benchmark case are substantially lower, with an av-
erage duration of 6.19 years. This is consistent with the fact that myopic immigrants do
not discount future utility changes as their economic position improves. Accordingly,
we find that a tax relief of 100 DM increases the average migration duration relative by
11.78% relative to the benchmark case, a little less than an extra year. Improvements
in speaking fluency and returns to labor market experience have the same positive
effect on migration duration than in the forward looking model but again, of much
smaller magnitude (raising migration durations by 12.92% and 15.99% respectively).
The most surprising differences between the forward-looking model and the myopic
model concerns the effect of increasing immigrant satisfaction with income and the
effect of returning money to the native country. While increasing satisfaction with in-
come doubled the average migration duration in the forward-looking model, it has a
very small effect on the migration durations in the myopic model. Similarly, while re-
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turning money increased migration durations by 59.79% in the forward-looking model,
they are found to increase migration durations in the myopic model by only 2.56%. The
shape of the predicted migration durations in the myopic model is also very different
from those of the forward-looking model. Figure 3.4 presents the simulated migration
duration distributions for the myopic model. The benchmark distribution is heavily
skewed to the left, and the probability of staying in Germany for longer than 26 years
is in all practical sense zero. All other graphs have a similar shape and make clear that
the myopic model predicts that our marginal immigrant would never enter retirement
age in the host country, a clear distinction with the forward looking model.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter is a first attempt to estimate a structural dynamic model of work and out-
migration decisions that immigrants make over their life-cycle. The optimization prob-
lem of immigrants has the structure of a dynamic programming problem, which can
be solved recursively by backward induction. The model in this chapter distinguishes
itself from the existing literature by allowing immigrants to progressively revise their
migration duration decisions during the migration period. Despite this difference, the
model is general enough to incorporate several determinants of outmigration put for-
ward in the existing literature, namely differences in earnings and marginal utilities
of consumption between the home and host country, credit market rationing, feelings
of social integration and satisfaction with income. The labor market earnings of im-
migrants are directly incorporated in the model and estimated along with the choice
data. The structure of our model allows us to estimate several popular measures of
immigrant economic assimilation while controlling for sample selection biases due to
the potential endogeneity in years of labor market experience and years since immi-
gration, both of which evolve over time according to past work and outmigration de-
cisions. We used panel attrition as a proxy variable for outmigration and corrected for
the fact that part of the attrition does not lead to outmigration by extending to our dy-
namic programming setting the method proposed in the previous chapten This allows
us to make structural inferences on outmigration behavior in conjunction with work
and earnings determination without properly observing outmigration decisions. The
estimates of the model are used to predict changes in the life-cycle patterns of outmi-
gration decisions due to changes in feelings of being integrated in the host country,
>-
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income satisfaction, labor taxes, and returns to labor market experience. We estimate
the model using the immigrant sample of the GSOEP, which contains a rich amount of
information on the social and economic well being of immigrants during the 1985-1999
period. The model was shown to fit the data reasonably well.
Our parameter estimates indicate that commonly used measures of economic as-
similation are very robust to endogenous work and outmigration choices. Part of the
robustness can be attributed to the low outmigration rates predicted by the model. In-
deed, our model predicts an outmigration rate of 3% per year, with very little cyclical
fluctuations across the time period observed. We suspect that the magnitude of the en-
dogeneity bias may be higher in data sets subject to higher outmigration rates, as long
as outmigrants are clearly selected from either the top or (in the case of the current
chapter) from the bottom of the immigrant earning distribution. Because estimates of
assimilation rates can directly influence the development of new immigration policies,
verification of this hypothesis using other data sets within a framework similar to the
one presented here will be an important task for future research.
Our findings confirm the hypothesis recently put forward in the literature that out-
migration is not entirely driven by earnings differentials. Specifically, we find that
immigrants who feel integrated in the German society, those who are satisfied with
their income, and those who return money to their native country are less likely to
outmigrate. The results of this chapter also highlighted the importance of incorpo-
rating the work decision along with the migration duration decision of immigrants,
a feature previously ignored in the outmigration literature. We found that both im-
migrants with relatively low and high labor market experience have a greater overall
utility of outmigration, which suggests a U shape relation between labor market ex-
perience and the overall utility to outmigrate. The decrease in overall outmigration
utility starting from low levels of experience is consistent with increasing psychic costs
associated with outmigration, keeping earnings constant. The convex increase in over-
all outmigration utility predicted to occur beyond 25 years of labor market experience
is consistent with progressively lower psychic costs of outmigration and diminishing
returns to labor market experience in the host country. These results are interesting
given that most of the outmigration literature has analyzed outmigration within an
earnings differential paradigm which, by construction, orient policy recommendations
towards measures aimed at influencing the earnings differential between the host and
home country. Clearly our results do not rule out the important role played by la-
*
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bor market earnings in determining migration durations. However, they do indicate
that the shape of the migration duration distribution is determined by past work de-
cisions, indicating that much can be gained from an analysis in which work decisions
are endogenously determined. Moreover, the foregoing analysis indicates that policies
aimed at improving access of immigrants to the host labor market upon their arrival
may also play an important role in determining migration durations.
The bimodal shape of the migration duration distribution was found to be robust to
realistic changes in model parameters. Our simulation results indicate that changes in
the economic environment have strong repercussions on migration durations of immi-
grants at the margin between staying in Germany and leaving, suggesting that small
policy changes may lead these immigrants to substantially revise their intended mi-
gration duration. Because immigrants in our sample discount substantially the future,
the impact of several policy changes on predicted migration durations based on a for-
ward looking model are found to be much more sensitive to changes in the economic
environment as opposed to a purely static, myopic model. Moreover, the predicted
migration duration distribution in the myopic model is unimodal, suggesting that im-
migrants at the margin between staying in Germany and leaving would never establish
themselves permanently in the host country, a feature in sharp contrast with the pre-
dictions of the forward-looking model. These results illustrate the need for a careful
evaluation of immigrant subjective discount rates when discussing the impact of policy
changes.
:inally, this chapter has shown that the approach used to separate outmigration
from attrition performs well in the structural setting developed in this chapter. Esti-
mates of the probability of confounding immigrants who leave the panel but remain in
the host country with outmigrants were found to be robust to the structural specifica-
tion, and gave practically identical values to those reported in the reduced form model
of Chapter 2, an indication that they are relatively well identified. As several panel
data sets follow immigrants over time but almost none of them possess information
on micro-level outmigration decisions, we hope that this chapter is a first step towards
more structural tests of life-cycle models of outmigration behavior.
>
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1985 1999 Variable description 1to
Age 39.78 44.53
Experience 24.49 27.81 Number of years of labor market experience
Education 9.34 10.04 Number of years
Income satisfaction 6.14     5.80 0= unsatisfied,...,10 totally satisfied
Wife in Germany 0.73      0.01     1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Integration feeling 3.94     2.93    Do you feel German ?, 5=Totally, ..,1=Not at all
German speaking fluency    2.65     2.30     1 = bad, 5
= excellent
Intended length of stay 2.18     0.59     1 = Within 1 year,2 = After a few years,3 = Never
Age at immigration 24.03 24.90
Years since immigration 15.75 19.63
Immigration year 1969 1979
Number Obs. 732 393
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics, 1985 and 1999
%
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Myopic Dynamic OLS
Parameter Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Utility of working in Germany
a10 Constant -36.176 9.709*** -38.640 7.923***
all Sendcash 1.041 0.111*** 1.089 0.119***
a12 Incomesa 0.441 0.022*** 0.449 0.023***
a13 Intfeel 0.186 0.042*** 0.211 0.043***
a14 Educ /10 -1.323 0.538** -1.254 0.394***
a15 Exper /10 0.594 0.484 0.599 0.452
216 Expet /1000 -1.911 0.888** -1.766 0.802**
217 Ysm / 10 -0.889 0.196*** -0.949 0.161 ***
BG Marg. utility cons. 4.624 1.344*** 4.906 1.086***
Utility  of outinigrating
K30 + GH7O Constant -4.229 1.712** -3.900 1.961**
R31 Sendcash 0.965 0.370** 0.784 0.324**
a32 Incomesa 0.023 0.086 0.059 0.070
a33 Intfeel 0.294 0.182 0.121 0.141
a34 Ageatim 0.795 0.379** 0.773 0.319**
235 Wifeinge 0.442 0.258* 0.181 0.208
BH71 Educ /10 6.578 1.257*** 3.252 0.971 ***
BH72 Exper /10 9.611 7.753 -2.934 0.858***
8H73 Exper2 /1000 -5.834 8.337 5.743 1.507***
Earningsjitnction in Germany
90 Constant 7.369 0.069*** 7.384 0.067*** 7.31 0.05***
91          Educ /10 0.284 0.042*** 0.252 0.037*** 0.25 0.03***
92 Gspeak -0.054 0.008*** -0.056 0.008*** -0.06 0.01***
93 Unemp -0.004 0.002** -0.005 0.002** 0.00 0.00
94           Exper /10 0.333 0.034*** 0.359 0.036*** 0.37 0.01 ***
95         Exper2 /1000 -0.581 0.062*** -0.635 0.064*** -0.65 0.04***
96          Ysm /10 0.112 O.Oll
*** 0.111 0.011*** 0.11 0.01 ***
Auxiliary parameters
23,12 Partial obs. prob. 0.103 0.028*** 0.102 0.028***
0 Discount factor             0             - 0.655 0.302**
Log-L (stepl) -3015.6 -3002.73
Distance MDE 0.078 0.074
Table 3.2: Minimum distance estimation of structural model. Asymptotic standard





N     % 1985 Attrition rate N % 1985   Attrition rate
1985 1987 100         - 732 100         -
1987 1648 82.9 17.1 583 79.6 20.4
1989 1408 70.8 14.6 473 64.6 18.9
1991 1253 63.1 11.0 416 56.8 12.1
1993 1122 56.4 10.5 355 48.4 14.7
1995 1002 50.4 10.7 291 39.7 18.0
1997 919 46.3 83 242 33.1 16.8
1999 834 41.9 9.3 195 26.7 19.4
Mean 1985-1999 11.6 17.2









4 = 0.655 0=0
                                                                                                               Mean    %8
with baseline    Mean    %6 with baseline
Baseline 14.95                     -                      6.19                      -
3 100 DM per month extra 24.78 65.75 6.92 11.78
Cri
4 Speaking fluency "Very good" 25.64 71.51 6.99 12.92
#                             Satisfaction with income 6 out of 10 30.22 102,14            6.47              4.56
Returns to experience 25% higher 29.83 99.53 6.18 15.99U Labor market experience 4 years higher 20.06 34.18 6.39 3.23
Returning money to native country 23.89 59.79 6.35 2.56
Table 3.4: Simulated migration durations in years. Baseline represents as a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated to Germany
four years ago, has 10 years of education, 8 years of experience, does not return money to his native country, speaks below
average German (4 on the scale from 1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with income of 3 (on the scale from
0 to 10), lives in a province with unemployment rate of 8
2
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Myopic Dynamic
Parameter Variable Estimate SDE Estimate SDE
A10 Constant -1.203 0.426** -1.804 0.543***
All Sendcash 0.999 0.112*** 1.045 0.121 ***
A12 Incomesa 0.428 0.022***. 0.435 0.023***
A13 Intfeel 0.108 0.044** 0.118 0.046**
114       Educ /10 0.034 0.248 0.039 0.254
A15 Gspeak -0.191 0.061*** -0.204 0.063***
A16 Unemp -0.091 0.018*** -0.096 0.019***
117       Exper /10 2.090 0.178*** 2.555 0.321 ***
A18      Exper2 /1000 -4.541 0.324*** -5.157 0.516***
119       Ysm /10 -0.392 0.075 -0.442 0.078***
A30 Constant -14.467 19.806 -6.239 2.386**
A31 Sendcash 0.571 0.388 0.626 0.332*
A32 Incornesa 0.089 0.091 0.094 0.071
A33 Intfeel 0.275 0.182 0.166 0.143
A34 Ageatim 0.437 0.418 0.549 0.338
A35 Wifeinge 0.420 0.258* 0.147 0.209
A36       Educ /10 5.254 1.354*** 2.786 0.976**
A37 Exper /10 -1.505 8.529 -1.338 1.021
A38      Exper2 /1000 5.768 9.339 3.586 1.609**
a3,12 Partial obs. prob. 0.117 0.033*** 0.112 0.031 ***
0 Discount factor                     0              - 0.618 0.342*
Log-L -3015.6 -3002.73
90 Constant 7.754 0.220*** 7.568 0.242***
91       Educ / 10 0.229 0.045*** 0.240 0.037***
92 Gspeak -0.054 0.008*** -0.054 0.008***
93 Unemp 0.007 0.003** 0.007 0.003**
94        Exper / 10 0.367 0.050*** 0.349 0.048***
95 Exper/1000 -0.669 0.102*** -0.622 0.097***
96        Ysm / 10 0.126 0.011*** 0.126 0.011***
T2 Work selection 0.239 0.091** 0.169 0.101*
9 Outmigration selection -0.038 0.009*** -0.044 0.009***
Table 3.5: Maximum likelihood estimates of reduced form model. Asymptotic stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. ***,**,* denote respectively significance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent level
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Figure 3.1: Proportions of immigrants working in Germany, not working and attrition
per time period, 1987-1999.
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Figure 3.2: Goodness of fit of the model. Real (R) and simulated (S) frequencies of each
alternative over the 1987 and 1999 period. Simulations are performed by taking for
each individual and each time period 1000 draws from the extreme-value distribution.
The simulations are obtained by averaging over individuals and draws the predicted
frequency of each choice.
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Benchmark 100 DM per month
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Figure 3.3: Simulated distributions for the forward looking model. Percentages are
obtained by simulating 10000 choice sequences and averaging the predicted migration
durations over all sequences. Benchmark is a 30 year old immigrant who migrated
to Germany four years ago, has 10 years of education, 8 years of experience, does not
return money to his native country, speaks below average German (4 on the scale from
1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with income of 3 (on the scale from 0
to 10), lives in a province with unemployment rate of 8% and has an average earnings
of 1000 DM.
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Figure 3.4: Simulated distributions for the myopic looking model. Percentages are
obtained by simulating 10000 choice sequences and averaging the predicted migration
durations over all sequences. Benchmark is a 30 year old immigrant, who migrated
to Germany four years ago, has 10 years of education, 8 years of experience, does not
return money to his native country, speaks below average German (4 on the scale from
1 to 5), is not married, has a reported satisfaction with income of 3 (on the scale from 0
to 10), lives in a province with unemployment rate of 8% and has an average earnings
of 1000 DM
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Notes
1 In this chapter, we treat return migration and outmigration as equivalent concepts since most of the
outmigration movements are believed to be return movements. However, the model above does not
rule out other departure destinations.
2In our data, reversible outmigration is negligible (Pannenberg, 1998). In other countries, the as-
sumption of non reversible outmigration is not likely to be satisfied. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) find
that reversible outmigration of Mexican immigrants living in the United States is particularly important.
30utmigration costs do not enter the budget constraint associated with outmigration, reflecting the
fact that the German federal government reimbursed outmigration costs from 1984 to 1992 (see Section
3.4 for details). We do not model the regime change after 1992.
4A practical reason for not including savings and borrowing behavior in the model presented here
is that this will generally lead to a considerable expansion of the choice set and the state space which,
given the associated computational burden, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
5T e most widely used alternative in the dynamic programming literature has been to assume that
individuals have rational expectations about the evolution of the exogenous variables over time. Man-
ski (2003) makes a convincing case against the plausibility of the rational expectations assumption in
the context of individual decision making. Since it is unclear whether we would be doing more harm
than good by assuming immigrants have rational expectations, we maintain through out the (restric-
tive) assumption that immigrants have myopic expectations concerning the evolution of all exogenous
variables.
6As is well known, solving the dynamic programming problem is computationally demanding. Op-
timizing the likelihood function presented below took more than one month on a 2.66 GHz pentium 4
processor. On the other hand, maximization of the likelihood function assuming immigrants are myopic
agents took less than a minute.
71-hisis closely related to the class of discrete choice models where the endogenous discrete outcome
is either misclassified or misreported. See Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) for a survey of this
literature. Our approach differs from this literature as one of the realizations of the binary outcome is
measured without error.
8The individual likelihood contribution of an immigrant can be written using (3.12) and using the
fact that the remaining event Pr (d  =l u d   = 11)4,) is given by
Pr  d ,  =  1 U d   =  1 IM,)      =     Pr   d,J  =  l u di,  =  1 Id ,  =  l  u dll  =  l   Pr (dit  =  lud   =  lly'l)
+Pr <di, =1 u d , = 1Id ,=1) Pr  dt, = 11Y1,)
=0
=    (1 - 13.12) Pr (dt,=ludi=l'Yit)
where we made use of the fact that Pr (djt  = l u d   = 1 Idji  = l u d   = 1)  = 1 - a3.12·
9Bellemare (2003) shows that the nonparametric identification result also holds, with minor modifi-
cation, if K3.12 depends on observable characteristics.
ioSeveral approaches have been proposed to identify and test for outmigration bias despite not di-
rectly observing outmigration. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) heuristically document the importance of
outrnigration in the U.S. by comparing the skill composition of specific cohorts over time. However,
their approach allows to identify the direction but not the magnitude of the outmigration selectivity. Re-
cent attempts have tried to combine longitudinal and cross-sectional data (Hu, 2000; Lubotsky, 2000).
These studies face several problems, notably censoring of the earnings records, representativeness of
the sample of participants in the longitudinal data sets, little information on human capital of migrants
and partial observation of some key variables.  None of these approaches allow to recover either the
conditional work probability or the conditional earnings of outmigrants.
11The degree of under-identification in discrete dynamic programming models is discussed in Rust
(1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002).
12Examples of restrictions are Alo  = a10 + 8690 and A13  =  86 92·
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13Immigrants of Portuguese nationality are not included in the panel.
14The 1985 choice data is omitted from the figure as no attrition took place by construction.
15The corresponding estimates of the reduced form choice and earnings parameters are presented in
Table 3.5 in the appendix.
16Formally to asses the impact of endogeneity on assimilation of the type defined in equation (3.7)
would require using earnings equation parameters for Germans which are estimated using a dynamic
model which endogenizes the number of years of labor market experience. We leave this task for future
work.
17The effect of credit market rationing in a dynamic model will be evaluated below.
18Recall that Lalonde and Topel (1992) define assimilation as the effect on one extra year of experi-
ence in the host country, which corresponds to the coefficient of the number of years since immigration
entering the earnings equation in Germany.
19The literature  (see e.g. Dja ic and Milboume, 1988; Stark, 1998) t ically assumes  that  GN   >  OG.Given our estimated value of B   is 4.906 (see table 3.2), it follows that 9    >0 will hold.
20In this case. the number of potential years of experience are 30-10 years of education -6 = 14.




It is increasingly argued that a nation's social capital can influence its economic per-
formance. Although there is an ongoing debate over what constitutes social capital
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Durlauf 2002), there seems to be a consensus that both aver-
age societal trust and trustworthiness are two important components. The transactions
cost paradigm remains the traditional way of thinking about the mechanism by which
both these components of social capital affect economic performance. When societal
trust and trustworthiness levels are high, transactions costs are low which makes or-
ganizations and governments more efficient which ultimately leads to better economic
performance.
The research on social capital started with the influential work of Putnam (1993)
who found a strong correlation between measures of civic engagement and govern-
ment quality across regions in Italy. The association of social capital with growth
started with the work of Knack and Keefer (199D, and Zak and Knack (2001) who
find that a one-standard deviation increase in the World-Value Survey (WVS) trust
index increases economic growth by more than one-half of a standard deviation. La
Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (199D find that across countries, a one-standard
deviation increase in the same measure of trust increases judicial efficiency by 0.7 of a
standard deviation and reduces government corruption by 0.3 of a standard deviation.
These empirical facts rest on the WVS trust index constructed by drawing in each par-
ticipating country a random sample of participants who are asked to answer, amongst
others, the following question
oThis chapter is the result of joint work with Sabine Krijger.
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WVS trust question Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
The WVS reports for each country the percentage of responders who indicated that
"Most people can be trusted".
Because of the strong correlation between measures of social capital and economic
growth, and since age and income distributions of many Western societies are pre-
dicted to evolve over time in very alarming ways (Gruber and Wise, 2001; Gottschalk
and Smeeding, 199D, it becomes relevant for policy makers to investigate how average
trust and trustworthirtess in their population are shifted as a result of changes in age,
education, income, and past life experiences of individuals. To perform these measure-
ments, two essential features must be combined: 1) to have a random sample drawn
from a country's population, and 2) being able to measure trust and trustworthiness
with little error. The motivation for the first condition follows from the law of large
numbers, whereas sample average trust and trustworthiness are consistent estimates
of their population counterparts. The second requirement follows from the fact that
the estimated parameters we make inferences on will, in general, be biased if trust and
trustworthiness are measured with error (Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz, 2001).
The empirical literature has up to now been unable to meet both requirements si-
multaneously. The empirical methods employed so far to analyze individual trust are
survey questionnaires and economic experiments. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) use
answers to the WVS trust question to investigate determinants of trust in the United
States. The main advantage of their approach is that it allows to make population in-
ferences by observing the behavior of a randomly drawn sample of individuals from
that population.  The main drawback is that researchers run the risk of collecting an-
swers to a vague and hypothetical question which can create a discrepancy between
someone's answers and his actual behavior. Thus, part of the variation in responses
may be attributed to differences in interpreting who compromises "most people", dif-
ferences in what is meant to trust someone etc. Moreover, variations in response may
also arise because individuals do not answer truthfully to the question.
Economic experiments have the virtue of countering the effects associated with sur-
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vey data by observing the actual behavior of individuals placed in a context which is
under experimental control. These experiments offer an attractive alternative to sur-
veys, given one can design an experiment which captures the essential features of trust
and trustworthiness which are of interest. The seminal experiment of Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe (1995) (hereafter BDMc) remains today the main experimental design
used to test for the presence of trust and trustworthiness (more details on the game
are given later). The general results of the BDMc game are that people place trust in
others, but it is ambiguous whether or not this trust pays. These results have since
been shown to be robust to several framing effects (Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing,
2000) and role reversals (Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen, 2003). The main drawback
of these types of experiments is that subjects are generally drawn from homogenous
pools of university students. These subjects lack the required variation in background
characteristics to measure how these variables influence trust and trustworthiness.
The analysis of determinants of trustworthiness is even less documented than trust
and relies mostly on analyzing responders' behavior in trust games such as the BDMc
game. Hence, this form of analysis suffers from the same drawbacks outlined above.
Our little knowledge of the determinants of trustworthiness at the population level is
source of concern as recent research has argued that trustworthiness could be " the"
economically relevant component of social capital to understand the process of eco-
nomic development (Francois and Zabojnik, 2002).
This chapter makes three important contributions. First, we combine the strengths
of survey and experimental methods in a straightforward way by having a random
sample of the Dutch population play a computerized version of the BDMc trust game.
This allows us to touch on several related issues. First and foremost we add to the
scarce body of knowledge on determinants of trust and trustworthiness by estimating
age, education, and other life experience effects from experimental trust responses. The
key results are that the age and education level of subjects influence trust and trustwor-
thiness in very different ways. Specifically, we find that there is an inverted U shape
relation between trust and education, and trust and age, while both relationships are
U shaped with respect to trustworthiness. The later finding contrasts with some of the
existing relationships found in the social capital literature. The second advantage of
combining survey and experimental methods is that we are able to test the assump-
tion of parallelism between the lab and the field.  Up till now, this assumption has
generally been tested with newspaper experiments (e.g., see Bosch-Dom&nech. Mon-
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talvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002) for a survey of newspaper experiments) and internet
experiments (e.g., Lucking-Reiley, 1999). Because newspaper readers or internet users
are not generally representative of a nation's population, these mediums prevent pop-
ulation inferences which are the primary concern of this chapter. Three noteworthy
experiments have recently been run with representative samples. Harrison, Lau, and
Williams (2002) use a random sample of the Danish population to investigate the het-
erogeneity in individual discount rates.  Hey (2002) used the CentERpanel of Tilburg
University (more on this panel later on) to have a random sample of the Dutch pop-
ulation play an experiment on decision making under risk and uncertainty. Fehr, Fis-
chbacher, Rosenbladt Schupp, and Wagner (2002) report about a "preliminary analy-
sis" (p. 529) of a "first implementation" (p. 528) of an interview based trust game with
the German Socio-Economic Panel.
The second contribution of the chapter builds on the seminal work of Glaeser, Laib-
son, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) (hereafter GLSS) who, among other things, inval-
idate the use of survey trust measures on the basis that they do not predict well trust
responses in the lab.  We show that the predictive power of survey trust is strongly
related to the sample used and the experimental design. The immediate consequence
of this is that experimenters can influence the predictive power of survey trust by ap-
propriately choosing subjects and experimental designs. This leads us to conclude that
the predictive power of survey trust questions is insufficient to validate or invalidate
their use. We propose a new approach to compare both trust measures, which consists
of testing whether survey and experimental approaches are equally informative on the
determinants of trust. Our evidence shows that the effect of some background charac-
teristics, especially religion and education, can change dramatically when using stated
rather than experimental trust responses.
Finally, by giving our subjects the choice to participate and by observing the char-
acteristics of those who refuse to do so, we are in the unique position to test for partici-
pation bias in our experiment. If participants have for example above average taste for
gambling and risk, or higher cognitive abilities than non-participants, and these un-
observable attributes are correlated with the outcomes that are measured in the lab,
a participation bias will be present. Because experiments typically do not observe
non-participants, tests of participation bias in experiments are very limited. Eckel
and Grossman (2000) find some evidence on the presence of participation bias in a
classroom experiment by comparing responses of student volunteers and "pseudo"-
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volunteers. Their results are specific to the game they use (a dictator game) and hold
only for student populations.  In this chapter we provide the first full fledge test of
participation bias in experimental economics. We do not find any evidence suggesting
that the trust and trustworthiness behavior of participants in our experiment differ in
any way from that of randomly selected subjects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
design of the experiment, the experimental procedure, and our sample. Section 4.3
discusses the empirical results on trust. Findings on trustworthiness are presented in
section 4.4. Section 4.5 reports results for participation bias while section 4.6 discusses
and concludes.
4.2 The Experimental Design and the Sample
The recruitment of our subjects was made by CentERdata, the survey research insti-
tute of Tilburg University in the Netherlands.  The main activity of CentERdata is to
manage and carry out panel surveys through a telepanel: the CentERpanel (hereafter
Cp), consisting of approximately 2000 representative Dutch households. Every Fri-
day, CP's household members receive a questionnaire which they are asked to fill in           '
at any time between Friday and Tuesday of the following week. This questionnaire is
filled at home either on a computer or on a television set which is connected to a set-
up box linking the household to the CentERdata server. In order to keep the sample
representative of the Dutch population, low income households without a computer
or a television set are given the necessary equipment in order to complete the weekly
questionnaire.1
There are many reasons why the CP is an attractive medium to conduct experi-
ments. First, it gives us access to a representative sample of a population, which is
the key feature of this study. Second, because participants answer questions on a com-
puter or a television set, we are able to replicate as closely as possible the environment
of a laboratory experiment, which simplifies comparisons of our results with those of
the existing literature. Third, because participants communicate with CentERdata, the
experiment is double blind as participants were told that they will be anonymously
matched and that their identities would not be revealed to the experimenters. Finally,
as CentERdata reimburses the weekly telephone costs for answering the questionnaire
by crediting CentERpoints (1 CentERpoint = 0.01 Euro) to their private bank accounts
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four times a year, our participants are already familiar to payment in fictitious currency.
This allows us to use CentERpoints as the experimental currency unit and reimburse
our participants in a very convenient way.
Our design closely follows BDMc.2 A sender3 S and a responder R were both en-
dowed with 500 CentERpoints. S could send money to R from his endowment. We
discretized the choice  set of  S  to 11 amounts YE   €   {0,50,...,450,500}. The amount  S
sent was doubled by the experimenters and added to R's endowment. We measured
responses using the strategy method by which R was asked to return an amount to S,
contingent on each of the 11 possible amounts he might receive from S. The response
which corresponded to the actual decision of S was chosen to be the effective action
and determined the payoff of both participants. After all participants made their de-
cisions, S and R players were randomly matched and payoffs were computed based
on the decisions of the pain The final payoffs were computed as follows: S received
the initial 500 CentERpoints reduced by the amount sent YE plus the amount received
from R, while R received his initial endowment of 500 CentERpoints, the amount sent
by S multiplied by 2 minus the amount returned to S.
The strategy method was chosen to overcome the difficulty of having CP members
play together in real time. This method has several additional advantages. First, it
facilitates data acquisition as the complete strategy plan for all 11 possible amounts
received is elicited. Second, as our game may seem complex to some subjects, the
strategy method requires that people thoroughly familiarize themselves with the ram-
ifications of all choices, so that we do not retrieve data from uninformed subjects.4
Under the assumption that both players maximize their monetary payoffs, the Nash
equilibrium of the game is for S to send nothing to R, as R's dominant strategy is to re-
turn nothing to S. Hence, observing increasing positive amounts sent is interpreted as
evidence that people increasingly trust others. Likewise, observing increasing amounts
returned is taken as evidence of the existence of increasing trustworthiness.  It is im-
portant to stress that repeated game effects, retaliation strategies, and game experience
effects are deliberately excluded by our experimental design. Thus, one can think of
the current design as measuring the basic trust propensity of an individual at a given
point in time.5
S and R were additionally asked to state their beliefs about their partners' action.
These questions were asked after both players made their decisions in order to cir-
cumvent the possibility that belief elicitation induces non--cooperative behavior when
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asked before the play of the game (Croson, 2000). We elicit senders' beliefs with two
questions. The first question asks to state how much they think R will return to them.
The second question asks them to state what they think the average S player will send.
The latter question is intended to capture behavior directed towards some social norm.
Responders on the other hand simply had to state how much units they thought of re-
ceiving from senders. This concluded the experimental part of the session.
All players were then asked to answer two survey questions. The first question
asked players to state their average experience with trust
Lifetime trust experience question   In the past, when you trusted someone, was your
trust usually rewarded or usually exploited?
(Always rewarded) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 (Always exploited).
This question will be used to test for the presence of state dependent behavior
whereby differences in past experiences with trust may lead to different experimen-
tal decisions.
The second question was the WVS trust question presented in the introduction.
This question will allow us to compare the inferences on trust which can be made us-
ing stated and revealed decisions. Contrary to GLSS, our subjects answered the WVS
trust question after having made their experimental decisions. This has the benefit of
not framing the experimental decision as one involving trust. The disadvantage is that
answers to the WVS trust question may be influenced by the experimental decisions
which were made before, which would complicate the comparisons of our experimen-
tal and survey trust measures. In the next section, we develop a simple economet-
ric model which allows to test for the presence of misreported answers to the WVS
trust question, and examines to which extent misreporting was influenced by the ex-
perimental decision. As will be shown, we do not find evidence suggesting that our
sequence of tasks influenced answers to the WVS question.
Two weeks after the experiment, each participant received feedback information
on the outcome of the game and their final payoff which was later credited to their
CentER bank accounts. The experiment was conducted in two sessions, in the 31st
and the 36th weeks of the calendar year 2002. Individuals contacted had to read an
opening screen informing them that they were selected to participate in an experiment
conducted jointly by a team of university researchers. A detailed description of the
game followed with the mode of payments. Each person was informed that condi-
tional on their participation, they would be randomly matched to one of the roles.
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The role was revealed to panel members once they had agreed to participate. We con-
tacted 541 panel members from which 42 declined to participate.6 Of the 499 panel
members who completed the experiment 276 were S players and 223 were R play-
ers. Table 4.1 gives the description of the variables and descriptive statistics of the 541
household members contacted for senders, receivers and non-participants. The means
of most variables are relatively identical across non-participants, senders, and respon-
ders.  63.7% of the persons contacted were heads of households and most players either
had a secondary or vocational training degree. Catholics and protestants are the two
most important religious communities in the sample and their relative weights in the
three participation categories are very similar. Two notable differences across the three
groups concern work propensity and age. Non-participants are on average 10 years
older than both senders and responders.  This age effect is also reflected in a higher
labor market retirement frequency and lower labor work participation.
4.3    Results on Trust
The distribution of amounts sent in the experiment is shown in figure 4.1. The two
distinctive features of this distribution are 1) the majority of subjects send positive
amounts 2) the distribution is heavily skewed to the left, with a mode at 5, the equal
split category The shape of this distribution is familiar to that usually found in lab-
experiments with student samples (BDMc; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing, 2000) but
differs greatly from that of GLSS, which was heavily skewed to the right, with most
subjects sending the maximal possible amount. We will try to reconcile the differences
between GLSS and our data below.
We assume that senders have a continuous unobserved latent trust propensity T,*
This propensity is heterogeneously distributed in the population according to
Tr  = 4, B + El (4.1)
where xf is a vector of observed characteristics of sender i, 4 is a vector of unknown
slope parameters, and €i is a random term capturing unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals. Our experimental trust measure yiE is ordinal and discrete. The ordered
probit model is adequate to analyze this type of data (Maddala, 1983). However, the
ordered probit model requires a sufficient amount of observations in each discrete cat-
egory to estimate nuisance threshold parameters. As can be seen from figure 4.1, cat-
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egories 300 to 450 CentERpoints have very little observations. In our empirical ap-
plication, we merge these categories and estimate an ordered probit model with eight
categories.
The first 2 specifications of table 4.2 present ordered probit regressions. The first
specification uses as regressors a standard set of background characteristics supple-
mented by reported life experience with trust (TRUSTEXID, subjects' beliefs about the
amount they expect to be returned to them (STHINK), and the average amount they
expect other senders will send (SMEANS). The second specification omits beliefs.7
In both specifications, we do not find gender (GENDER) of subjects to influence
trust. This contrasts with the earlier findings in the social capital literature which
showed that women are less involved in organizations (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacer-
dote, 2002) and that women trust less than men (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). We
also find that family size (HSIZE), whether an individual is retired from the labor force
(RETIRED) or is not working (WORK) do not correlate with trust.
The estimated age effect is robust and of similar magnitude across both specifica-
tions. Both age parameters are significant. Based on specification 1 and holding other
factors constant, trust is seen to increase until the age of 30, beyond which it starts
to decline. This reconfirms the inverted-U shape pattern usually found in the social
capital literature (Putnam, 2000; Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002) although those
studies report that social capital reaches a high at 45 years of age. Education also has
an inverted-U profile. We find that individuals with secondary and technical training
are more likely to trust than subjects with either low education levels (the omitted cat-
egory) and subjects with university degrees. Comparisons of specification 1 with spec-
ification 2 show that the education relationship is also robust to inclusions of beliefs.
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) find a positive relation between education and
organizational membership but do not report results which would indicate the pres-
ence of non-linearities. Subjects' religious beliefs were classified in three categories,
protestants, catholics, and atheists. We find no evidence that either catholics or protes-
tants trust differently than atheists (the omitted category), which squares with results
found by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).
Both belief variables, STHINK and SMEANS, have positive effects on trust and are
highly significant. These results indicate that senders who expected to receive more
sent more, and senders who thought other senders would send more increased their
amount sent. The former result captures expectations of the subjects.8 The latter re-
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sult can be interpreted as a social norm as individuals tend to partly emulate what
they expect others to do. In order to asses the contribution of beliefs to the empirical
model, we computed a likelihood-ratio test comparing specifications 1 and 2. The test
value of 232.12(5% X2 critical value of 5.99) indicates that apart from being statistically
Significant, beliefs substantially improve the predictive fit of the model.
Finally, we asked subjects to report their lifetime experience with trust (TRUST-
EXP). This was done to investigate whether a form of state dependance existed, whereas
an individual who is dissatisfied with his experiences with trust is less likely to trust
in the experiment.9 Our results show that the state of trust individuals perceive them-
selves to be in does not significantly correlate with experimental trust.
4.3.1 Comparing Experimental and Survey Trust Measures
In this section, we sequentially address the following questions: 1) Do answers to the
WVS trust question predict well experimental trust? 2) Do survey and experimental
trust measures provide the same information on the determinants of trust? It is impor-
tant to stress that both questions are complementary. The first question is relevant if
we are interested in predicting experimental trust responses. However, it leaves open
the reasons of what drives the possible correlation between both variables. The second
question asks whether we can extract the same information from both set of measures.
Prediction
The question of whether or not answers to the WVS trust question predict experimental
trust has been addressed by GLSS. Running a linear regression of experimental trust
of answers to the WVS trust question and a set of covariates, they find that answers
to the WVS do not significantly explain their experimental trust outcomes. The main
explanations given for this result are that the WVS question is vague, hypothetical, and
likely to be misreported. To investigate which of these explanations is more relevant,
we first follow GLSS by adding answers to the WVS trust question (WVS) as a regressor
in our experimental trust equation. This corresponds to specification 3 of table 4.2.
Contrary to GLSS, we find that answers to the WVS trust question do significantly
explain experimental trust. Furthermore, all other parameter estimates of the model
are robust to the inclusion of this variable.
How can we rationalize the finding that answers to the WVS trust question pre-
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dicts well our experimental trust and not that of GLSS? In our view, the two elements
explaining the differences between both studies are the amount of background infor-
mation on subjects which is available, and differences in experimental designs. The
role of each of these factors can be better understood by analyzing the following sys-
tem of linear equations 10
yf   =   x:,0E + IY,WVS + Ef (4.2)
Y,wvs   =   lf'Bwvs + Ei
WVS
(4.3)
Equation (4.2) is the linear version of equation (4.1), where y,wvs denotes answers to
the WVS question, Ef captures the unobserved determinants of experimental trust and
5 measures the predictive power of answers to the survey trust question. The second
equation relates answers to the WVS trust question to xf and an unobserved compo-
nent Ewvs I
It is important to point out that the result which we present below will hold
in general for any other measure or linear combination of survey trust and social cap-
ital measures which are used as predictors. Substituting (4.3) in (4.2) and rearranging
yields
E       tl -E+Yi =Xi P + IEIvvs + Ef (4.4)
where BE+ =BE + 1 WVS . From equation (4.4) we see that the value of & is iden-
tified from the variation between yf and €,wvs.  Partialling out the covariates 4, it is
straightforward to show that for the linear model, the probability limit of the estimated
predictive effect K is
/  V (Ef)     1/2p lim  I= 5+ Cor  ei, EIVVS (4.5)C V (£1Vvs)
where V (€,E) and V (Ef) are the variances of Ei and tivs and Cor (€f, Eivs) denotes
the correlation between both unobserved components.
The impact of the amount of background information available and the experimen-
tal design on the estimated predictive power of survey trust measures emerge from
equation (4.5). First, the amount of information on the characteristics of subjects which
is available to experimenters will play an important role, as any omitted character-
istics remotely correlated with survey and experimental trust will be captured by E,E
and E,wvs. The higher the number of common unobserved characteristics, the higher
Cor (Ef, trvs)  will be.  It is important to note that a stronger correlation will amplify
the differences in estimates of f between studies which have different variance terms
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V (Ef )  and V (Et/vs).  One such omitted factor is subjects' history of traumatic experi-
ences which has been shown to be correlated with trust (Alesina and La Fererra, 2002),
but which is not observed by GLSS nor the present study. We investigated the amount
of correlation between ef and Er'vs in our data by jointly estimating equations (4.2) and
(4.3), conditioning on the set of background characteristics corresponding to specifica-
tion 4 in table 4.2.11 The estimated value of Cor (Ef, Er'vs) was 14.8%,significantat the
1% level. To get an idea of the impact an omitted variable can have on the estimated
correlation between unobserved components, we removed lifetime experience with
trust (TRUSTEXP) from the list of regressors. As conjectured, the estimated correlation
increased from 14.8% to 17.28%.12
Second, differences in experimental design will directly influence the predictive
power of survey trust measures via J. the common component between both trust
measures, and via V (Ef), the variance of the experimental design. The common el-
ement shared by two trust measures g is expected to be higher when both measures
are tailored to capture the same type of trust. The WVS question explicitly elicits trust
towards strangers. In our experiment, senders and receivers were strangers as their
identities were never disclosed to the other party On the other hand, subjects in GLSS
were not strangers, as their identity was deliberately revealed amongst subject pairs
in order to irwestigate the role of social connections.13 We suspect that the fact that
subjects knew each other served as a behavioral discipline device, with subjects acting
more kindly than they would if paired against strangers.  This may well account for
the high concentration of offers around the maximal amount sent reported by GLSS.
Because our experimental design makes us more likely to capture WVS type trust than
the experimental design of GLSS, we expect 6 to be relatively higher in our experi-
ment. Finally, if whether subjects knew each other or not influences the distribution of
responses, this design feature will also affect the variance term V (Ef ).  Data of GLSS
show that the variance in amounts sent is low, with 71% of their senders sending the
maximal amount. In our experiment, the variance in the amount sent is much more
dispersed which, from (4.5), implies that we should indeed expect higher values of S
V (Ef) is also likely do differ across studies according to differences in the dimension
of the choice space of players, the fictitious currency used in the experiment, the mon-
etary endowments, the multiplier, whether the experiment is conducted in the lab, in
the classroom, at home on paper or on a computer, and whether the strategy method
is used or not.
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The framework above demonstrates that the predictive power of survey trust mea-
sures is intimately linked to the information experimenters posses on their subjects,
and the choice of the experimental design. Because most of the factors are to some
extent under the experimenters' control, prediction is not a suitable basis to compare
experimental and survey trust. As the relevant policy exercise concerns measuring
the effect of changes in the background characteristics on trust and trustworthiness, it
seems more interesting to compare both measures on the basis of whether or not they
carry the same information on the determinants of trust. This is something on which
prediction has little to say.
Informational Content
Measuring trust and trustworthiness using experiments is difficult when the target
group is a nation's population. A more accessible alternative consists of surveys, which
are easily found for a handful of countries. The methodological question is whether
or not the effects of background characteristics on trust can be measured equally well
using either experimental or survey data. If the effects measured were the same, the
relative accessibility of survey measures would weaken the need for conducting exper-
iments with representative samples.
By observing subjects' decisions in the trust game and their answers to the WVS
trust question, we are in the unique position to compare how different the inferences
on the determinants of trust can be when researchers use a popular survey question
rather than experimental methods to measure trust. Specification 4 in table 4.2 reports
results from a probit regression of the answers of our senders to the WVS trust question
on their background characteristics. The differences with the experimental estimates
are quite remarkable. We find that catholics and protestants trust others less than in-
dividuals without religious beliefs. This is in sharp contrast to the results from the
experimental data where religious effects were totally absent. The second major differ-
ence concerns the education pattern. We do not find any effect of education on survey
trust while we have found that a significant inverted-U relationship related experi-
mental trust to education. Another notable difference is the effect of reported lifetime
experience on trust. The effect is positive and significant when using the survey trust
measure while it has an insignificant impact on experimental trust.
Despite these differences, there are some notable similarities. The inverted-U shape
effect of age on trust remains when using survey trust. The number of children, sub-
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jects income, gender, and work status also remain insignificant using the survey mea-
sure.
To test whether the differences across measures significantly outweigh the simi-
larities, we compare all effects simultaneously. In the appendix, we propose a simple
minimum distance test which compares the difference between all parameter estimates
of the probit model and the ordered probit model. We computed the test statistic based
on specifications 2 and 4 of table 4.2. The value of the test is 21.78, significant at the
10 percent level. This indicates that the differences driven by the changes in the re-
ligious and education effects are strong enough to reject the null hypothesis that the
informational content of both trust measures is identical.
4.3.2 Explaining Differences between both Measures
The preceding section has shown that effects of background characteristics on trust are
not robust to the type of measure used. We already rnentioned that these differences
can be attributed to the fact that the WVS question is vague and hypothetical or that
it is misreported at the individual level. Recent developments in econometrics give
us ways to test and control for misreporting of a discrete endogenous variable.  If the
difference between both experimental and survey trust measures are entirely due to
misreporting, there is scope for using the WVS question and appropriately correct for
misreporting. Furthermore, because our senders answered the survey question after
having played the trust game, there is the possibility that senders may have given
answers to the WVS question which looked coherent with their play in the game. This
would add to the amount of misreporting in our answers to the WVS question. This
section tests for general misreporting and misreporting due to the sequence of play.
We define 0:10 (Yf) as the probability that a subject answers 1 ("YES") to the WVS
trust question when his truthful answer would be 0 ("NO"). This event occurs when,
for example, generous senders are more inclined to state that they trust others rather
than truthfully answering that they don't. Similarly, we define 201 (yf) as the probabil-
ity that subject answers 0 ("NO") to the WVS trust question when his truthful answer
would be 1 ("YES"). This probability captures events such as senders who are more
likely to state that they do not trust others when they would have answered the op-
posite, had they been truthful. We allow for the fact that the amount of misreporting
may depend on the experimental decision yf by assuming the probabilities have the
Section 4.4. Results: Trustworthiness                                                                  95
following logit form
210  yiE    =      exp (8 0 + 8]OyiE)
exp (8 0 -1- 8110YE) t 1
201 (yE)   =     exp (0001 + e?lyf)
exp (881 + 89iyE) + 1
where {8 0,081,8110,8?1 } are unknown parameters to be estimated. Some special cases
are of interest. If 8110 = 8?1 = 0 and the constant terms  0 and 881 are large, misre-
porting is random in the population of senders and is not affected by the preceding ex-
periment. If in addition 830 and 881 are small, the misreporting probabilities are small
indicating that senders truthfully answer the WVS question. Incorporation of these
probabilities in a likelihood equation is a straightforward application of the results of
Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) and can be found in the appendix of
this chapter.
Specification 5 of table 4.2 presents regression results for the probit model with mis-
reporting. Both  0 and 0?1 associated with senders' experimental decisions yf are not
Significantly different from zero, indicating that the experimental decision did not lead
senders to systematically misreport their true answer to the WVS trust question. To test
for overall misreporting, we computed a log-likelihood ratio test comparing the probit
model with and without misreporting (specifications 4 and 5).14 The test value of 5.38
with 10% critical value of 7.02 does not reject the null hypothesis of no misreporting.
Both sets of results suggest that senders in our experiment truthfully answered the
WVS trust question, which means that allowing for the possibility that subjects misre-
port their answers is not sufficient to reconcile both measures. This suggests that the
WVS trust question captures a notion of trust which differs from the notion of trust
captured in our economic experiment.
4.4   Results on Trustworthiness
We follow GLSS and measure trustworthiness as the return ratio, defined as the amount
returned divided by the amount available to return. In our experiment, the available
amount to return equals the amount received multiplied by two, plus the experimen-
tal endowment of 500 CentERpoints. Responders were asked to play the strategy
method by which they decide how much they will give back for each of the 11 possible
amounts they can receive from the sender. This implies that we observe a sequence
96                                                                                           Chapter 4. On Representative Trust
{yf  €  IO, l]la €  {0,50....500}}  for each responder, where yaR denotes the return ratio
when receiving a CentERpoints from the senden The main advantage of the return ra-
tio is that it is automatically scaled, which controls for the fact that receivers can send
more simply because the total available amount increases with a. Figure 4.2 shows a
boxplot of the return ratio for all 11 possible amounts. The thick line inside each box
represents the median, the top and bottom of the boxes represent the 75th and 25th
percentiles while the top and lower whiskers represent respectively the maximal and
minimal values of the distribution.15 The two important features of this figure are that
the ratio 1) monotonically increases and is concave in the amounts received, 2) a sig-
nificant fraction of the responders return nothing (especially in low categories) while
practically no responder returns the entire possible amount.
Did it pay to trust? Figure 4.3 presents density estimates of senders returns of
investments in trust.16 Each line represents the estimated distribution of returns for
a given number of CentERpoints sent. If responders return to senders exactly what
they sent, the return on investment is 0. If responders do not return anything to the
senders, the return is -1. Apart from the distribution of returns when 50 CentERpoints
are sent all distributions have roughly the same shape. The common finding in labo-
ratory trust experiments is that trust barely pays, as responders return to senders what
they have sent (Camerer, 2003). Our results reconfirm these findings. We find that the
median return on investment is slightly above 0 for every amount sent. Furthermore,
the probability of getting nothing back from a receiver (a return ratio of -1) is not zero.
The individual level analysis of the return ratio is based on the following Tobit model
(Amemiya, 1984)
1/     =   x74+71a + 7202 + E;   i = 1,2,..., N (4.6)
Yfi    =   YS,R    if yi:R  , 0 (4.7)
=    0        ify 8  5 0 (4.8)
Equation (4.6) describes the unconstrained trustworthiness propensity of responders.
This propensity is modelled as depending on a vector of background characteristics
X'I'an unobservable component E,r, and a vector of unknown population parameters 4.
The quadratic form in a is added to capture the increasing monotonicity in amounts
returned observed in the data.17 Equations (4.7) and (4.8) describe the censoring rule
which allows responders with extremely low trustworthiness propensities to return
nothing with positive probability.
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The estimation results are presented in table 4.3. The first specification includes
standard background characteristics of the responder, reported trust experience, their
beliefs about what they expect to receive from the sender (RTHINK),18 and responders'
answers to the WVS trust question. 1he second specification removes the WVS trust
answers while the third specification adds answers to the trust question and respon-
ders' beliefs. We compare the first three specifications using log-likelihood ratio tests.
The extended specification which includes interaction terms is clearly preferred to the
first two specifications.19 Accordingly, our analysis below will focus on the results of
the extended specification.
As could be seen from the raw data in figure 4.2, amounts returned monotonically
increase and are concave in a, the amounts received. This is also reflected in the Tobit
estimates, where the first order term 71 is positive and the second order term 72 isneg-
ative, both significant at the 1% level. The life cycle evolution of reciprocity is captured
by the parameters of RETIRED, AGE, AGESQ, and the three interaction terms. The
change in the trustworthiness propensity which follows from a change in age is given
by (standard errors in parenthesis)
B Rl
-ta    =2 x 0.000032 AGEi - 0.0014 WVSi - 0.0003 RTHINKi (4.9)BAGEi (0.000017) (0.0005) (0.0000)
We first solve for the turning points, which we define as the age around which the
Sign of the derivative changes, and compare them with those of trust found in the
previous section. Because of the interaction terms, computation of the turning points
requires that we fix the values of WVS and RTHINK. We can get an overall picture
by evaluating equation (4.9) at the sample means of WVS and RTHINK. We find that
trustworthiness reaches its lowest level when individuals reach the age of 30 years, and
increases beyond that. These results differ remarkably from the life cycle evolution
of trust discussed in the previous section. There, we found that trust increases until
the age of 30 and decreases beyond that.  The last section of the chapter discusses a
possible explanation of this result. We next evaluated the age turning points for those
who report trusting others (WVS=1) and those who do not (WVS=O). The age profile
of individuals who state they do not trust others reaches a low at 21 years of age, while
it reaches a low at 43 years of age for those who declare trusting others.
In the previous section, we found that the relationship between trust and educa-
tion was inverted U shape, with subjects without a secondary degree and those with
university degrees displaying relatively less trustful behavior. The relation between
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education and trustworthiness is very different. Less educated subjects (the omitted
category) return significantly more than educated subjects, all degrees confounded.
Moreover, the parameter estimates suggests a U shape relationship, with individuals
with university degrees being more trustworthy that subjects with technical education
degrees.
The effect of gender also distinguishes trust from trustworthiness. While gender
was found to have no impact on trust, we find here that men return on average signif-
icantly less than women.
One of the interesting findings of GLSS was that answers to the WVS trust question
did not correlate with experimental trust but correlated rather well with the return ra-
tio. In our experiment, we also find that subjects who trust more others are also more
trustworthy. However, some of the issues raised in section 4.3.1 concerning the predic-
tive power of stated trust questions may also apply here, although it is less clear from
the results in this section whether the underlying process determining trustworthiness
and trust are as similar.
We have shown in the previous section that subjects' beliefs were important deter-
minants of trust. Here, beliefs of responders also play an important role in determining
trustworthiness. Responders who believed they would receive more had higher aver-
age return ratios.  To gain some insights on the importance of beliefs on trustworthi-
ness, we estimated our extended specification omitting beliefs. Specification 4 in table
4.3 shows the result of this regression. The only notable change is that trustworthiness
of those who report trusting others continues to decline with age while it no longer
declines for those who report not trusting others. A log-likelihood ratio test (value of
85.88, significant at the 1% level) confirms that omitting beliefs substantially lowers the
predictive fit of the model.
We end by noting that some individual characteristics have no effect on trustwor-
thiness. This is the case of subjects' income, whether they work or not, their retirement
status, religion, and their lifetime trust experience. Interestingly, none of these charac-
teristics were found to explain experimental trust.
It is well known that the Tobit model is sensitive to the distributional assump-
tion placed on the unobserved component (Newey, 1987). An alternative estimator
which relaxes most distributional assumptions of the Tobit model is the Symmetri-
cally Trimmed Least Squares estimator (STLS) of Powell (1986). Contrary to Tobit, the
semiparametric STLS estimator does not require normality and is robust to (bounded)
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heteroscedasticity of unknown form in E j. All our specifications were estimated using
the STLS estimator (results are presented in table 4.4). Hausman (1978) specification
tests never reject the null hypothesis of normality and homoscedasticity of the error
terms on which the Tobit model rests.
4.5   Results on Participation
The major impediment experimenters must overcome to test for participation bias is
that they generally do not observe non-participants. In our experiment, we observe
both the decision to participate and the characteristics of non-participants.  This al-
lows us to address the following issues 1) whether observed or unobserved factors
are more important determinants of participation and 2) if participation is based on
unobservable characteristics, are these related to experimental outcomes? The first
question addresses the current belief in experimental economics which suggests that
unobserved factors such as preferences for risk and money are more likely to explain
participation in the experiment than the observed characteristics of subjects (Camerer
and Hogarth, 1999). The second question directly touches the issue of participation
bias, by which actions of participants are not representative of the population at large.
The most natural framework to approach both questions is that developed by Heck-
man (1978). We model participation as being driven both by observed and unobserved
factors, the latter having the potential to affect the outcomes of interest and cause par-
ticipation bias. Let di €  {0,1} be an indicator of participation in the experiment and let
an individuals' unobserved latent propensity to participate be
d;  = 2,J + e RATIO,+ d      for j = r, t
where 2, is the conditioning vector entering the trust and reciprocity models, E  is an
unobservable determinant of participation assumed to be drawn from a N(0,1) distri-
bution, and (8,8) are unknown parameters. A general feature of these models is the
requirement of a valid exclusion restriction for nonparametric identification of the par-
ticipation bias. In practical terms, we need a variable which affects participation but
does not directly affect either experimental and survey measures used in this chap-
ten Our exclusion restriction is the variable RATIO, which is computed as proportion
of questionnaires completed by panel members in the three months which preceded
our experiment. This variable directly measures the participation propensity of sub-
jects when participation is uncorrelated with financial outcomes.20 The dependance
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between the experimental outcomes and the participation decisions is captured by the
amount of correlation between 4 and the unobservable components determining trust
(see equation (4.1)) and trustworthiness (see equation (4.6)). We replicated the estima-
tions of sections 4.2 and 4.4 by separately estimating an ordered probit, a binary probit
model, and a Tobit model, along with the participation decision. We allow for potential
participation bias by letting 4 be correlated with the unobserved component of each
experimental decision.
Most of the parameters entering the systematic part of the participation propen-
sity were insignificant confirming the conjecture that participation is mostly explained
by unobserved characteristics of subjects. Results for trust and trustworthiness are
virtually identical to those reported in the text. All but one parameter entering the
trust propensity was significant (see text above).21 One notable exception was income
which has a positive and significant effect on participation, which rules out partici-
pation based on low opportunity costs. The presence of participation bias can be de-
termined by testing the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients between
21 and the unobserved components of the trust and trustworthiness measures used in
this chapten We find that none of the three correlations are significant at the 10% level,
a clear indication that the unobserved characteristics determining participation in the
experiment do not correlate with the experimental decisions.
4.6   Discussion and Conclusions
The literature has identified trust and trustworthiness as important factors of economic
performance and growth. Understanding the determinants of these at the societal level
is important yet, not well documented. The majority of the existing empirical evidence
relies on one of two complementary methodologies. Survey methods on one hand col-
lect responses of heterogeneous samples, at the expense of having to rely on hypothet-
ical and self-reported measures. On the other hand laboratory experiments offer the
possibility to collect data on the actual behavior of subjects at the expense of collecting
this data for a very special subset of the population of interest.
This chapter presented results from a computerized experiment whose participants
were randomly drawn from the Dutch population. This approach allowed us to com-
bine the strengths of experiments and survey data collection methods.
One of the key findings of this chapter is that background characteristics of subjects,
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mainly their age and education levels, do play an important role in determining trust
and trustworthiness, although they affect trust and trustworthiness in very different
ways. Our results reconfirmed the existing inverted U shape relation between trust and
age, with trust increasing until the age of 30 and decreasing beyond that. On the other
hand, we find that the relation between trustworthiness and age is U shaped, with
trustworthiness decreasing until the age of 30, and rising again beyond that point. This
raises the question of why do the young and elderly trust less but are more trustworthy
than middle aged individuals? One explanation is that individuals who trust the most
take for granted that the average individual in society will do the same. Hence, when
someone places trust in them, they are less likely to be surprised by this action and will
not place a premium as high on rewarding trust as would individuals who trust others
less.
The education patterns are also very different. We find an inverted-U shape re-
lation between education and trust, and an U shape relationship between education
and trustworthiness. Such opposite influences of background characteristics are puz-
zling insofar as it is typically assumed that trust and trustworthiness go hand in hand,
which would suggest that both are determined in similar ways. Reconciling the age
and education patterns of trust and trustworthiness is an interesting topic for future
research.
An additional contribution of the chapter is that we provided a new way to com-
pare experimental and survey trust measures. The literature has up till now assessed
the validity of survey trust questions by testing whether or not they predicted well
experimental trust.  One of the main messages of the chapter is that this method of
validation has been given too much attention, primarily because the predictive power
of survey measures is intimately linked to the sample used, the amount of background
information available on the subjects, and the experimental design. Our analysis has
shown that by carefully selecting samples and designs, experimenters increase their
odds of finding either a low or high predictive power of the survey trust measure.
Thus, despite that contrary to the existing literature our survey trust measure predicts
well trust in our experiment, we do not take this as evidence validating the use of sur-
vey trust questions. It is important to note that the problems with prediction are only
relevant if predicting experimental trust with survey trust is what experimenters are
trying to achieve. In general, prediction is useful if applied to an object which has a
clear interest in being predicted well. Trust measured in an experiment is an abstract
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quantity whose main purpose is to extract from it useful characteristics of the popula-
tion under study. Viewed in this way, it is not clear whether the emphasis on predicting
its value by other trust measures is in general warranted.
As our chapter focuses on investigating the determinants of trust and trustworthi-
ness, it follows quite naturally that a more convincing comparison of both measures
could be achieved by comparing whether experimental and survey measures have the
same informational content. On these grounds, the differences between both trust mea-
sures are stark. We found that education has an inverted-U shape relation with exper-
imental trust while it does not correlate at all with answers to the WVS trust question.
In contrast, religion correlates well with answers to the WVS trust question but not at
all with experimental trust.
We have also examined possible explanations for the differences between both mea-
sures. The two prominent explanations are that subjects either misreport their answers
to the WVS question, or that the question simply captures a different notion of trust
than the one which is captured in the experiment. We do not find any evidence sug-
gesting that these differences are due to subjects misreporting their answers to the sur-
vey trust question. As surveys remain more accessible than nation-wide laboratory
experiments, it seems worthwhile for researchers interested in making cross-country
comparisons to design new survey questions which will narrow the gap with experi-
mental measures.
Finally, this chapter made one of the first tests of participation bias in an economic
experiment.  We have not found any evidence suggesting the presence of participa-
Hon bias in our experiment. In our view, this is a reassuring finding for experimental
economics.
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Minimum Distance Test
Define owvs and e£ respectively as the standard deviation of Ewvs and EE.  Under
the assumptions of the parametric models, the probit estimator provides consistent
estimates of 4E /cE while the ordered probit model provides consistent estimates of
 wvs /gwvs. The comparison of both ratios is complicated by the fact that the exper-
imental variance is partly under experimental control (see discussion in section 4.3.2).
It is possible to get ride of oE by normalizing say the kth component to 1, which is
equivalent to dividing the parameter vector by the kth component B /FE. Under this
normalization,22 the following transformed vector <   0£               -1     1     / L 1 4 1 is in(le-L 4- "" T' " T'    ' BI  I
pendent of oE. One can perform a similar division for parameter estimates from the
probit model on the WVS trust question and obtain a second vector of parameters, this
time independent of gwvs. In what follows, we use gE as shorthand nota-and gwvs
tions for the vectors of the ordered and binary probit models excluding the constant
and the normalized kth term.23 Under the null hypothesis that the effects of back-
ground characteristics are the same, both sets of estimates would equal each othen
Our test statistic has the following familiar quadratic form
N (f,-r,S)' w-,(f'-r") (4.10)
where W represents the covariance matrix of the difference between both parameter
vectors. Below we show that the test statistic above follows a chi square distribution
with K-2 degrees of freedom.
We briefly sketch here a minimum distance test for observable characteristics. We
will use EN to denote sample expectations and E for corresponding population expec-
tations. The estimated parameters solve
F   =   argmax EN  LE (5) 
r'vs   =  arg max EN ILwvs (&)1
where Lwvs (g) denotes the binary probit likelihood function and LE (f) denotes the
likelihood function of the ordered probit where the threshold parameters have been
concentrated out. We will use the notation L K (g) and Ls&, (f) to respectively denote
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the scores and the matrix of second derivatives of each function. It follows that
-1
¢R ( A-Pr   )   - - { { {EN ILE, (DI }                     ,„/      0   EN L ;5(    1  
/   E., [Lf (go)]    \ 1 7 1 - + Op (1) (4.11)
C EN 'Lrvs (f,)1 ) f
where every element of I lies in between corresponding elements of *£ and 60. Under
appropriate regularity conditions (Newey and Mcfadden, 1994), Both E  Lf (50)  and
r r.wvs,      1
1:  Li      (&0)  are zero vectors and
EN ILIi, (DI li E ILEs, (fo)]   =  Hi
EN ILT's (5)1 -f E 'Li;vs (50)1   =  H,
where 8 denotes uniform convergence. It follows that (4.11) converges in distribution
to
N ( /0   . C  Hi-1      0     \/ JE.E JE.WVS     )
( ( 0 ) 't    O      Hil  /1 t  WVS,E  WVS,WVS ) ( „i' „2-1 ))
-   A r( (0) ,C V,1   Vu ) )( /'\VU V22
where Jid = E  Ll (&0) Ll (50)  for i, j = E. WVS. Finally, we get
v/N  fE - rvs   1 N (0; W)
where W E Vii + 1/22 - 1/12 - 1'21. Hence, equation (4.10) follows a chi square distribu-
tion with K-2 degrees of freedom. We compute the test statistic (4.10) by replacing W
with a sample average evaluated at either KE or fwvs. both equivalent under the null
hypothesis.
Probit Model with Misclassification
Following Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998), the probability that a subject
states that he trusts others is given by
Pr (yiwvs =l'x:,y,E) =,10 (yiE) + (1 - 2,0 (yE) - ao, (yf)) ·pr (Ti > 0'x:)  (4.12)
where  (a01 (yf) , Rio (YE) )  and T; are defined in section 4.3. It follows that in the ab-
sence of misreporting errors (aol (yf)  = alo (YiE)  = 0), equation (4.12) collapses to
standard binary probit model (Maddala, 1983). The likelihood function of the binary
choice model with misreporting is constructed using the choice probabilities (4.12).
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Instructions (Translation)
The first 3 screens of the experiment are the same for both senders and responders.
Italic notes in the translation are comments by the authors.
• First screen:
This experiment is a research project of researchers from Humboldt University
Berlin and Catholic University of Brabant.24
With this experiment you can make real money in terms of CentERpoints.  You re-
ceive from the researchers additional CentERpoints (besides the usual telephone
allowance).
•  Second screen:
During this experiment you will be matched with another member of the panel.
You will not know who this person is, both of you will stay anonymous. Both of
you receive 500 CentERpoints. Then the experiments starts.
One of you has the possibility to send a share of this away. The amount of points
sent will be doubled and given to the other person. The other person has then the
opportunity to send a share of the own total amount back. The amount which is
sent back will not be doubled.
How many points you finally earn depends therefore on your decision and the
decision of the person you are matched with. You will be randomly assigned to
your role.
• Third screen:
We now give you the chance to indicate whether you want to participate. If you
decide not to participate, the experiment will end immediately. You will receive
the usual telephone reimbursement.  If you continue you will receive the 500
CentERpoints.
Do you want to continue?
0  Yes
0 No
Subjects who choose to participate were then randomly assigned to their roles. Sellders and
receivers had to read decision screens tailored  to their roles.
Senders
• Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this person
received 500 CentERpoints. You can send a share of your 500 CentERpoints. The
panel member with whom you are matched with receives the amount you sent
multiplied by 2.  Then, this person has the opportunity to send a share of the
own total amount back (without knowing who you are). The amount which this
person sends back to you will not be doubled.
How many points do you want to give?
(The sender could send one out Of 11 possible amounts.)
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0   0 the other person receives additionally nothing and has therefore 500 and
you remain with 500 points.
0  500 the other person receives additionally 1000 and has therefore 1500 in
total and you remain with 0 points.
•  Fifth screen:
(was depending on  the decision taken  at  the fourth screen, here  as example  "200")
You decided to send 200 points.
The panel member you are matched with receives therefore 400 additional Cen-
tERpoints.
He or she has therefore in total 900 CentERpoints.
You remain with 300 CentERpoints.
How many points do you think the other panel member with whom you are
matched with will send to you?
(Participants had to type in a number.  In this example in the range of [0,9001.)
•  Sixth screen:
This experiment is done with some panel members.  Half of them interact in the
same position as you. They can send a share of their 500 CentERpoints which is
doubled and received by a person of the other position.How many points do you think those panel members have sent?
(The sender could indicate one out Of 11 possible amounts»,n 0 to 500).
Responders
• Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this personreceived 500 CentERpoints. This person is asked to send you a share from their
own 500 CentERpoints. You will receive the amount of those points the other
person has sent multiplied by 2.
For example, if the other person sends 100 CentERpoints, you will receive 200
CentERpoints. Together with the 500 points you begin with, you will have in
total 700 CentERpoints.
From this amount you can return a share. The amount you send will not be
doubled.
•  Fifth screen:
As we do not know now how many CentERpoints the other panel member with
whom you are matched with has sent we present all possible amounts this per-
son could send to you. The amount you actually receive is written in the next
column. Please indicate in the last column what amount you would return for
each possible amount sent.
After the real decision of the other person is known the amount you indicated
for this particular decision will be realized. The amount you will return will be
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deducted from your total amount.
(The responder had to indicatefor each of 11 possible amounts  the sender  could send what
he would return. The  table was designed as follows:)If the other sends:    I receive: In total with the In this case I return:
500 CentERpoints:
0            0            500
500 1000 1500
•  Sixth screen:
How many points do you expect the panel member with whom you are matched
with has sent to you?
(The responder couW indicate one out of 11 possible amounts,»om 0 to 500.)
After these screens the experiment was over. Nobody could go backwards and both senders
and  responders were  asked  the following post-experimental questions:
•  Seuenth screen (Trust experience question):
The last two questions are about trust in general. This question is about your
own trust experience.
If you trust is your trust generally rewarded or exploited?
Choose the number which is closest to your answer.
always rewarded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 always exploited.
(Participants had to type in a number between 1 and 7).
•  Eight screen (WVS trust question):
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that youcannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
in6
2
S                           R Not played
Mean StD Mean StD Mean StD
 , GENDER 0.46         0.5         0.46         0.5         0.43 0.5 Dummy, 1 if Man
4 AGE 42.66 15.55 43.98 15.67 53.79 16.55 Age
8 GRINCP 2580.38 6133.47 1916.28 3289.66 2356.90 3584.27 Gross Personal Monthly Income (Guilders)
4 GR_INCH 4175.59 7526.39 4342.07 4313.76 4302.52 6593.33 Gross Household Monthly Income (Guilders)
 HSIZE 2.27 1.12 2.53 1.33 2.17 1.23 Household Size
4 NCHILD 0.55 0.92 0.75 1.16 0.4 1.06 Number of Children in household
% PARTNER 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.42 0.76 0.43 Partner is living in the householdU
LOWEDUC 0.043 0.204 0.076 0.266 0.143 0.354     Dummy, 1 if Low education level
SECONDEG 0.388 0.488 0.390 0.489 0.381 0.492     Dummy, 1 if Secondary degree
TRAINDEG 0.449 0.449 0.448 0.499 0.357 0.485      Dummy, 1 if Training degree
UNTVDEG 0.119 0.325 0.085 0.279 0.119 0.329      Dummy, 1 if University degree
WORK 0.591 0.493 0.511 0.501 0.429 0.501      Dummy, 1 if Labor Work
RETIRED 0.130 0.337 0.148 0.356 0.262 0.445      Dummy, 1 if Retired
HHEAD 0.637 0.482 0.609 0.488 0.667 0.477       Dummy, 1 if Head of household
CATHOLIC 0.297 0.458 0.349 0.478 0.309 0.468      Dummy, 1 if Catholic religion
PROTEST 0.210 0.408 0.265 0.442 0.191 0.397     Dummy, 1 if Protestant religion
OTHERS 0.493 0.501 0.386 0.488 0.500 0.506     Dummy, 1 if Atheist or Other religion
WVS 0.5 0.56 0.6 0.58             -               -         Dummy, 1 if Yes to WVS trust question
TRUSTEXP 3.16 1.18 3.45 1.31           -            -        1-7, 1 Always rewarded 7, Always disappointed
Nobs 276 223              42
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
 
>
Experimental trust Stated trust (WVS)                      b
Specification (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  b
Coef· Std. coef· Std. coef· Std. coef· Std. coef. Std. 8:
CONSTANT -2.018- 0.736 -0.314 0.681 -1.828*** 0.687 -3.069*** 0.838 -3.787 1.424
GENDER 0.182 0.133 0.229* 0.134 0.217 0.160 -0.186 0.181 -0.335 0.244 Q
AGE 0.067" 0.031 0.052* 0.029 0.060-* 0.031 0.067* 0.037 0.071
0.051  AGE_SQ/1000 -0.897** 0.367 -0.662** 0.335 -0.803-* 0.349 -0.909** 0.435       - 1.026* .589
RETIRED -0.193 0.374 0.271 0.293 -0.251 0.287 0.528 0.411 0.707 0.535          4
SECONDEG 0.908*** 0.396 0.626* 0.308 0.845*** 0.318 0.518 0.422 0.504 0.578
TRAINDEG 0.809-* 0.404 0.589* 0.312 0.761** 0.332 0.394 0.436 0.446 0.602
UNIVDEG 0.729 0.457 0.716* 0.361 0.678 0.395 0.522 0.499 0.337 0.678
WORK -0.219 0.193 -0.089 0.185 -0.189 0.208 -0.290 0.243 -0.451 0.373
LN(GR_INCP) 0.024 0.026 0.007 0.028 0.019 0.039 0.034 0.038 0.044 0.053
NUMCHILD -0.118* 0.064 -0.043 0.066 -0.129 0.099 0.105 0.102 0.121 0.146
CATHOLIC 0.101 0.170 0.002 0.165 0.149 0.171 -0.476- 0.211 -0.567* 0.290
PROTEST -0.016 0.164 -0.109 0.149 0.042 0.208 -0.524** 0.227 -0.699** 0.355
TRUSTEXP 0.045 0.059 0.090 0.065 -0.032 0.082 0.665** 0.085 0.905*** 0.205
STHINK 0.003*** 0.0001 0.003*** 0.000






Log-Likelihood -406.42 -520.06 -403.58 -150.8 -148.11
Table 4.2: Sender results. Specifications (1) to (3) refer to the ordered probit model, columns (4) and (5) to the binary probit
model. The significance of parameters is based on robust standard errors and bootstrap empirical quantiles of the t-statistics
(1000 repetitions). N=276.                                                                                                                                                           
14P.
(1)                   (2)                    0)                   
(4)
Coef Std. coef· Std. Coef. Std. coef Std.
5 CONSTANT -0.042 0.032 -0.071** 0.032 -0.076 *** 0.035 -0.056 0.035











.*. 0.0003 -0.005*** 0.0003
 GENDER -0.018*** 0.007 -0.019** 0.007 -0.017*** 0.0068 -0.008 0.007
8 AGE -0.002* O.001 -O.001 O.001 -0.0014 0.0014 0.0003 0.001
v; AGESQ/1000 0.033*** 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.032* 0.017 0.004 0.017
2 RETIRED -0.004 0.015 -0.007 0.015 0.0052 0.014 0.017 0.015
 SECONDEG -0.053-* 0.012 -0.060*** 0.012 -0.054*** 0.012 -0.052*** 0.012
TRAINDEG -0.065*** 0.012 -0.067*** 0.012 -0.067*** 0.012 -0.062*** 0.012
UNIVDEG -0.053*** 0.015 -0.057*** 0.015 -0.058*** 0.015 -0.058*** 0.015
WORK 0.016* 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.019- 0.0089 0.013 0.009
LN(GR_INCP) 0.0006 0.0011 0.002 0.001 0.0001 0.0011 0.0002 0.001
CATHOLIC -0.009 0.007 -0.009 0.007 -0.0062 0.0073 -0.002 0.007
PROTEST 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.0051 0.0076 -0.0005 0.008
WVS 0.045*** 0.007 0.1035*** 0.022 0.149*** 0.021
TRUSTEXP -0.003 0.003 0.0064- 0.0027 -0.017 0.009 -0.011 0.009
RTHINK 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.0255*** 0.0044
AGExTRUSTEXP 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
AGExWVS -0.0014*** 0.0005 -0.002... 0.0005
AGE x RTHINK -0.0003 *** 0.0000
j                            0.144*** 0.002 0.021 *** 0.0006 0.0207*** 0.0006 0.021 *** 0.0006
Log-Likelihood 936.52 916.75 946.47 903.53
***.
. 1% Level.-: 5% Level. *: 10% Level




(1)                   (2)                   (3)                   (4)                       51
1
coef Std. Coef Std. co4. Std. Coef· Std.CONSTANT -0.039 0.033 -0.069.* 0.033 -0.042 0.036 -0.043 0.037
71 0.079*** 0.004 0.079*** 0.005 0.079 .** 0.005 0.079*** 0.005
72                            -0.004*** 0.0004 -0.004*** 0.0004 -0.004*** 0.0004 -0.004*** 0.0004         GENDER -0.013** 0.007 -0.015.* 0.007 -0.014** 0.007 -0.003 0.006                1AGE -0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 -0.0006 0.001 0.002 0.001
AGESQ/1000 0.017 0.017 0.004 0.016 0.009 0.018 -0.021 0.018RETIRED -0.002 0.017 -0.005 0.017 0.006 0.017 0.021 0.017
SECONDEG -0.050*** 0.016 -0.059*** 0.016 -0.053*** 0.015 -0.045** 0.016TRAINDEG -0.064*** 0.016 -0.065*** 0.016 -0.066*** 0.015 -0.057** 0.016UNIVDEG -0.040*** 0.018 -0.045*** 0.018 -0.0469** 0.018 -0.043** 0.018WORK 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.0128 0.008 0.008 0.008
LN(GR_INCP) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.0005 0.001 -0.0006 0.001CATHOLIC -0.014" 0.007 -0.012 0.007 -0.013 0.007 -0.008 0.007PROTEST 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.008WVS 0.042*** 0.007 0.086*** 0.020 0.129*** 0.021
TRUSTEXP -0.001 0.003 0.0082- 0.003 -0.025** 0.009 -0.017* 0.009RTHINK 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.0046
AGExTRUSTEXP 0.0006** 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0002AGE x WVS -0.0011** 0.0005 -0.002*** 0.0005AGExRTHINK -0.0002** 0.0000
Hausman X2 test 3.106 2.762 15.656 19.234
***.
. 1% Level. **: 5% Level. *: 10% Level
Table 4.4: Responder results - Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator. N = 2453.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of experimental trust.
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Figure 4.2: Return ratio of responders for each units received, strategy method.
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Figure 4.3: Estimated density of potential returns on investments in trust for each
amount sent. Gaussian kernel density estimation. Rate of return computed as (amount
returned - amount sent) / amount sent. The rate of return is infinity when the amount
sent is zero and is not plotted here.
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Notes
1For a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the CentERpanel see:
www. centerdata.nl . Children below 16 years of age as well as immigrants are excluded from the panel.
The latter for the reason being that their language proficiency in Dutch makes it difficult for them to
answer the questions on a weekly basis.
2Computer screens of the original experiment (in Dutch) are available upon request. The translated
text of all screens are enclosed in the appendix
3For ease of reading we keep the terms "sender" and "responder" for the different roles.  In the
experiment we omitted suggestive labels and referred to the person itself or to his opponent as "the
matched panel member."
4There is weak evidence suggesting that a hot environment triggers stronger responses in two player
games. Brandts and Charness (2000)  find that the strategy method and the hot environment do not
yield significant different responses in two simple sequential two player games.
sResults from repeated trust experiments can be found in Anderhub, Engelmann, and Guth (1999)
and Willinger, Keser, Lohmann, and Usunier (2003).
614 non-participants initially accepted to play but eventually backed out of the experiment after
having observed the roles  they were assigned  to  play.   It is interesting  to note  that  11  out of those  14
panel members were assigned to the role of responders.
7We have experimented with a specification including cross-terms but none was found to be statisti-
call significant.It has been argued that the causality may be in the opposite direction (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998,
p. 526-529). We do not investigate these issues in this chapter.
9This definition of state dependance differs from that used in labor economics. Labor economists
are generally interested in whether or not individuals in a state of unemployment are more likely to be
unemployed in the future. In our experiment, we do not investigate whether having trusted in the past
increases the likelihood of trusting in the experiment.
10In the probit model, E (yIX = x) = * (24) is approximately linear in x' 3 for individuals answering
1 to the WVS trust question with probability between 20% and 80% (e.g., Ruud, 2000). In general, the
average probability of answering 1 to the WVS questions lies between 45% and 55% which implies that
the linear model holds for most individuals in the sample.
11Tables of results are available upon request.
12Additionally removing age as a regressor further increased the correlation to 18.5%.
13In GLSS, pairs either knew each other before the experiment or got to know each other by jointly
filling in a social connection survey. This survey includes among other questions to report the number
of all personal acquaintances whom they have in common.
14We use the test proposed by Andrews (2001) to deal with the fact that the probabilities of misre-
porting rest on the boundary of the parameter space under the null hypothesis. Computation of the test
requires that the critical values of the log-likelihood ratio test be simulated. We report critical values
based on 1000 simulations. See Andrews for further details.
15The minimal and maximal values are corrected to the presence of extreme outliers.
16These returns are computed as the (amount received - amount sent) / amount sent.
17We have estimated a less restrictive specification with dummy variables for each a category. Results
were numerically identical to those presented above.
18RTHINK is coded from 0 to 10, where each unit is worth 50 CentERpoints.
19The log-likelihood ratio test value is 19.9 when comparing specifications 1 against 3, and 59.14 when
comparing specifications 2 and 3.  Both are significant at the 1% level.
20CP members are not paid to participate in the panel.
21 Results are available upon request.
22This normalization requires that &00.
23·rhe constant term parameter is generally not separately identified from the threshold parameters
in both the binary and ordered probit models. Given their values are functions of ad hoc threshold
assumptions, they are not used in computation of the test.





How much additional income does a family with two children need to attain the same
welfare level as a married couple without children?  And how much does a single
person need compared to a childless couple? The answers to these questions, so-
called equivalence scales, are important for public policy concerning social benefits
and child allowances. See, for example, Browning (1992), Nelson (1993), and Lewbel
(1989). Chakrabarty (2000) uses equivalence scales to analyze gender bias in children
in rural India. Equivalence scales are also required for an analysis of income inequality
within and between countries that corrects for differences in household composition
(see Jenkins, 1991) and for the analysis of poverty (see, for example, De Vos and Zaidi,
199D.
The most common approach to estimate equivalence scales is via a consumer de-
mand system, relying on variation in expenditure on commodities such as food or
typical adult goods across families with different composition (see Browning, 1992).
Pollak and Wales (1979) already showed the main limitation of this approach: expen-
diture data alone are not sufficient to identify the equivalence scales. Identification
can be achieved by making the assumption of independence of base utility, but this
assumption has been rejected numerous times in empirical work. 1
Results of Blundell and Lewbel (1991) imply that the informational content of de-
mand systems about equivalence scales is limited, and that estimating equivalence
oThis chapter is the result of joint work with Betrand Melenberg and Arthur van Soest and has ap-peared as Bellemare, C., B. Melenberg, and A. van Soest, 2002, Portuguese Economic Journal, 1(2)
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scales could proceed in two steps. First, the levels of the equivalence scales in a given
reference price setting should be estimated using other than demand data. Second,
information on demand data can be used to identify the effects of price changes on
the equivalence scales. An enormous literature is devoted to this second step (see
Browning, 1992). The current chapter is concerned with the first step only. Equivalence
scales in a fixed price setting are analyzed, avoiding the complications and specifica-
tion choices involved with estimating a demand system.
There are two types of non-demand data that have been used for this purpose in
the literature. Both are subjective data, reflecting either the income level needed to
attain a certain utility level (see van Praag, 1968, 1991, and Kapteyn, 1994, for exam-
ple) or reflecting satisfaction with actual family income. We will use the latter type. It
has been used before by, for example, Vaughan (1984) and Charlier (2002). The latter
analyzes parametric cross-section as well as panel data models for Germany. Van den
Bosch (1996), and Melenberg and van Soest (1996a) compare equivalence scales based
upon the two types of subjective information. The latter study finds that equivalence
scales based on the first type of subjective data are implausibly low One of the possi-
ble explanations of this is that heads of households tend to underestimate household
income components when reporting total household income (see Kapteyn, Kooreman
and Willemse, 1988).  If the head of the household underestimates required income
in a similar way as actual household income, this could explain the low equivalence
scales derived from this type of subjective data. Most of the studies on this issue use
parametric models only. Exceptions are Melenberg and van Soest (1996a), who com-
pare some parametric and semi-parametric estimates of equivalence scales for Dutch
data, and Stewart (2002), who uses parametric and semi-parametric models explaining
self-reported financial well-being to estimate equivalence scales for pensioners in the
UK.
The current chapter provides an overview of some parametric and semi-parametric
techniques for estimating and comparing models that can be used to analyze ordered
response variables such as satisfaction with income and to estimate functions of the
parameters and non-parametric features of the model such as equivalence scales. Not
only the estimation techniques will be described and applied, but also some tests that
can be used to select the most appropriate model. The techniques will then be applied
to compare a number of models of varying degrees of flexibility that explain satis-
faction with household income from household income, family size and other family
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composition and age variables, and regional dummies. Data are drawn from the 1998
wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel, which has information on the household
representative's satisfaction with household income on the discrete scale 0,1,2,. . .,10.
The semi-parametric models that we consider differ in several dimensions. Some
are direct generalizations of the standard ordered probit model, relaxing distributional
assumptions on the error terms. Others can be seen as generalizations of linear models,
allowing for a flexible, non-linear, specification of the systematic part. These models
and the corresponding estimation and testing techniques will be discussed in Section
5.2. The data used for the empirical analysis are presented in Section 5.3. Empirical
results are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Models, Estimation Techniques, and Specification Tests
The standard model to explain an ordered discrete choice variable is the parametric
ordered probit model:
y; = x;0 + ui (5.1)
yi=j    if    mj-1<y; 5 mj, j=0, . . . ,1 0 (5.2)
u,Ixi - N(0,01). (5.3)
The index i denotes the household; xi is a vector of explanatory variables including
a constant term, 0 is the vector of parameters of interest, and ui is the error term. We
assume m-1  =  -00 and mio  =  00. The variance 02 and the bounds m o, . . . ,m g can
be seen as nuisance parameters. For identification, location and scale have to be fixed
by imposing two parameter restrictions. This will be discussed below. Throughout,
we assume that the observations (yi, xi) are a random sample from the population of
interest. The standard way to estimate this model is maximum likelihood (ML)
Based upon moments involving generalized residuals, this specification can be
tested against models with heteroskedasticity and non-normality of the error terms
in the underlying latent variable equation (see Chesher and Irish, 1987). If the tests re-
ject the standard ordered probit specification, parametric extensions allowing for het-
eroskedasticity and/or non-normality can be used. See, for example, Horowitz (1993)
and Melenberg and van Soest (1996b) for applications in the binary choice case.
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The standard ordered probit model has the property that the conditional distri-
bution of the dependent variable given the regressors xi depends on xi only through
some linear index £,0, making it a special case of the following single index model as
presented by Ichimura (1993):
E (Yilxi) = G (h (xi, B)) (5.4)
where h is given but G is an unknown function, referred to as the link function. In
this model, xi affects E(Yilxi) only through the single index h(xi, 4).  The most common
case applied in practice is the case of a linear index, with h (xi, B)   =  40:
E(Vilxi) = G(x;B) (5.5)
It is easy to see that the standard ordered probit model is a special case of (5.5), with
a link function that is known up to the auxiliary parameters 0*2 and mo..... mg.  If in the
ordered probit model the normality assumption in (5.3) is replaced by the assumption
that ui and xi are independent, (5.5) is still satisfied, but with an unknown link function
that depends also on the distribution of ui. Thus, (5.5) is a natural semi-parametric
generalization of the standard ordered probit model. Identifying   in (5.5) (without
imposing restrictions on G) requires normalizations of location and scale. Location is
fixed by excluding the constant term from xi. The scale is normalized by fixing one
of the slope parameters to 1 or -1. This makes the assumption that the effect of the
corresponding variable is known to be non-zero.
There are many ways in which (5.5) (with some additional regularity conditions)
can be estimated. See, for example„theeverview in Powell (1994). If all regressors are
continuous, average derivative estimation is a computationally convenient and intu-
itively attractive estimation procedure, see Powell, Stock and Stoker (1989). Horowitz
and Haerdle (1996) show how this technique can be combined with GMM to tackle the
case where some regressors are continuous and some other regressors are discrete. See,
for example, Dustmann and van Soest (2000) for an application and some simulations
exploring the finite sample performance of this estimator. Since this estimator requires
non-parametric regressions for each sub-sample of observations with specific values
of the discrete regressors, it will not work very well in case the number of discrete
outcomes is relatively large (given the size of the sample).
In this chapter we focus on the semi-parametric least squares estimator introduced
by Ichimura (1993). It has a natural intuitive interpretation. It requires numerical min-
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imization of a non-convex objective function, but this appears to work quite well in
practice, at least for the application in our analysis.2
Semi-parametric Least Squares (SLS)
For the true value 00 of the parameter B in model (5.5), (5.5) implies E(ylx) = E(ylx'Bo)  =
G(200). Regularity conditions guaranteeing identification (for example, no multi-
collinearity in x) imply that for 4 96 00, there will be some x for which E(ylx) 96
E(ylx'B). Together with the equality E((y - E(yix'4)21%)  = E((y- E(ylx))2Ix) + (Eyix) -
E(ylx'B))2 (the proof of which is straightforward), this implies that 00 is the value of 0
minimizing
E(W(x)(y - E(ylx'B))2) (5.6)
for any weighting function W(x) which is positive for almost all x. The standard SLS
estimator introduced by Ichimura (1993) minimizes the sample analogue of (5.6) with
W(x)  =1, using a sample (yl,xi),...,(Yn, xn)· For given 4, E(ylx' ) is estimated using
a one-dimensional non-parametric kernel regression estimator,
f (ylz) =   E w (0,4-z) yi
#1
where the w(x;B - z), i  =  l, . . . ,n are kernel weights giving high weight to observa-
tions i with close to z. The sample analogue of (5.6) is then given by
E ((y - E (ylx'0))21,) =  i  (yi- E (yilx;4))2                   (5.7)
Finding the 0 at which (5.D is minimized requires an iterative procedure. If smooth
kernel weights are used, the function to be minimized is smooth in 0 and a Newton-
Raphson technique can be used to find the optimal B, i.e.,  SLS· Ichimura (1993) shows
that, under appropriate regularity conditions, this yields a v/N consistent asymptoti-
cally normal estimator of Bo. He also derives the asymptotic covariance matrix of this
estimator and shows how it can be estimated consistently.3
Implementing the SLS estimator in practice requires a choice of kernel and band-
width, i.e., a specification of the weights w(x;16 - z). We will work with the Gaussian
kernel K(t) = 1/ 427 e-,2/2. For given bandwidth h > 0, the weights are then given
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by
w (40 -z)  =        K((<B-z)/h)
  . 1 K ((x;B-z) /h)
For consistency, the bandwidth should tend to zero if N - 00 at a slow enough
rate. Although a large literature on the optimal bandwidth choice exists for the non-
parametric regression problem itself, it is not clear how to determine the optimal band-
width for estimating Bo. Theoretical results for similar problems suggest that under-
smoothing will be optimal, i.e., the optimal bandwidth will be smaller than the optimal
bandwidth for the non-parametric regression of y on x'B. The common approach for
choosing a bandwidth in a situation like this is to experiment with the bandwidth
which would be optimal for the non-parametric regression problem (given plausible
values of 0) and with smaller bandwidth values (to under-smooth).  In our experiments
with such bandwidth choices, the results hardly varied with the bandwidth.
The link function G can be estimated in a second step by regressing y non-parametrically
on the estimated index x'B, using a kernel estimator. The usual asymptotic proper-
ties of a kernel estimator apply since  sLS converges at a faster rate than the non-
parametric estimator.
Smoothed Maximum Score
The parametric model in (1) - (3) assumes that the errors and regressors are indepen-
dent and thus does not allow for heteroskedasticity. The single index model in (5) only
allows for very specific types of heteroskedasticity, where the regressors affect the con-
ditional variance V(elx) through the single index x'B only. A model that allows for
much more general forms of heteroskedasticity is obtained if (5.3) is replaced by
Med(u Ix) = 0 (5.8)
This model nests the parametric ordered probit model (1) - (3) but not the single in-
dex model in (4), since (5.8) is a conditional median assumption and not a conditional
mean assumption. The reason for using the conditional median is the median preserv-
ing property of any increasing function.  Lee (1992) uses this property to construct a
consistent estimator for the model defined by (5.1), (5.2) and (5.8). These assumptions
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imply#
9
Med(ylx) = E l[x'B 2 mrl (5.9)
r=0
Since the conditional median minimizes the conditional expectation  E(ly  -  alix)
over a, a consistent extremum estimator for B and mo, . . . ,m, can be obtained as
9
(#Ms, mo..... m,)
= argmin 1 Ely,-El [x;B kmr]
1
(5.10)
BMS,"10,···,mg"  1=1            r-0
Lee's estimator generalizes the maximum score estimator of Manski (1985) for the bi-
nary choice model. It shares the drawback of Manski's estimator: the asymptotic dis-
tribution is intractable. For the maximum score estimator, this problem is solved by
Horowitz (1992). His 'smoothed maximum score' estimator maximizes a smoothed
version of the sum of least absolute deviations. The same idea is applied by Melen-
berg and van Soest (1996a) to Lee's estimator in (5.10). See also the clear exposition in
Horowitz (1998). The smoothed maximum score estimator is given by
 i-MS,  io,..., lig = argmin ttly,-EK ((x;#-mr)/9) 1BMS,mo,·"'mg i=l r=0
where K is some smooth distribution function that is symmetric around zero and 0
is a bandwidth parameter that tends to zero with the sample size at a slow enough
rate. This estimator shares the asymptotic characteristics of the Horowitz (1992) esti-
mator: it is consistent and asymptotically normal.  The rate of convergence depends
on conditions on smoothness and properties of the kernel, but is always slower than
v*1. Horowitz (1998) and Melenberg and van Soest (1996a) show how the asymptotic
covariance matrix can be estimated.
In the application we use a Gaussian distribution function for K. Unfortunately,
there are no procedures for selecting the optimal bandwidth for this estimator. We
experimented with a broad range of bandwidth values and found that the estimation
results were similar for a large range of reasonable values. On the other hand, the es-
timates of the standard errors were more sensitive. Unfortunately, bootstrapped stan-
dard errors are not a feasible option here, since the numerical optimization routine to
obtain the estimates requires too much computer time.
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Partially Linear Model
In the more recent econometrics literature, partially linear models and generalized par-
tially linear models have become popular. These models relax the linear index assump-
tion on the conditional mean. Some regressors (xl) are allowed to enter in an arbitrary
not necessarily linear way, while others (x ), are assumed to enter linearly The stan-
dard partially linear model assumes
E(ylxl,X2) = g(Xl) + X 0 (5.11)
where g is an unknown continuous function. Robinson (1988) and Stock (1991) explain
how to estimate B and g, respectively. (5.11) immediately implies:
y - E(yixi) = (4 - Elx lx11)4 + €, with E(Elxl) = 0 (5.12)
The first estimation step is to replace the conditional expectations in (5.12) by their
nonparametric (kernel) regression estimates. The second step is to estimate # by OLS
on (5.12). This gives v'N consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of B. The
third  step  is to estimate g using a nonparametric regression  of  y -  x2   on  xi·    This
estimator has the same limiting distribution as a usual one step nonparametric regres-
Sion estimator, since the nonparametric rate of convergence is slower than the rate of
convergence of  .
For choosing the bandwidth, similar remarks apply as for the other semi-parametric
estimators. There is no theory on how to choose the bandwidth. Bandwidth choices
that are optimal for the non-parametric regressions are not necessarily optimal for esti-
mating B. Our experiments show that such bandwidth choices and bandwidth values
that are smaller lead to very similar results.
Generalized Partially Linear Models
Generalized partially linear models add a link function G to the partially linear model
in (5.11):
E(ylxl, x2) = G(g(xl) + 40) (5.13)
Horowitz (2001) discusses the case where G is unknown. To identify this model, a
sufficient number of continuous variables must be available. Given the limitations of
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the data with respect to continuous variables, however, we will only consider a special
case where G is known. In particular, we will generalize the ordered probit model
(5.1)-(5.3) as follows:
y; = g(xli) + x6,0 + Ui (5.14)
Yi=j     if    mj-1  <y;  <mj, j=0, - . . .1 0 (5.15)
Uilxi - N(0,02) (5.16)
Instead of relaxing the distributional assumptions on the error term as for the single
index models and the smoothed maximum score estimator, model (5.14)-(5.16) retains
the normality assumptions but does not impose that the systematic part is linear in xli·
The probabilities of the ordered outcomes are given by
P(yi = jIXi) = 0((g(xli) + X ·0 - mj)/9) - *((%(xi,) + x6,0 - mj-1)/0) (5.17)
The model can be estimated by the quasi maximum likelihood technique described
by Haerdle, Huet, Mammen and Sperlich (2001). The estimator is based upon the
algorithm of Severini and Staniswalis  (1994). The nonparametric part  (g(xi))  and the
parametric part (8  =  (0, mo,...,mg, 92)) are iteratively updated. For given 8, g(t) is
updated by maximizing a weighted likelihood based upon (5.17), giving weight to
observations i with xii close to t only: g(t) is the value of V that maximizes
N 10
E El[Yi = jl K((t - xii)/h)(*((4 + 44 -mi)19)- *(('1+ 42,4 - m,·-1)/9)) (5.18)
i=lj=0
Substituting this expression for g(t) in the likelihood gives a profile likelihood in
terms of 8. Maximizing this profile likelihood over 8 gives the estimates of 8 and g.5
Haerdle et al. (2001) show that the estimator for 8 is v/N consistent and asymptotically
normal and derive its asymptotic covariance matrix. To determine the limiting distri-
bution of the estimator of g, the fact that 0 is estimated can again be ignored, because
the non-parametric estimator has a slower rate of convergence than the estimator of 8.
We estimated the standard errors using a bootstrap procedure that takes the estimate
of 8 as fixed.
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Testing for Misspecification
To test some of the semi-parametric models, we will apply the consistent tests devel-
oped by Fan and Li (1996).6 These can be used to test both the semi-parametric partial
linear model and the semi-parametric single-index model. Consider first the semi-
parametric single-index model. Define g(x) = E(ylx). Consider the null hypothesis
Ho : g(x) = G(0'x), for some function G with domain and range the real line, against
the alternative that no G and B exist such that g(x) = G(0'x) for all x (or, to be precise,
almost sure in x). Define u=y- G(0'x). Then E(ulx) = 0 under Ho, while under Hi,
E(ulx)  0 0 forsome x (tobe precise, P(E(ulx) 4 0) > 0).
For positive weight functions wl (x) and w2 (x), it is easy to show (using the law of it-
erated expectations) that under Hi, E(uwl(x)E(uw2(x) Ix)) = E(wl(X)W2(x)(E(ulx))2)  >
0, while under Ho, E(uwl(x)E(uu,2(x)Ix)) = 0. Fan and Li (1996) use this to construct
a consistent test for Ho against Iii ·
Fan and Li use the weighting functions wl (x) = fi(24)12(x) and w2(x) - 12(x),
where h (x)  is the density of x'B and 92(x)  is the density of x.   This has the advan-
tage that low weight is given to observations in regions where data are sparse and
non-parametric estimates are inaccurate, and can thus be seen as some type of trim-
ming.  Fan and Li (1996, eq.  (14)) show, under some regularity conditions, that an
appropriately scaled estimator of E(ufi (x'B)E(uh (x'B) ix)12(x)) yields a test statistic
that asymptotically follows a standard normal distribution under Ho. Under Hi, the
probability that the test statistic exceeds the 5% critical value of the standard normal
distribution will tend to 1, leading to a one-sided consistent test.
The same idea is also applicable to the semi-parametric partial linear model, see
Fan and Li (1996, eq.  (11)).  In this case the consistent test is again asymptotically
N(0, 1)-distributed under the corresponding null hypothesis.
The asymptotic distributions of the Fan and Li (1996) are derived under the as-
sumption of continuously distributed regressors, while some of our regressors are dis-
crete. We will ignore this problem when we apply the tests in the next section. To
investigate whether this is a serious problem, we conducted a small simulation study
on the performance of the Fan and Li test in the case when not all regressors are contin-
uous. We sampled data from a standard (homoskedastic) ordered probit model with
three possible outcomes and from an ordered probit model with heteroskedasticity of
a (separate) single index type. The former satisfies the null that the model is a single
index model, the latter does not satisfy the null. We considered two sets of regressors:
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one with two continuous regressors, and the other with one continuous regressor and
one dummy variable. We estimated slope parameters of the (regression) single index
applying Ichimura's SIS-estimator, and tested subsequently for misspecification using
Fan and Li's approach.
In the Fan and Li test, two bandwidth parameters need to be chosen, one in the
non-parametric regression on 24 and the other in the non-parametric regression on
x.  The results appear to be insensitive for the choice of the first bandwidth but do
depend on the second one. We applied Silverman's a rule of thumb to choose the first
bandwidth (see Silverman, 1986), and varied the second bandwidth over a fine grid.
For each bandwidth choice we performed 100 simulations, with sample size 200, for
each of the four models described above.
Figure 5.1 presents the simulated rejection probabilities. For the two data generat-
ing processes that satisfy the null hypothesis, the type I error probability is close to the
nominal size of 5% for a large range of bandwidth values, suggesting that the perfor-
mance of the test is quite good, even in the case of one discrete regressor that does not
satisfy Fan and Li's regularity assumptions. For the two data generating processes that
do not satisfy the null, the rejection probability (i.e., the power against these specific
alternatives) is more sensitive to the chosen bandwidth, particularly for the case with
one discrete regresson The power is not systematically larger or smaller for any of
the two cases. We conclude that the test performs well in terms of similarity of actual
size and nominal size. On the other hand, the simulations reveal that, as long as there
is no theory on how to choose the bandwidth in some optimal way, it seems wise to
calculate the test under various bandwidth choices.
5.3   Data and Variables
The data are drawn from the fifteenth wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) Public use File, drawn in 1998. We have used the full sample, including
former East as well as former West Germany and including the refreshment sample
drawn in 1998. In each household, one person answers the household specific part of
the survey, usually the main earner. This person also reports total household net in-
come, the income measure we use in the empirical models. The dependent variable in
' our analysis is the answer by the same household representative to the question
How satisjied are you with your household income?
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Possible answers: 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very satisfied).
The total sample consists of 7,274 households. About 7% had a missing value on
one of the variables used in the analysis, usually after tax household income. Deleting
these gives a sample of 6,755 households that is used for the descriptive statistics and
for all the estimations. Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
analysis are provided in Table 5.1. About 26.5% of the sample consists of households
living in East Germany. Family size varies from 1 to 12, but only 6% of all households
consist  of  more  than four persons  and  only  1.8%  of  more  than five persons. Almost
26% are one person households.
Figure 5.2 presents the distribution of satisfaction with household income.  The
sample average is 6.03 but the dispersion is substantial. Figure 5.3 presents nonpara-
metric kernel density estimates7 of the distribution of log net household income by
family size. As expected, the larger families tend to have the higher incomes. The dif-
ference is particularly large between one and two person households, since the third
and fourth person in the household are typically children who do not contribute to
total household income.
Figure 5.4 presents nonparametric (Gaussian) kernel regressions8 of satisfaction
with income on log household income for the same family size categories that were
distinguished in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 gives the log income ranges in the data, i.e., the
ranges for which the curves are reasonably accurate. For given family size, satisfac-
tion rises with the level of income in the whole income range, except for some regions
where data are sparse and estimates are inaccurate. Moreover, for given income, sat-
isfaction falls with family size. This confirms that larger families need more income to
be as well off as smaller families.
Figure 5.4 also illustrates how equivalence scales can be determined in a nonpara-
metric setting. A reference satisfaction level has to be set a priori. In Figure 4, the
chosen level is represented by the horizontal line at satisfaction level 6.03, the sample
average. The intersection of this line with one of the curves gives the typicallog income
value needed for a family of given size to attain the average satisfaction level.  For a
one person household, this is log income level 7.60, for a two persons household it is
7.97. Thus, according to these nonparametric estimates, the equivalence scale for a two
person household compared to a single living person, is e7.97/e .60 = 1.45. Equivalence
scales for three and four persons households can be determined in a similar way. We
will discuss the results at the end of the next section and compare them to parametric
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and semi-parametric estimates.
In principle, standard errors on the non-parametric estimates of the equivalence
scales can be derived from the asymptotic distribution of the non-parametric estimates.
Since the equivalence scales are obtained by inverting the curves, it is not clear how
point-wise or uniform confidence bands on the curves could be used directly. Instead,
a bootstrapping procedure can be used.
The non-parametric equivalence scales rely on very weak assumptions and may
therefore not be very inaccurate. Moreover, they have the drawback that other vari-
ables which may affect satisfaction with income (and could be correlated to log income
and/or family size) are not taken into account. To control for these additional vari-
ables, we use the parametric and semi-parametric models in the previous section.
5.4 Results
The performance of some of the semi-parametric estimators may depend on the num-
ber of regressors included in the model. To investigate whether this is indeed the case,
we analyzed two different specifications. Both include log income, a dummy for East
Germany, and log age of the household respondent but the specifications differ in
the family composition variables. Specification 1 is kept as parsimonious as possible
and includes log family size only. Specification 2 includes separately the numbers of
children in various age groups.9 We focus on the second specification but we will com-
pare the equivalence scales according to this model with those according to the more
parsimonious model.
The estimation results for the second specification are presented in Table 5.3. The
magnitude of the parameter estimates is not comparable across models, since, due
to different link functions, the scale varies.  It is possible to compare signs and rela-
tive magnitudes, however. In some specifications, the coefficient of log income is nor-
malized to one and in some other specifications the relation between satisfaction with
income and income is non-parametric. In the remaining specifications, the log of self-
reported income has a strong and significant positive effect on the reported satisfaction
with income.
According to all estimates other than smoothed maximum score, East Germans are
Significantly less satisfied with a given income than West Germans with the same char-
acteristics. The reason may be that satisfaction not only depends on the current real
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income level but also on the change in purchasing power (cf. Clark and Oswald, 1996).
Due to price increases, real wages in East Germany have risen less than in West Ger-
many. Log age is always significantly positive, indicating that the older cohorts tend to
be more satisfied with a given income than the younger cohorts. In this cross-section
analysis, this may reflect a cohort as well as an age effect. Marital status does not
have any effect in the ordered response models and is no longer included in the other
models.
According to all estimates other than smoothed maximum score, keeping the in-
come level and other regressors constant, children and other adults in the household
reduce satisfaction with income, and increase the family's cost of living. The effects
are significant at the 5% level, except, for several models, for the youngest age group.
The effects are all significant at the 10% level. According to all except the smoothed
maximum score estimates, the effect of very young children is much smaller than the
effect of children in the older age groups. Moreover, costs of additional adults typically
exceed costs of children in all age groups. Only according to the generalized partially
linear model, adults and children between 13 and 17 have virtually the same effect.
The smoothed maximum score estimates do not look plausible. They imply in-
significantly negative costs of children in the age groups 6-12 and 13-17.  Such negative
effects do not make sense from an economic point of view It seems that the rich spec-
ification combined with the very weak conditional median assumption makes it very
hard in practice to estimate the parameters, in spite of the comparatively large size
of the sample. This is confirmed by the estimation results of the more parsimonious
specification 1 (not presented).  For this specification, the smoothed maximum score
estimates look much more plausible. They are also similar to those of other models,
with a significantly negative effect of log family size and significantly lower satisfac-
tion levels of East German households, ceteris paribus. 10
Figure 5.5 presents the estimated link function G for the semi-parametric least
squares estimates, together with 95% uniform confidence bounds. This function is
obtained by a non-parametric kernel regression of the dependent variable Y, on the
estimated index 0, SLS· The points (Yi, X; SLS) are plotted as well. The estimated link
function is monotonically increasing on almost the whole range of the index.
In the partially linear model and the generalized partially linear model, log income
enters in a non-parametric way. The estimated non-parametric functions of log in-
come (g(xl) in (5.11) and (5.14)) are presented in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 for the partially
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linear model and the generalized partially linear model, respectively. The figures also
include the estimates for specification 1, which are very similar to those for specifica-
tion 2. Figure 5.6 also presents uniform confidence bands for the estimated function
in specification 2. The figures show that satisfaction is monotonically rising with in-
come on almost the whole range of observed incomes. Although linearity is formally
rejected, the curves are not far from linear, particularly in the partially linear model
case.
The parametric ordered probit specification was tested against heteroskedasticity
and non-normality using the Lagrange Multiplier tests described in Chesher and Irish
(198D.  Results are presented in Table 5.2. The assumption that the error terms are
normal is rejected at any reasonable significance level. Moreover, there is evidence of
heteroskedasticity, suggesting that the variance of the error term varies with income
and the numbers of older children and adults. These results make looking at more
general parametric or semi-parametric models worthwhile, since the evidence of mis-
specification implies that ordered probit may lead to biased estimates of the parameter
estimates. On the other hand, how large this bias is and which sign it has can only
be investigated by looking at alternative estimates based upon less stringent model
assumptions.
Applying the Fan and Li (1996) test reveals that the estimated single index model
fits the data reasonably well. For most values of the bandwidth parameters, the null
hypothesis that the single index specification is correct cannot be rejected. Similar re-
sults are found for the partially linear regression model, so that the Fan and Li test
cannot determine which of the two models should be chosen. In discussing Figure 6,
we already showed that the linear model is rejected against the more general partially
linear model, since the estimated function g is non-linear in log income. Unfortunately,
the tools for testing the generalized partially linear specification are not yet available.
We conclude that specification tests show that the two simplest models (ordered probit
and linear regression model) are rejected, but are not able to choose among the semi-
parametric models.
Estimated equivalence scales according to both specification 1 and specification 2
are presented in Table 5.4. The single person household is chosen as the benchmark.
For the partially linear and generalized partially linear model, the equivalence scales
have been computed numerically, in the same way as for the non-parametric case, de-
scribed in the previous section. The benchmark satisfaction level is set equal to 6.03, the
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mean satisfaction level in the data. For given family size and mean values of the other
variables, the income required to attain the benchmark satisfaction level is computed
using the estimated function &(xl). The equivalence scales are computed as ratios of
required income levels at different values of family size. Standard errors for the par-
tially linear model are bootstrapped. Those for the generalized partially linear model
are bootstrapped as well, but taking the first step estimates as given, as explained in
the previous section. Even this is extremely time consuming so that only 50 bootstrap
replications could be used.11
For specification 1, most of the estimated equivalence scales are remarkably close
to each other and suggest that the cost of living for a couple are about 32% to 39%
higher than the cost of living for a single person. Only the fully non-parametric esti-
mate discussed in the previous section (cf. Figure 5.4) is substantially larger (45%). This
estimate cannot be directly compared to the other estimates since it does not control
for age of the household representative or for living in either East or West Germany.
A third person raises the household's cost of living by about 37% of the cost of living
of a couple according the non-parametric estimates and by about 18% to 22% accord-
ing to the single index models (ordered probit, SIS, smoothed maximum score and
linear model estimates). In the single index models, however, this percentage is di-
rectly linked to the cost of living index of a couple, due to the choice of functional form
with log family size and log income. This functional form also implies that additional
persons lead to lower relative cost increases. The generalized partially linear model
yields point estimates of the equivalence scales for two and three person households
that are similar to those in the partially linear model, but this model yields particularly
high estimates of the costs of a fourth person. Since, however, log family size enters
linearly and only log income enters in a more flexible way, this finding may be due to
the chosen benchmark level of income.
Standard errors in the partially linear model are much larger than the standard
errors in the single index model or in the linear model. The slower rate of convergence
of the nonparametric part seems to play a large role here. According to the standard
errors in Table 5.3, the parametric part is estimated with virtually the same accuracy in
linear and partially linear model. The bootstrapped standard errors on the equivalence
scales in the generalized partially linear model are somewhat smaller but of similar
order of magnitude as those in the partially linear model.
Table 5.4 also contains some equivalence scales according to the second specifica-
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tion. Since in this specification, the cost of a child or adult can vary with the age of
the person, we focus on singles and couples with one or zero children. The results are
in line with the estimates in Table 5.3. The smoothed maximum score estimates lead
to negative costs of children in the age groups 6-12 and 13-17 and thus do not make
economic sense. The non-parametric estimates are in some cases determined with very
little precision only, due to small number of observations with specific family compo-
sition. The other estimates are generally in line with the existing literature. They all
imply that the cost of a person increases with the person's age.12 The partially linear
model and the generalized partially linear model give somewhat higher equivalence
scales than the other models, but the differences are not very large and confidence in-
tervals overlap. The standard errors according to these models are larger than those
in the parametric models but much smaller than those of the fully non-parametric es-
timates. This illustrates once again that the semi-parametric assumptions help to in-
crease precision and avoid the curse of dimensionality, even though the dimension of
the non-parametric regression is limited by excluding the region and age variables.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have compared a number of parametric and semi-parametric es-
timators of the ordered response model. We have discussed theoretical and practical
features of the models and the estimators. Moreover, we have presented some con-
sistent ways of testing the underlying model assumptions against general forms of
mis-specification. These techniques were applied to estimating the determinants of
subjectively measured satisfaction with household income, with emphasis on comput-
ing household equivalence scales. This is a particularly attractive application for the
single index models, since the parameters of these identify only the ratios of the coef-
ficients, and this is exactly what the equivalence scales refer to.
We find that the specification tests are powerful enough to be of help to evaluate
the performance of the various models (to which we have applied these tests). On
the other hand, however, the equivalence scales that we find seem to be rather robust
for this mis-specification, in the sense that most models give rather similar scales. In
particular, this is the case for the estimators that do not depend on smoothness param-
eters or for which findings are robust for the choice of smoothness parameters. Among
the semi-parametric estimators, these are the semi-parametric least squares estimator
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of Ichimura (1993) and the estimator for the partially linear model taken from Robin-
son (1988) and Stock (1991). The estimator for the generalized partially linear model
recently developed by Haerdle et al. (2001) performs similarly well as far as we can
judge, but has the drawback that it requires an enormous amount of computer time.
As far as we know, we are the first to apply this estimator, and more refined program-
ming can solve a large part of this problem. We leave this for future work. Obtaining
more efficient estimates using a weighted version of Ichimura's SLS estimator is an-
other topic for future work.
The smoothed maximum score estimator is the other estimator that gives some con-
cem about robustness for choice of smoothness parameters and plausibility of the re-
sults. This estimator is consistent under weaker conditions than the other single in-
dex estimators, but it seems that this theoretical robustness property comes ate the
cost of inferior finite sample behavior. Developing methods for choosing appropriate
smoothness parameters remains an open issue. This also holds for the tests against
non-parametric alternatives that we have considered, since the result of these tests
often appears to vary with the smoothness parameters that are chosen.
Overall, we hope to have demonstrated that the applied researcher now has a num-
ber of semi-parametric alternatives to the standard parametric ordered probit model
and an increasingly large toolbox for testing parametric and semi-parametric assump-
tions against still more general, non-parametric, alternatives. We hope to have demon-
strated that some of these alternative estimators and tests are not only theoretically









Mean   Std. Dev Variable Description
Dummy East 0.265 0.441 1 if living in East Germany, 0 otherwise
Log(age) 3.778 0.360 Log of age of the household member
Log(famsize) 0.761 0.537 Log of the number of persons in the household
Log(income) 8.130 0.515 Log of the household income net (DM per month)
DMarried 0.603 0.489 1 if married or living together, 0 otherwise
NAge06 0.223 0.551 Number of children 0-5 years old
NAge712 0.214 0.525 Number of children 6-12 years old
NAge1317 0.165 0.451 Number of children 13-17 years old
NAdults 1.855 0.732 Number of household members age 18 or older
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 1999, 6755 observations
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of the sample
E
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Table 5.2: LM Specification Tests Ordered Probit
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Ordered Ichimura's Smoothed
Probit SIS Maximum Score
Coef. St.er. Coef.  St. en Coef. St. en
Constant -7.738 0.283   -   - 3.121 0.665
Dummy East -0.253 0.029 -0.193 0.021 -0.025 0.865
Log(age) 0.441 0.038 0.327 0.029 0.355 0.167
Log(income)  1.122 0.031   1   -   1    -
DMarried 0.044 0.034 0.036 0.025 0.004 0.185
NAge06 -0.044 0.025 -0.077 0.019 -0.024 0.078
NAge712 -0.156 0.026 -0.127 0.018 0.169 0.139
NAge1317 -0.179 0.028 -0.168 0.022 0.151 0.142
NAdults -0.311 0.023 -0.285 0.015 -0.259 0.102
Linear Partially Gen. Partially
Model (OLS) Linear Model Linear Model
Coef. St.er. Coef.  St. en Coef. St. er.
Constant -14.781 0.541              -             -
Dummy East     -0.502   0.058   -0.512    0.057 -0.304 0.029
Log(age) 0.852 0.077 0.859 0.077 0.239 0.013
Log(income) 2.268 0.059   -
NAge06 -0.096 0.051 -0.094 0.050 -0.053 0.023
NAge713 -0.301 0.050 -0.303 0.050 -0.104 0.025
NAge1317 -0.365 0.057 -0.362 0.057 -0.127 0.029
NAdults -0.612 0.045 -0.607 0.045 -0.128 0.017
Table 5.3: Estimation Results, Extended Specification
1u                                   0. Probit SLS S. Max. Score OLS PLM GPLM Nonpar°
4 Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
i      Specifcation 1
      1 Person                   1        - 1 -1-1-1-1 -1-
8       2 Persons 1.342 0.020 1.368 0.017 1.364 0.036 1.326 0.019 1.388 0.093 1.364 0.049 1.448 0.171
-4      3 Persons 1.593 0.037 1.644 0.033 1.636 0.068 1.564 0.036 1.688 0.102 1.636 0.084 1.981 0.248
..2       4 Persons 1.800 0.053 1.872 0.048 1.860 0.098 1.758 0.051 1.923 0.137 1.982 0.120 2.104 0.144U
Specification 2
Single + 1 ch. 0-6 1.032 0.022 1.080 0.021 1.025 0.080 1.033 0.051 1.059 0.084 1.104 0.062 1.807 0.331
Single + 1 ch. 7-12 1.143 0.026 1.135 0.021 0.845 0.117 1.135 0.056 1.173 0.106 1.228 0.091 1.980      0.701
Single + 1 ch. 13-17 1.169 0.030 1.182 0.026 0.860 0.123 1.169 0.067 1.207 0.079 1.299 0.079 2.129 0.417
Couple 1.302 0.020 1.283 0.027 1.290 0.117 1.286 0.029 1.352 0.073 1.299 0.066 1.446 0.758
Couple + 1 ch. 0-6 1.344 0.034 1.386 0.035 1.322 0.111 1.329 0.034 1.414 0.094 1.462 0.082 1.683 0.112
Couple + 1 ch. 7-12 1.488 0.040 1.457 0.036 1.090 0.119 1.460 0.038 1.561 0.100 1.555 0.088 2.079 0.149
Couple + 1 ch. 13-17   1.522   0.042   1.517   0.041   1.109    0.230    1.503   0.041   1.610   0.112   1.656   0.127   2.089   0.381
0 Model without Dummy East, DMarried, and Log(Age); cf Figure
Table 5.4: Equivalence Scales
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Notes
i An  exception  is the analysis of Pendakur (1998). Using a semi-parametric model estimated  on
Canadian expenditure data, he cannot reject independence of base utility.
20ther examples of estimators that require numerical optimization are the maximum rank correlation
estimator of Han (198D and the estimator of Klein and Sherman (2002). The latter is specifically designed
for the ordered response model and can also be used to estimate the thresholds mi, · · · , mg.
3In general, this estimator is not efficient. Ichimura (1993) mentions that efficiency can be improved
by choosing an appropriate weighting function W(x), using a two step procedure. We do not pursue
this in the current chapter.
4Here 1 []  is the indicator function.  1 [A]  =  1 if A is true and  1 [A]  = 0 if A is false.
5As in the ordered probit model, some normalizations are needed.
6Fan and Li (1996, p. 866-867) refer to several alternative tests, but argue that most of these have ad
hoc features such as sample splitting that probably makes them less powerful.
7See, for example, Silverman (1986) or Haerdle and Linton (1994)
8See, for example, Haerdle and Linton (1994)
9The twO models are non-nested since the first specification uses log family size rather than family
size.
10Another reason for differences between smoothed maximum score and the other estimates could be
the assumption of a zero conditional median instead of a zero conditional mean.  See the discussion in
section 2.
ilobtaining the estimates already took more than one week of computer time.
12For West Germany 1984-1991, Charlier (2002) finds costs of children of a similar order of magnitude
as we do. However, he finds much larger costs of a second adult in the household.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vier empirische studies die drie verschillende onderwerpen
behandelen. Twee studies hebben betrekking op de economische positie van immi-
granten en hun keuze om langer te blijven dan wel terug te keren naar het land van
herkomst.  In de derde studie wordt met behulp van een experiment geanalyseerd
in hoeverre individuen verschillen in de mate waarin ze vertrouwen hebben in an-
dere leden van de maatschappij en in de mate waarin ze het vertrouwen van anderen
waard blijken te zijn. De vierde studie gaat over de factoren die bepalen hoe tevreden
individuen en gezinnen zijn met hun inkomen.
Het eerste essay laat zien hoe empirische uitspraken kunnen worden gedaan over
het proces dat bepaalt hoe lang immigranten in het land blijven voordat ze terugk-
eren naar hun land van herkomst. Er wordt een model ontwikkeld waarin rekening
wordt gehouden met het probleem dat wanneer immigranten niet langer geobserveerd
worden in de steekproef, het onbekend is of dat is vanwege terugkeer naar het land
van herkomst of om een andere reden (zoals de gewone paneluitval die ook bij niet-
immigranten wordt waargenomen). Een belangrijke eigenschap van dit model en de
methode om het te analyseren is dat de toepassing relatief eenvoudig is en de resul-
taten niet gevoelig zijn voor de gemaakte statistische aannamen. In tegenstelling tot
andere methoden om dit probleem van ontbrekende informatie aan te pakken, laat het
voorgestelde model toe dat de beslissing om het gastland weer te verlaten afhangt van
eigenschappen van de immigranten die niet geobserveerd worden in de data, zoals
de motivatie en de productiviteit van de immigrant. Het model wordt toegepast op
paneldata van immigranten in Duitsland. De resultaten impliceren dat immigranten
die Duitsland weer verlaten hebben in Duitsland gemiddeld 18% minder zouden ver-
dienen dan degenen die zijn gebleven. Bovendien zouden degenen die weer zijn
vertrokken een 30% kleinere kans om te werken hebben gehad dan de immigranten
die nog in Duitsland zijn.
Het tweede essay analyseert de beslissing om het gastland weer te verlaten met
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een structureel model, waarin de preferenties van de immigranten voor consumptie en
werken en wonen in het gastland of het land van herkomst expliciet een rol spelen, eve-
nals de financiele beperkingen waarmee de immigranten te maken hebben. Het model
veronderstelt dat immigranten keuzes maken die het nut over hun hele levensloop
maximaliseren. Deze studie heeft twee belangrijke voordelen. Ten eerste wordt een di-
recte en intuYtief aantrekkelijke toets mogelijk gemaakt voor de empirische geldigheid
van diverse theorieen die verklaren waarom immigranten al dan niet teruggaan naar
het land van herkomst. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat de beslissingen van immigranten
niet alleen beinvloed worden door economische factoren, maar ook door hun eigen
gevoel over hoe goed ze zijn geintegreerd in het gastland en door de mate waarin hun
familie in het land van herkornst financieel afhankelijk van hen is.
Het tweede voordeel van het voorgestelde model in deze studie is dat het kan wor-
den gebruikt om het effect te analyseren van nieuwe potentiele beleidsmaatregelen
ten aanzien van immigranten en om een kosten baten analyse te kunnen uitvoeren.
De resultaten in dit opzicht zijn opzienbarend. Er wordt aangetoond dat pro-actief
beleid gericht op de verbetering van de economische integratie van immigranten van
grote invloed kan zijn op de beslissing om in het gastland te blijven van immigranten
die het economisch niet voor de wind gaat. In het bijzonder wordt gevonden dat de
mogelijkheid van een combinatie van werk en leren voor nieuwe immigranten of het
verbeteren van hun vaardigheid in de locale taal het verblijf in het gastland met een
flinke periode (zo'n 15 jaar) kan verlengen.
Het is in de economische wetenschap bekend dat er een sterk verband bestaat
tussen de mate van vertrouwen dat de leden van de maatschappij in elkaar hebben
en macro-economische groei. Het doel van de derde studie is een beter begrip te krij-
gen voor de factoren die bepalen of individuen meer of minder vertrouwen hebben in
hun medemensen. In het bijzonder wordt gekeken naar de effecten van leeftijd, oplei-
ding, en religie, omdat de verdeling van deze drie factoren in de bevolking flink kan
veranderen in de loop van enkele decennia. Er zijn tot nu toe in de literatuur twee mo-
gelijke benaderingen voor de analyse van dit probleem. De meest populaire benader-
ing gebruikt antwoorden op enquetevragen die direct een heterogene steekproef van
respondenten vragen naar hun vertrouwen in andere leden van de samenleving. Een
alternatieve aanpak gebruikt economische experimenten die de deelnemers (meestal
studenten) in een realistische situatie plaatsen waarin ze bepaalde beslissingen moeten
nemen. Uit hun beslissingen kan worden afgeleid in hoeverre ze vertrouwen hebben in
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anderen. De experimentele methode waarin de opvattingen van de respondenten wor-
den afgeleid uit geobserveerd feitelijk gedrag wordt door velen geprefereerd boven
de methode van enqu6tevragen, omdat velen denken dat individuen hun werkelijke
mening niet zullen prijsgeven. Een nadeel van bestaande experimenten is dat studen-
ten een homogene groep vormen die niet geschikt is om het belang van factoren als
leeftijd en opleiding te bestuderen.
In dit essay worden de voordelen van de enquetemethode met die van de exper-
imentele aanpak gecombineerd door een experiment te houden onder een represen-
tatieve steekproef van de Nederlandse bevolking. Een van de belangrijkste conclusies
is dat individuen in de leeftijdsgroepen die het minste vertrouwen in anderen hebben,
het in hen gestelde vertrouwen juist het meest waard blijken te zijn.  Dit is consistent
met een "verrassingseffect ": als mensen ouder worden verliezen ze het vertrouwen
in anderen en gaan ze geloven dat anderen hetzelfde doen. Als anderen dan toch
vertrouwen in hen blijken te hebben, komt dit als een aangename verrassing, die leidt
tot een actie waaruit blijkt dat zij het in hen gestelde vertrouwen waard zijn.
Het vierde en laatste essay kijkt naar het schatten van huishoud-equivalentieschalen,
ruwweg gedefinieerd als het extra inkomen dat aan een gezin met een bepaalde samen-
stelling gegeven moet worden om hetzelfde welvaartsniveau te bereiken als een ref-
erentiehuishouden. Equivalentieschalen zijn belangrijk voor overheidsbeleid op het
gebied van bijstandsuitkeringen, kinderbijslag, en armoedebestrijding, en worden ook
gebruikt om inkomensongelijkheid te analyseren over de tijd of tussen verschillende
landen. De nadruk in dit essay ligt op het schatten van de equivalentieschalen voor
Duitse huishoudens op basis van gegevens over tevredenheid met het gezinsinkomen.
Het essay gebruikt een scala van schattingstechnieken met statistische veronderstellin-
gen die minder zwaar zijn dan in meer traditionele methoden. De geschatte equiv-
alentieschalen blijken robuust te zijn voor de gebruikte schattingsmethode. Er wordt
gevonden dat de benodigde compensatie voor de kosten van een extra kind toeneemt
met het aantal kinderen voor de lage en middeninkomensgroepen, maar niet voor de
hoge inkomens.
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